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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
A.

The ABCO Case

Basically, this case involved a shareholder buyout dispute between two brothers,
Branson and Marvin. Branson and Marvin entered a buyout agreement on December 8,1999,
dividing their construction company known as ABCO, some farm property in Corinne, Utah,
the land upon which the ABCO offices were built, as well as other property interests which

-3-

attorney's fees for Branson. (R. 9790-91). The judge had previously retained authority to
award the amount of attorney's fees. (R.9771).
Branson filed a memorandum of costs and attorney's fees, seeking over $387,000 in
fees. Marvin filed a motion ofjudgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the issues of slander
of title, breach of fiduciary duty, and the erroneous checking of the box for attorney's fees.
The trial court granted Marvin's motion for JNOV and refused to award Branson any
attorney's fees on any of his claims. (R. 10563-70). In addition, the court found Branson's
award for contract breach as miniscule and certainly not a victory when compared to the total
damages Branson sought. (R. 10565); that Branson's claims were unmeritorious

(R.

10565fflf14 and 16); that Branson, unmeritoriously and unnecessarily, required Marvin to
participate in the litigation, to assert defenses, and to defend against Branson's claims. (R.
10565 ]f 17). Marvin's counterclaims at trial were primarily to defend against Branson's
aggressive action and so during the jury trial, Marvin only asked for one dollar ($1.00) in
damages for Branson's assault and one dollar ($1.00) in damages for Branson's breach of the
buyout contract. The jury awarded Marvin all the damages he sought. (R. 9792).
Branson has appealed only the JNOV decision and malicious prosecution summary
judgment. He has not appealed the trial court's refusal to award Branson's attorney's fees for
breach of contract or the jury's no damage award on slander of title or fiduciary duty claim.
(R. 11425-11426; Branson's Docketing Statement pgs. 3-5). It should also be noted that

-14-

condition precedent, agreement to agree and various other arguments. (Addendum Exhibit
M). These arguments consumed the majority of the lawsuit from October 29,2002 to Jan 9,
2007. The trial court acknowledged in motion practice and at a trial by jury, "the Plaintiff
failed to recover or succeed on the majority on his claims." (R. 11352). It must be noted, that
Marvin prevailed on 17 pre-trial claims to counter Branson's attempt to get around the
buyout contract. (R. 11210-212). Essentially, Branson's 16 causes of action were reduced to
breach of contract and slander of title. (R. 8707-8736).
3.

The court also found in its June 19, 2007 decision regarding attorney's fees,

that prior to trial most of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed. (Addendum Exhibit D, R. 10565
Tf 12). The court further found, "Plaintiffs claim to set aside the subject contract on grounds
of fraud consumed substantially all of the pre-litigation motions and was totally
unmeritorious." (Id. at ^}14). The court held in paragraph 17 that "Plaintiff unnecessarily
and unmeritoriously required Defendants to participate in the litigation, to assert defenses
and to defend against Plaintiffs claims at trial." (Id). (Emphasis added). The ABCO buyout
agreements allowed for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs, "whether an action
has been commenced or not, which may arise or accrue from enforcing any of the terms of
this agreement." (See ^ 9.11 and 9.H of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Partnership
Interest Agreement and Section 9.H of the Membership Interest Redemption Agreement. See
Trial Ex. 155,156 and 157). (Emphasis added). Those agreements allow for pre-trial motion

-20-

attorney's fees to successfully defend against a rescission claim and to properly enforce a
valid, binding contract where Branson seeks to void it for fraud. The court acknowledged
that Branson should not have evenfiledthis complaint against Marvin stating, "If I find fault
in this case, frankly it is the bringing of this action in the first case and prosecuting it." (R.
11483 pg. 7).
4.

Despite these findings made on June 19, 2007, on July 25, 2008, the court

inappropriately grouped Marvin's necessary defense of Branson's aggressive action together
with Branson's bad faith lawsuit at trial by generally finding, without pointing to any
specifics, that both brothers had an acrimonious relationship, distrust of each other to a tragic
break down of family relationships. (Addendum Exhibit B, R. 11352). The court
placed Marvin in the same cup as Branson and found that neither party prevailed. "Both
suffered irreparable loss and this court refuses to compound the loss by awarding fees to
either party." (M,R. 11353). Judge Low stated that Marvin's pre-trial attorney's fees and
costs, even though he prevailed on the majority of those motions would not be awarded for
the reasons above stated. {Id.). That is the sum total of the court's findings and they are
inadequate as a matter of law and insufficient to support the conclusion reached. In addition,
they are grossly mistaken regarding the attorney's fees incurred by Marvin Neff prior to trial
on enforcement of contract issues and avoiding Branson's attempt to rescind the contract.

-21 -

B.

Explanation of facts regarding attorney's fees on Manila Ranch.
5.

The attorney's fees for the Manila Ranch trial were based upon both contract

provisions and the trust documents as well as statutory provisions in the trust code. There is
no question that Branson misappropriated trust monies to his own private use, breached his
fiduciary duty to Marvin, misappropriated funds and failed to provide an appropriate
accounting or distribution to beneficiaries until Marvin actually forced the same with a
lawsuit. (R. 11484, pgs. 28, 30, 33, 55, 59, 60, 61, 117 and 155).
6.

Indeed the court found: "I think Marvin will prevail, unless there is something

astounding that you can show me." (Referring to Branson's attempt to offset.) (R. 11484,
pgs. 137-38). Branson never did show the court any offsets - so by implication, Marvin
prevailed on Manila Ranch.
7.

The trial court appropriately did not grant Branson any off-sets except for the

$8,999 jury verdict on breach of contract. (R. 11357). This left Branson owing Marvin a
substantial amount which Marvin still has never received and is forced to litigate just to
recover the same.
8.

When one analyzes the Manila Ranch case in isolation from the ABCO trial,

there is no question that Marvin prevailed, was the only party who prevailed, was awarded
what he sought, and had to incur substantial attorney's fees just to get that award. Even if
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insurance, life insurance, equipment and tools, or Marvin's improper deductions (see pg. 17
to 19 of Branson's Brief). These speculations must be treated as contract breach issues, not
fiduciary duty issues. (R.10188, ^f 1). The jury gave Branson $9,000 under his breach of
contract claim but zero under fiduciary duty. (Addendum Exhibit N, R. 10564-65).

V.

FACTS RELEVANT TO MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM
31.

On or about June 5,2000, Judge Ben Hadfield issued a protective order against

Branson that prohibited him from, among other things, "directly or indirectly contacting,
harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating" with Marvin. (Trial Ex. 168, Protective
Order, pg. 2). This was issued against Branson because Branson entered ABCO's offices
and verbally and physically attacked and harmed Marvin while Marvin was at work.
(Addendum Exhibit H, R. 7299-7301) (which is Branson's own version of the event at the
ABCO office). Branson also admitted in an apology letter to assaulting Marvin. (Trial Ex.
72). Branson's statement of fact on page 16, sentence 2 is therefore a misrepresentation of
the actual record.
32.

On or about January 26, 2005, Branson, in violation of the protective order

stopped his vehicle near Marvin's driveway and talked to Marvin. (Addendum Exhibit I,
R.7124).
33.

This discussion became heated and Branson drove off fast. (Id). Marvin

grabbed Branson's truck window to keep from sliding under Branson's truck wheels and
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recent trial date on this matter, the trial court, in an admitted attempt to "bring matters to
closure," hastily entered a Memorandum Decision on July 25,2008. While, concededly, the
time had come to bring matters to a closure, the July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision did not
provide Marvin a sufficient and accurate closure to the remaining matters in three areas:
first, Marvin's requests for attorney's fees on the pre-trial ABCO case and the Manila Ranch
case1; second, Marvin's entitlement to prejudgment interest through the date of the final
judgment; and, third, a clerical error made by the trial court in memorializing relief granted to
Marvin during a prior trial.
The contract between the parties provides that attorneys fees shall be paid by the
"prevailing party." In this case, evidence shows Marvin was the prevailing party in regards to
the ABCO pre-trial and Manila Ranch matters and, thus, was entitled to an award of
attorney's fees in both ABCO pre-trial motions and the bifurcated Manila Ranch case.
However, in the aforementioned July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision, the trial court simply
stated, "the only feasible and reasoned decision relative to attorney's fees is that neither party
prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss, and this Court refuses to compound the loss by
awarding fees to either party." This assertion was supported neither by findings of fact, nor
analysis of the "flexible and reasoned" factors. Additionally, the July 25,2008 Memorandum
Decision stated the trial court would consider nothing more, and, thus, precluded Marvin

1. Note, the trial court seemingly foreclosed either party from an award of attorney's fees on the breach of contract issues
entertained during the ABCO trial (even though Marvin was never given an opportunity to seek those fees) (R.l 1190), but
reserved Marvin's right to seek pre-trial motion fees on the ABCO case and Manila Ranch trial. (R. 11484 pgs. 137,140-154).
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ARGUMENT OF CROSS APPELLANT'S CLAIMS
I.

THE ISSUE OF MARVIN'S ATTORNEY'S FEES (REGARDING BOTH THE
ABCO PRE-TRIAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND MANILA RANCH TRIAL
ATTORNEY'S FEES) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

A.

The attorney's fees issues should be remanded to the trial court because the trial
court erred by not entering sufficientfindings of fact in support of its July 25,2008
Order that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney 'sfees.
The trial court erred by not entering sufficient findings of fact in support of its final

ruling that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. In Utah, an award of
attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d
226, 230 (Utah 1997). In exercising that discretion, however, a trial court must make
findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions. (Id.); Anderson v. Thompson,
2008 UT App 3,1| 42,176 P.3d 464; Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985); see
also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This enables an appellate court to determine if the trial court has
abused its discretion. Willey, 951 P.2d at 230. Without adequate findings of fact, there can
be no meaningful appellate review. (Id.); Anderson, 2008 UT App 3 at ^f 42.
Because it is not the role of an appellate court to find facts, an appellate court will
normally remand a matter to the trial court for further proceedings if it determines that the
findings of fact are insufficient to support the trial court's legal conclusions. Willey, 951
P.2d at 230; Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998). In this case, the trial court
failed to enter sufficient findings of fact in support of its final order that Marvin was not
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preservation) for the end of the proceedings.
After reviewing Marvin's pre-trial ABCO/ Aspen Springs written request for
attorney's fees, which was sufficient under Utah law, the trial court entered its July 25,2008
Memorandum Decision and summarily denied Marvin's requests altogether, both oral and
written. In that decision, the trial court stated that the "flexible and reasoned" approach was
appropriate under the facts of this case, but failed to enter proper findings of fact or otherwise
analyze the various factors involved in the "flexible and reasoned" analysis.
Under the flexible and reasoned approach (discussed in greater detail below), the court
must make specific findings of fact sufficient to lead the court to the conclusion of law as to
who, if anyone, is the "prevailing" or "successful" party. J. PochynokCo., Inc. v. Smedsrud,
2005 UT 39, f21, 116 P.3d 353. A successful party is one who successfully enforces or
defends against an action. EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 2008 UT App 284, \ 14, 192
P.3d 296. "Where it is not manifestly obvious which party was the "successful" one, courts
employ a flexible and reasoned approach to determine which party was victorious." {Id.)
"Under this approach, the trial court must consider, at a minimum, 'the significance of the net
judgment in the case [and] the amounts actually sought and ... recovered'". {Id.) It should
further consider and make findings on things such as contractual language; the number of
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc. brought by each party and their success on each of
these claims; the importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the

-38-

context of the lawsuit considered as a whole; and the dollar amounts attached to and awarded
in connection with the various claims. R. T. Nielson Company v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, % 25,40
P.3d 1119.
In its July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision (attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B),
the court made minimal or no findings of fact regarding the aforementioned "flexible and
reasoned approach factors" concerning either the ABCO/ Aspen Springs pre-trial request for
fees or the Manila Ranch trial attorney's fees issues. No findings of fact were made that lead
to the trial courts conclusion of law that "neither party prevailed." No findings of fact were
made as to why it was not manifestly obvious as to which party was successful. No findings
of fact were made showing that the trial court even considered the net judgment of the case in
comparison with the amounts actually sought and recovered by both parties.
Rather, the trial court simply stated that the "only feasible and reasoned decision
relative to attorney's fees is that neither party prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss, and
this Court refuses to compound the loss by awarding fees to either party." The trial court
then went on to say that its July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision "will constitute the final
order herein and any further relief is to be sought on appeal." These statements are
insufficient under the legal standard set forth above. In concluding that Marvin was not
entitled to an award of attorney's fees as requested, the trial court was under a legal
obligation to weigh the evidence presented, and thereafter enter detailed findings of fact that
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lumps attorney's fees into costs, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure § 54(d)(2), Marvin
should have been afforded five days after the entry of the Manila Ranch judgment to seek
costs, including the attorney's fees Marvin incurred in the Manila Ranch litigation.
Due to the procedural deficiencies of the trial court, Marvin was precluding from even
exercising his statutory and procedural right of seeking his reasonable costs which include
reasonable attorney's fees. Under the rules cited above Marvin is allowed to assert his
affidavit and memorandum seeking attorney's fees and costs at the conclusion of the entire
matter. The Manila Ranch trial was initially heard before the court on August 29,2007. The
court ruled in Marvin's favor awarding Marvin $27,865 plus prejudgment interest on a claim
that Branson did not properly administer the trust. However, the court left the judgment open
regarding Branson's offsets and statute of limitations arguments. Further, the court failed to
sign any of the proposed orders, findings of fact, or conclusions of law regarding the Manila
Ranch trial prior to its decision on the offset and statute of limitations issues.
Marvin's desire to seek an award of attorney's fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial
was made known to the court during this trial and the court told Marvin he could file for
attorney's fees. (See Addendum Exhibit B, pg. 5). Additionally, the court acknowledged
Marvin had reserved the right to seek an award of attorney's fees at the end of the
proceedings. (See November 6,2007 Memorandum Decision, Exhibit C). In reliance on this
reservation, during the eleven month span between the trial and the July 25, 2008 decision,
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Marvin's counsel prepared an affidavit and memorandum for attorney's fees in accordance
with the dictates of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 73, waiting to supplement and file it
after the decision was made as to the offsets and statute of limitations.
After eleven months of consideration, the court made its determination regarding the
remaining issues in the Manila Ranch trial (the offset and statute of limitations issues) in its
Memorandum Decision dated July 25, 2008. Rather than providing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and recognizing Marvin's reservation of the costs and attorney's fees
issues until after a decision was made on the offset and statute of limitation issues, the court
made a statement of frustration (deemed the court's "final order") attempting to "bring ...
matters to closure" and indicating neither party would be awarded attorney's fees in the final
judgment and no other motions or memorandum would be considered. See July 25, 2008
Memorandum Decision.
As a result, the court precluded further filings and never properly allowed Marvin to
claim, brief, or argue for costs/ attorney's fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial. The court
did not allow the benefit of the procedural rules, specifically, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 54(d)'s provision for five days after judgment to file for costs, which pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 75-7-1004 include reasonable attorney's fees.
Even if Rule 54(d), as applied in Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah
1998), does not provide a five day grace period with which to file a motion for the statutorily
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"Whether attorney['s] fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law to be
reviewed by appellate courts for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85,
f22,100 P.3d 1200. In Utah, attorney's fees are awardable only if provided for by statute or
contract and, if by contract, only as the contract allows by its terms. Mountain States
Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah App. 1989); Crowley v. Black,
2007 UT App 245, % 12, 167 P.3d 1087; A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy,
2004 UT 47 %/, 94 P. 3d 270. In observance of this rule, a trial court should grant
reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with a written contractual provision. Crowley, 2007
UT App. 245 at H 12 (Emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (2008). It is also important to note that in
cases where the various issues are inextricably tied together, Utah courts have awarded
attorney's fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may not have been incurred
solely on issues for which attorney's fees are customarily available. Brown v. David K.
Richards & Company, 1999 UT App 109, Tf 16-24, 978 P. 2d 470.
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, each of the buyout agreements at issue
clearly provided that the "prevailing party" was entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the
event of litigation. For purposes of this provision, the term "litigation" includes attempts by
one party to rescind the contract at issue. See Chase 2001 UT App. 404 at ^f 11-17. (holding
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compounded by the fact that the jury awarded Branson only $9,000 in damages despite his
claim for more than $879,000 (R. 10256) plus five times that for punitive damages
($4,395,000), plus an attorney fee claim.
By contrast, in connection with the ABCO trial, the jury ruled in favor of Marvin and
against Branson on Marvin's claims for breach of contract, assault and battery, breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. Although Marvin was only
awarded $2.00 in damages as a result of those verdicts, that amount was the full sum
requested by Marvin, and does not take into account the many forms of non-monetary relief
which Marvin received throughout the course of this extended litigation. Moreover, it was
the trial court's belief that "the jury could have found a whole lot more [damages in favor of
Marvin] had they been asked to. The evidence was certainly there..." (See April 16,2007
transcript, and July 25,2008 decision). Marvin was also the only party to receive a monetary
payout from the Manila Ranch trial. In any event, the Manila Ranch payout came about as
the result of Branson's wrongful conduct in his trustee or fiduciary capacity.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Marvin was the prevailing party in this matternot only on the contractual claims, but on the majority of other claims which were, as a
whole, inseparably related thereto. Branson's ultimate jury award of $9,000 does not take
into consideration the fact that nearly all of Branson's claims and causes of action were a
total failure; does not take into consideration the fact that most of the significant disputes
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and the slanderous statement must cause actual or special damages to the Plaintiff); Utah
Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1315
(D. Utah 1999) (Where the court explained that to prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty
claim, the Plaintiff "must demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as a result of the alleged
breach"). The real issue then, is whether attorney's fees incurred, without any other damages
proven, can support a claim for "special damages." The answer, based on case law, reason
and logic, is that attorney's fees, standing alone, without other special or general damages, do
not and cannot satisfy the damage element to make the claim viable.
For instance, in slander of title cases, the Plaintiff cannot prevail unless he alleges and
proves a pecuniary loss resulting from the act of the Defendant. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.,
208 P.2d 956, 958 (Utah 1949). Further, presumed or general damages are not sufficient to
support the claim. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,
1257 (Utah 1989). "Proof of special damages usually involves demonstrating a sale at a
reduced price or at greater expense to the seller." Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders,
Inc., 944 P.2d 361,364 (Utah 1997). Additionally, attorney's fees on slander of title are
limited to those employed to correct the slanderous statement itself rather than to obtain
compensation for the slander. Banberry, 780 P. 2d at 1258. In Banberry, as in this case, the
incorrect title recording was voluntarily corrected and thus attorney's fees could not serve as
the required damages on the slander of title action. As stated in Bass, Neither a judge or a
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jury can award gratuitous attorney's fees if the elements of the cause of action were not
proven. 761 P. 2d at 569. "It is the jury's duty to determine the amount of damages a plaintiff
in fact sustained, but it is up to the court to conform the jury's findings to applicable law."
Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, If 34, 89 P.3d 109.
Only those attorney's fees actually incurred to cure the defect, correct the recording or
place the property in Branson's name prior to the lawsuit were awardable, and then only if
actual damages existed. However, any attorney's fees incurred prior to Branson's lawsuit
were actually performed by Travis Bowen, who did not charge either brother. Moreover,
Branson himself could have voluntarily corrected the problem by signing his own corrective
deed. (R. 11487, pg. 503-504). Note, Branson has failed to show one bit of evidence about
the amount of attorney's fees he specifically incurred to correct the slander of title prior to
filing the lawsuit. As a matter of law, he failed to prove any special damages.
Nor can Branson show he must receive attorney's fees on his breach of fiduciary duty
claim. A successful breach of fiduciary duty claim requires damages to the Plaintiff,
proximately caused by that breach. See Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson,508 F.3d 277,
283 (5th Cir. 2007), Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959(11th Cir. 2009).
Utah courts have consistently held that a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim requires a
showing of actual damages before attorney's fees can be awarded. Free Motion Fitness, Inc.
v. Wells Fargo Bank West, NA, 2009 UT App. 120, If 28, 208 P. 3d 1066. In Free Motion
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Fitness the Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees without a showing of damages, and
the court ruled that Plaintiffs could not prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. (Id.); See
also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) ("When a Plaintiff only recovers nominal
damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief,
\ . .the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all'").
The Federal District Court of Utah faced a similar issue in Utah Medical Products,
Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Incf where the Court held the Plaintiff, "must
demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as a result from the alleged breach." 79 F. Supp.
2d at 1315. The Court also explained that, "the fact of damages is an essential element of
[the]... cause of action that must be substantiated." (Id.) In other words, "because damage is
an essential element for a claim for breach of fiduciary duty," a claim without damages "fails
as a matter of law." (Id.)

C.

There are other reasons that JNO V was properly granted as a matter of law.
The trial court's decision is also justified by other valid reasons that defeated

Branson's claim for slander of title or fiduciary duty. For instance, slander of title requires
the statement to have been made with malice. The court in Banberry noted a "difference
between poor performance and malice." 780 P.2d at 1257. In Banberry, the mistake arose
when the bank made a clerical error in copying a verbatim description in the recorded Deed
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C.

Summaryjudgment was proper because the prosecution was initiated with a proper
purpose: to bring an offender to justice.
The third element of a malicious prosecution is improper purpose. In Hodges, the

accusers had an improper purpose because they used the threat of criminal prosecution as
leverage to force the accused to pay money that was missing. 811 P.2d at 161. Conversely, an
employee who initiated prosecution "for the legitimate purpose of protecting company
property" was not malicious. Agler v. Scheidle, 2006 UT App 495, \1. In affirming the trial
court's granting of summary judgment against a malicious prosecution claim, the Agler court
noted that "the record is void of any evidence beyond Plaintiffs speculation" of an improper
purpose. {Id.)
Unlike Hodges, Marvin did not use the criminal justice process to force Branson to
pay money or for any other improper purpose. He only asked for $ 1.00 for the assault. As in
Agler, the trial court in this case explained that "the record is void of any evidence beyond
[Branson's] speculation that [Marvin] initiated the prosecution allegations for any wrongful
or improper motive." (R. 8722). This includes the neighbor's affidavit, which "is neither
conclusive of actual innocence (of Branson) nor is it sufficient proof of malice (by Marvin)."
(R. 8722). Thus, Branson failed to present any genuine dispute as to the third element.
As shown above, Branson did not obtain a favorable outcome. Rather, he pled guilty
to two criminal charges and the other was deferred until the civil trial which also found
assault. Even if Branson could satisfy one of the elements, the absence of any one of the four
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contracts broadly so as to award attorney's fees on appeal where a statute or contract initially
authorizes them.

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305, 319 (Utah 1998); see also

Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P. C. v. Pugh, 2006 UT App 68, U 12 (quoting R&R
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc. 936 P. 2d 1068,1081 "where party entitled to attorney
fees below prevails on appeal, attorney fee award on appeal is proper"). On these grounds
Marvin is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees and costs he has incurred in relation to
this appeal.

CONCLUSION
I.

CROSS APPELLANT BRIEF

For the foregoing reasons, Marvin respectfully requests that this case be remanded so
the trial court can enter an award for Marvin's attorney's fees and costs on the ABCO pretrial motion practice and Manila Ranch trial in this matter, that it sua spontae Marvin be
awarded prejudgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum through July 25,
2008 on all amounts granted to him in connection with the Manila Ranch trial, and that the
trial court's final order in this matter be corrected as set forth herein to reflect that the total
principal amount of Marvin's award from the Manila Ranch trial is $27,865 principal and
$ 17,968.42 in pre-judgment interest, less $8,999 due Branson, for total final judgment due of
$36,834.42. Marvin also respectfully requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs in
connection with Branson's appeal and this cross-appeal.
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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
For purpose of clarity and except as otherwise stated, the Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
Branson G. Neff, shall be referred to herein as "Branson." The Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
Marvin G. Neff, shall be referred to herein as "Marvin."

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Branson appropriately cited the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

CROSS APPEAL BRIEF
Marvin submits the following issues for appeal:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Marvin's request for attorney's fees

regarding the ABCO/ Aspen Springs pretrial issues and the Manila Ranch trial issues, due to
the trial court's failure to make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that
neither party is entitled to attorney's fees, and due to the fact that the trial court did not honor
Marvin's procedural and statutory rights to seek attorney's fees? Standard of Review: Abuse
of discretion regarding the question of "Prevailing Party;" but on the issue of whether fees
are recoverable, it is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Willey v. Willey, 951
P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997); R. T. Nielsen Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ^16, 40 P.3d 1119.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to amend the Manila Ranch Order to
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include prejudgment interest at ten percent from August 29,2007 untilfinaljudgment on July
25, 2008? Standard of Review: Correctness. Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19,111, 155
P.3d917.
3.

Whether the trial court erred and made a clerical mistake when it rendered its

final order effective July 25,2008 by overlooking the amount previously awarded in the trial
involving Manila Ranch by omitting the undisputed sum of $7,548 in principal with an
appropriate award of prejudgment interest thereon? Standard of Review:

Correctness.

Frito-Lay v. Labor Commission, 2008 UT App 314, 193 P.3d 665.

II.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
1.

Did the trial court correctly grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the

breach of fiduciary duty and slander of title claims when the jury held there were no damages
and damages are a necessary element before attorney's fees can be awarded, and yet the jury
improperly marked the attorney fee section on the verdict form?
2.

Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment against Branson's

malicious prosecution claim where Branson failed to present a prima facie case or
demonstrate material disputes of fact on each of the four necessary elements?
Branson stated the proper standard of review for these two issues as "correctness."

-2-

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah R. App P. 33 (2008). See Addendum.

2.

Utah R. App P. 34 (2008). See Addendum.

3.

Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) (2008). See Addendum.

4.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (2008). See Addendum.

5.

Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (2008). See Addendum.

6.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (2008). See Addendum.

7.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) (2008). See Addendum.

8.

Utah R. Civ. P. 73 (2008). See Addendum.

9.

Utah R. Evid. 101 (2008). See Addendum.

10.

Utah R. Evid. 606(b) (2008). See Addendum.

11.

UTAH CODE ANN. §75-7 1004 (2004). See Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
A.

The ABCO Case

Basically, this case involved a shareholder buyout dispute between two brothers,
Branson and Marvin. Branson and Marvin entered a buyout agreement on December 8,1999,
dividing their construction company known as ABCO, some farm property in Corinne, Utah,
the land upon which the ABCO offices were built, as well as other property interests which
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the brothers jointly held including Farr West and Lincoln property. (Trial Ex. 43 as
Addendum Exhibit E). Branson was to receive the farm property, over $282,000 in
installment payments and various other payments, in the buyout. (Id). Marvin was to receive
ABCO and all of ABCO's assets, debts, inventory and equipment, as well as the land
surrounding the ABCO offices and Farr West and Lincoln. (Trial Ex. 43). Attorney Travis
Bowen was engaged to draft all of the documents for this buyout including various stock
redemption agreements, partnership interest redemption agreements, membership interest
redemption agreements and the necessary real estate deeds to accomplish this division of
interests. (Trial Ex. 155 and 156). The documents were signed and executed by the brothers.
Sometime in June 2000, Branson became frustrated with the terms and conditions and
sought to rescind or set aside the buyout agreement and litigate or re-negotiate all of the
terms, which terms he claimed included the division of Aspen Springs Storage Units ("Aspen
Springs"). Aspen Springs was a totally separate entity owned by Marvin individually and
built in 1993. (Trial Ex. 4 as Addendum Exhibit G). The parties tried to resolve the
problems, using attorneys Bowen and Ben Hathaway. Branson filed suit on October 29,
2002 claiming sixteen (16) causes of action against Marvin and Travis Bowen. (R. 1-32).
Branson stated to Mike Gale he was "jealous ABCO was still doing well without
him...he wanted ABCO to go broke." (R. 7330 to 7335 ^ 12). Branson was upset about
Marvin obtaining a protective order against him, for Marvin not paying Branson earlier (Trial
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Ex. 4), particularly since Branson lost over $210,000 in the stock market. (R. 11487 pg. 384).
Branson seemed determined to destroy ABCO and Marvin, even threatened to kill Marvin
with his 9 millimeter handgun. (R. 11486 pgs. 204-207).
Marvin countered claiming that the buyout agreement could not be rescinded or set
aside for fraud, but enforceable and that all of Branson's claims outside of the buyout
agreement were barred by the statute of limitations or doctrines of merger, acceptance,
ratification, parol evidence and so forth. (R. 132-152).
The majority of Branson's claims in the ABCO proceedings were dismissed or were
resolved prior to trial through summary judgment. The remaining issues for trial were
enforcement of the buyout agreement, whether there had been a breach of said contract, and
whether anyone's title had been slandered. (R. 8707-8736). Both brothers sought damages
for breach of contract and other matters. Branson sought a minimum of $879,959, plus
punitive damages and attorney fees while Marvin only requested $1.00 or nominal damages
and attorney's fees. (R. 10256). Branson was awarded $9,001 and Marvin was awarded $2.00
by the jury. (R. 10563-10570). Thereafter, Branson sought attorney's fees and was awarded
none. (Id). Marvin sought all ABCO pre-trial motion attorney's fees and was denied the
same.(R. 11349-11358).
B.

The Manila Ranch Case

Marvin also filed an Amended Counterclaim for damages on a separate issue
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involving property known as the Manila Ranch; which was a jointly owned ranch inherited
from the brothers' father through a family trust, and which required the property to be
divided equally between Marvin and Branson. (Manila Trial Ex. 1 and 2). The brothers'
father died in July of 1994, but the trust estate had never been formally closed. Branson
administered the trust but had never supplied an accounting, report, or proper distributions
for closing to Marvin. The Ranch received income from cattle sales and oil royalties from
1994 until July of 2000. The Ranch land was sold to Pallesens for $240,000. (Manila Trial
Ex. 7, 5 and 25). Pallesens had made a $120,000 down payment and were to pay the
remaining $120,000 in yearly installment payments of $13,903.28. {Id). Branson did not
properly distribute the profit or income from this property to Marvin, and so Marvin added a
cause of action by amending his counterclaim on February 10, 2005. (R. 1605-1623).
Branson's answer denied any wrong doing, claimed the Ranch never had any profits to
distribute, and even if Marvin deserved a share, Branson was entitled to offset money on the
buyout which Branson claimed. (R. 5225-5229).
In the Manila Ranch proceedings, Marvin asked for damages of approximately
$31,000 plus one-half (14) of a $100,000 payoff, or $50,000; all of which was held in escrow.
Marvin also was entitled to interest at 10% per annum from the date that funds should have
been paid. (Manila Ranch Trial Ex. 29 and 30). On August 29, 2007, Marvin was awarded
$27,865 in principal plus 10% interest. Marvin reserved a claim for attorney's fees, but the
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trial judge failed to award fees. Additionally, the judgment contains a clerical error of $7,548
in principal. (R. 11349-11358).

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The ABCO/Aspen Springs proceedings and Manila Ranch proceedings were at first

part of the whole matter, but just prior to the ABCO trial, the Manila Ranch claims were
bifurcated for separate trials.
A.

ABCO Proceedings

Branson brought a lawsuit in Salt Lake County against Marvin on October 29, 2002
seeking over $5,304,070 in damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees. (R. 1-32; R.
8581-8584) (Note, this did not include the additional claim for damages against Aspen
Springs for over $1,600,000). Branson's complaint also included a cause of action against
Travis Bowen. (Id). The initial complaint was thirty-two pages long with sixteen different
causes of action. (R. 1-32).
Marvin immediately requested the Court to change venue, since the bulk of the real
estate was in Box Elder County and the contract signed there. Marvin's motion to change
venue from Salt Lake County to Box Elder County was granted on February 14, 2003. (R.
290-292; 307-308). Branson filed a motion for accounting by a Special Master and various
other motions. Marvin filed a motion for summary judgment on May 5, 2003 to limit
Branson's aggressive litigation to purely breach of contract issues and enforcement of the
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buyout agreement. (R. 369-370). Branson argued that Marvin had committed fraud so the
agreement was void and asked the court to first let the Special Master review all of the
ABCO books and records including the construction records on Aspen Springs and all
farm/Westco records before making any decisions. (R. 557-653). The court, out of caution
and pursuant to Rule 56(f), hired a court appointed accountant, Dan James and Associates, to
conduct a full audit and review of the books and records and ordered discovery to take place
before the summary judgment motion would be heard. (R.699-701).
During this discovery process it became clear that several of Branson's causes of
action should be barred by the statute of limitations. Marvin filed a motion to dismiss or in
the alternative for summary judgment under the statute of limitations on February 2, 2004.
(R.809-810). This motion sought to eliminate the Aspen Springs lost corporate opportunity
claim, and other fraud claims so as to avoid needless litigation and discovery on barred
claims. Branson filed a Rule 56(f) motion to stay the proceedings until more discovery was
obtained. (R. 842-846). The court granted the stay until further discovery was completed.
In the meantime, Marvin was successful in obtaining a discovery protective order over
his personal finances and was also successful in obtaining a release of the lis pendens which
Branson had recorded against four acres surrounding Marvin's home. (See R. 1219-1220;
R. 1320-1322). The court then ordered mediation.
The parties attended mediation with Paul Felt but the mediation was unsuccessful,
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except that Marvin released Travis Bowen from his counterclaim since there appeared no
evidence that would hold Travis Bowen liable. Branson, however, continued to proceed
against Travis Bowen.
Branson also filed motions to release escrow funds from the court and to obtain
certain farm equipment. (R. 1776-78). The court denied Branson's request to remove
escrow funds, found it improper that Branson was trying to rescind the contract and yet trying
to enforce a provision regarding equipment transfer under the contract, but still ordered
Marvin to turn over said equipment "as is." (R.2134-2135).
Marvin, on September 15, 2005 renewed his request for summary judgment on the
statute of limitations because Dan James and Associates had finally completed their
accounting and audit, which showed no wrong doing. (R. 2022). Branson filed a motion for
partial summary judgment alleging that the parties buyout agreement or property settlement
was void for fraud or was merely an agreement to agree and non-enforceable. (R. 21442145). Marvin also filed a motion for summary judgment on October 19, 2005 regarding
Branson's retirement benefits or salary continuation agreement (R.2418-2419); and on
November 22, 2005, again renewed his request that the court decide the partial summary
judgment on the statute of limitations. (R.2582). Marvin also filed a Motion in Limine on
December 12, 2005 to exclude all prior inconsistent statements regarding the buyout
agreement and for partial summary judgment to enforce the contract based on the doctrine of
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merger and integration of contracts. (R. 3218).
It was not until December 15, 2005 that the court finally, after allowing Branson to
conduct extensive discovery, issued a ruling on some of the motions. The court partially
granted a dismissal according to the statue of limitations defense, holding that Branson could
not assert any separate claim against Aspen Springs during phase one of construction because
Branson was aware of underlying facts prior to 1995. The court held that Branson could
have discovered said facts and therefore granted the motion. (R. 3688). However, phase two
and three of Aspen Springs construction after 1995 remained in dispute, so this was still
pursued by Branson. Branson, in January of 2006, filed a motion to reconsider the court's
decision regarding the statute of limitations. (R. 4506).
The court granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
salary continuation on March 13,2006. (R. 5367-5371). However, the court denied Marvin's
motion to hold the buyout contract valid and binding on the grounds that material issues of
fact were still present. The court recognized that the buyout contract may be a valid and
binding contract, but deferred the decision based on disputed facts. (R. 5398). A week later,
the court denied Marvin's motion to find the contract fully integrated at that time. The court
stated that Marvin could renew the motion prior to trial to limit the evidence. (See Decision
dated March 21, 2006, R.5398). On March 31, 2006 the court clarified the ruling regarding
the statute of limitations and denied Branson's claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
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regarding Aspen Springs and any fraud or breach of fiduciary duty claim regarding the
disproportional payments among the parties' children prior to April 1999. (See R. 5502).
On March 12,2006 Marvin filed a motion to reconsider the denial of Marvin's motion
to limit the evidence regarding the contracts and to find the contract binding on the parties.
(R. 5565). Branson likewise filed a supplemental motion to hold that the contract was merely
an "agreement to agree" based on new evidence. (R. 5601). Oral argument was held on May
11, 2006 regarding the various outstanding motions and issues. (R. 5753). Branson was
ordered to submit a brief showing he had prima facie evidence for punitive damages against
Marvin and Travis Bowen. (R. 5785). On July 7, 2006 the court issued a Memorandum
Decision regarding partial summary judgment reversing its March 21, 2006 Memorandum
Decision by stating that the contract was a valid contract which could not be set aside as
merely an "agreement to agree," but there were still issues regarding the contract that needed
to be resolved by trial unless settled. (R. 6115 -6121).
Travis Bowen then filed a motion for summary judgment to release him from the
lawsuit. (R. 6251, 6432). Marvin filed a motion to reconsider his motion to limit certain
evidence and find that Branson had elected his remedy under a contract breach claim and was
bound thereby. Branson filed a motion to keep Marvin's expert witness Jeff Thorne from
testifying regarding the contract. On October 27,2006, the judge ruled that Marvin's expert
Jeff Thorne could testify for Marvin thus denying Branson's motion to exclude him. (R.8468-
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8470). On November 15,2006, the court dismissed Travis Bowen as a party, indicating that
Branson could not show any damages and further held that Branson would not be allowed to
bring any punitive damage claims at the trial, except for possibly on slander of title or breach
of fiduciary duty. (R. 8520-8530).
Marvin then filed a motion to completely deny Branson's claim to Aspen Springs or
any other disproportionate payments, and to bar Branson's attempt to value ABCO's worth.
Because of the confusion created by the numerous orders and the scope of said orders,
Marvin asked for clarification on the previous statute of limitations ruling; particularly on
phase two and three of Aspen Springs and Branson's allegations of fraud. Marvin also asked
for a partial summary judgment regarding the malicious prosecution claim and other slander
of title claims by Branson. (R. 7089). Marvin, on August 25, 2006 asked for summary
judgment on breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment and fraudulent nondisclosure claims. (R. 7218 dated August 25, 2006). Branson sought to introduce at trial
various appraisals he had obtained regarding the value of Aspen Springs, Farr West, Lincoln,
and the farm using values in year 2006. Marvin renewed his request that the court decide,
prior to trial, whether this contract was fully integrated or partially integrated and whether
Branson had waived his right to rescind that contract as a matter of law. (R. 8196).
All of the above motions were filed to limit Branson's claims to breach of contract
and to stop Branson from rescinding or voiding the contract.
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Finally, on January 9,2007, after nearly four and one-half (4 Vi) years of litigation, the
court issued its Memorandum Decision regarding all of the pre-trial motions for summary
judgment and other various motions; which essentially eliminated Branson's breach of
fiduciary duty claim, fraud claim, fraudulent concealment claim, fraudulent non-disclosure
claims, malicious prosecution claim, severely limited the slander of title claim, held that the
contract was a binding contract and was fully integrated in parts and partially integrated in
others, foreclosed Branson from seeking any remedies against Aspen Springs or
disproportionate payments and excluded Branson from bringing any appraised values on
ABCO, Aspen Springs, Farr West, Lincoln or other properties using data obtained after
December 13,1999, and treated any breach of fiduciary duty claim after December 8,1999 in
winding up the parties division of property as "akin to breach of contract." (R.8707-8736).
Branson, in the ABCO trial, sought in excess of $879,000 in damages plus five (5)
times this sum for punitive damages ($4,395,000) plus attorney's fees on his remaining
claims. (R. 8585-8587; 10256). The jury returned a verdict of no damages for breach of good
faith, no damages for slander of title, no damages for breach of fiduciary duty, $9,000 in
damages for breach of contract, and zero damages for Branson's request for retirement or
salary continuation, which resulted in no punitive damages. (R. 9788 to 9795). The jury, in
the special verdict form on slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty, because no damages
had been awarded, erroneously checked a box that the trial judge should consider an award of
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attorney's fees for Branson. (R. 9790-91). The judge had previously retained authority to
award the amount of attorney's fees. (R.9771).
Branson filed a memorandum of costs and attorney's fees, seeking over $387,000 in
fees. Marvin filed a motion ofjudgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the issues of slander
of title, breach of fiduciary duty, and the erroneous checking of the box for attorney's fees.
The trial court granted Marvin's motion for JNOV and refused to award Branson any
attorney's fees on any of his claims. (R. 10563-70). In addition, the court found Branson's
award for contract breach as miniscule and certainly not a victory when compared to the total
damages Branson sought. (R. 10565 f 2); that Branson's claims were unmeritorious (R.
10565fflf14 and 16); that Branson, unmeritoriously and unnecessarily, required Marvin to
participate in the litigation, to assert defenses, and to defend against Branson's claims. (R.
10565 f 17). Marvin's counterclaims at trial were primarily to defend against Branson's
aggressive action and so during the jury trial, Marvin only asked for one dollar ($1.00) in
damages for Branson's assault and one dollar ($1.00) in damages for Branson's breach of the
buyout contract. The jury awarded Marvin all the damages he sought. (R. 9792).
Branson has appealed only the JNOV decision and malicious prosecution summary
judgment. He has not appealed the trial court's refusal to award Branson's attorney's fees for
breach of contract or the jury's no damage award on slander of title or fiduciary duty claim.
(R. 11425-11426; Branson's Docketing Statement pgs. 3-5). It should also be noted that
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Branson has not marshaled the evidence on appeal, has not presented all evidence that
supports why the trial court granted Marvin's JNOV motion or his motion for partial
summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, Marvin has filed a
motion for summary disposition of Branson's appeal.

B.

Manila Ranch Trial Proceedings

As previously stated, Branson administered his father's trust from July 1994 until well
into 2005.
Marvin learned that Branson, acting as trustee, had failed to distribute the trust assets
properly under a 50/50 division so he amended his counterclaim and sought recovery. (R.
1605-1623).
Depositions and discovery were taken regarding Manila Ranch of Branson and
attorney Dale Dorius, and bank records were produced, as well as information from the
Ranch purchasers, the Pallesens.
The parties approved a stipulated order regarding interpleader of the $100,000 payoff
of the Manila Ranch sale, entered on May 31, 2005, wherein the court received in escrow
approximately $99,696.62. (R. 1774). These funds were placed in an interest bearing
account. (Id). Branson sought to release these funds from escrow on June 22,2005. (R. 17761777).
The court also entered an order denying Branson's request to withdraw the interplead
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funds unless a proper bond was posted. (R. 2574-2575). Branson tried to modify the above
order and his request was denied. (See R. 6034-6048) The funds are still being held in an
interest bearing account to this day.
The Manila Ranch case, as indicated, was bifurcated and set for a separate four (4)
day bench trial (See Notice March 27, 2007, R. 10282-10284).
Branson filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the Manila Ranch claims on
August 9, 2007, approximately 20 days prior to the trial. (R. 10653-10713). Marvin filed a
trial brief on August 16, 2007 as well as his own cross motion for summary judgment. (R.
10788-10790).
The bench trial started on August 29,2007 and the court conducted the hearing more
like an argument for summary judgment with proffers of evidence since several of the facts
were undisputed. The trial lasted one day with Branson stipulating that he owed Marvin
$27,865 in principal plus 10% interest from the appropriate dates. (See R. 11484 pgs. 28,30,
33, 51, 55, 59, 60, 61, 117 and 155). Marvin submitted his own order regarding the Manila
Ranch trial showing the exact same principal due, as Branson, but calculating the interest at
10% from the dates the court ordered, which would amount to interest of $15,181.92 to
August 29,2007. {Id; R.10930; 10932-10935). The parties argued about interest, (R.10980),
with Branson seeking interest from inappropriate dates. (R. 10981. See also R. 10999 which

-16-

were the principal calculations written from the chart at trial showing the amount of principal
due).
The court never made a decision regarding this matter, and Branson next filed a
memorandum for off-sets, seeking off-sets totaling more than the Manila Ranch award. (See
R. 11004-11012). Marvin argued that Branson was not entitled to any off-set, since all offsets were decided on the merits prior to the ABCO trial or during ABCO's trial. (R.l 107511091).
Subsequently, Judge Low retired from the case, but Chief Judge Thomas L. Willmore
asked Judge Low to please finish up the case.
In the meantime, Marvin filed a memorandum of points and authorities for his costs
and attorney's fees incurred in the pre-trial actions on the ABCO case. (R. 11208). These
fees had been reserved to be requested until after the final order. Marvin asked for a decision
on the ABCO pre-trial attorney's fees in November 2007. (See R.l 1338).
Finally, after the file seemed to sit inactive for a significant length of time, on July 25,
2008 a final order was entered by the court on both ABCO and Manila Ranch. In the order
the court stated that any further relief was to be sought on appeal. (R.l 1349-11357). That
order failed to grant Marvin $7,548 in principal previously awarded. The court previously, on
August 29, 2007 had awarded Marvin $7,548. (R. 11484 pgs. 117 and 155). The court also
had awarded interest at 10% thereon from March 24,2003 to August 29,2007 or $3,268.28;
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for a total amount left out of the final order of over $10,816.28. This was purely a clerical
error. The court did not award Branson any off-sets (other than the $8,999 the jury had
already granted to Branson) and denied Branson's off-set claims. (R. 11357).
The court basically overlooked Marvin's attorney fee request on all pre-trial ABCO
contract enforcement; did not even allow Marvin the right to seek attorney's fees on the
Manila Ranch trial; and, ignored all subsequent motions thereafter to correct the judgment.
(R. 11357). Both parties filed notices of appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As stated above, Branson has failed to satisfy his marshaling requirement on appeal
and Marvin now is forced to spend more time, energy, and attorney's fees to list facts that
support the trial court's decision. (See Marvin's separate motion to strike Branson's
misleading facts and for failure to marshal the evidence).

I.

FACTS RELEVANT TO MARVIN'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

A.

Explanation of facts regarding requestfor attorney ysfees on allpre-trial motions to
oppose Branson ys attempt to rescind the contract as well as to enforce a binding
contract.
1.

It should be noted that the trial court found that neither brother would be

entitled to attorney's fees for breach of contract, which breach of contract was tried to the
jury and Branson was awarded $9,000 and Marvin was awarded $ 1.00 (which is all he asked
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for). (Addendum Exhibit B, C and D). The trial judge treated Branson's recovery of $9,000
as nominal, or more accurately de minimis, in its nature and awarded Branson no attorney's
fees. (R. 11352, Addendum Exhibit D). The court further held in November 2007 that
although the contract did allow the prevailing party to be awarded attorney's fees and even
though Marvin reserved his request for attorney's fees to be determined after final order, "the
court finds that neither party is justified in receiving attorney's fees in regards to the breach
of contract issue." (R. 11190, Addendum Exhibit C). The court reasoned that even if the
parties were justified in receiving attorney's fees for the trial on breach of contract issues
they would off-set one another. (Id.) This ruling appeared to be limited to the ABCO trial
attorney's fees incurred by both parties.
2.

Thus, Marvin did not seek any attorney's fees for the trial on breach of contract

and did not appeal that decision. Neither did Branson. Instead, Marvin sought attorney's
fees to enforce the contract regarding all pre-trial motions. Marvin filed his request for fees
and accompanying affidavit on November 20, 2007, after the court had made the decision
regarding breach of contract attorney's fees. (See R. 11208-11307 attached as Addendum
Exhibit F). The filing for these attorney's fees was based on the trial judge's earlier decision
of January 9, 2007 granting most if not all of Marvin's motions for summary judgment;
which eliminated most of Branson's claims, including his largest claim attempting to rescind
the contract based on fraud, misrepresentation, failure to disclose, no meeting the minds,
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condition precedent, agreement to agree and various other arguments. (Addendum Exhibit
M). These arguments consumed the majority of the lawsuit from October 29,2002 to Jan 9,
2007. The trial court acknowledged in motion practice and at a trial by jury, "the Plaintiff
failed to recover or succeed on the majority on his claims." (R. 11352). It must be noted, that
Marvin prevailed on 17 pre-trial claims to counter Branson's attempt to get around the
buyout contract. (R. 11210-212). Essentially, Branson's 16 causes of action were reduced to
breach of contract and slander of title. (R. 8707-8736).
3.

The court also found in its June 19, 2007 decision regarding attorney's fees,

that prior to trial most of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed. (Addendum Exhibit D, R. 10565
T[12). The court further found, "Plaintiffs claim to set aside the subject contract on grounds
of fraud consumed substantially all of the pre-litigation motions and was totally
unmeritorious." (Id. at ]fl4). The court held in paragraph 17 that "Plaintiff unnecessarily
and unmeritoriously required Defendants to participate in the litigation, to assert defenses
and to defend against Plaintiffs claims at trial." (Id). (Emphasis added). The ABCO buyout
agreements allowed for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs, "whether an action
has been commenced or not, which may arise or accrue from enforcing any of the terms of
this agreement." (See <[ 9.11 and 9.H of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Partnership
Interest Agreement and Section 9.H of the Membership Interest Redemption Agreement. See
Trial Ex. 155 and 156). (Emphasis added). Those agreements allow for pre-trial motion
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attorney's fees to successfully defend against a rescission claim and to properly enforce a
valid, binding contract where Branson seeks to void it for fraud. The court acknowledged
that Branson should not have even filed this complaint against Marvin stating, "If I find fault
in this case, frankly it is the bringing of this action in the first case and prosecuting it." (R.
11483 pg. 7).
4.

Despite these findings made on June 19, 2007, on July 25, 2008, the court

inappropriately grouped Marvin's necessary defense of Branson's aggressive action together
with Branson's bad faith lawsuit at trial by generally finding, without pointing to any
specifics, that both brothers "had an acrimonious relationship, distrust of each other to a
tragic break down of family relationships." (Addendum Exhibit B, R. 11352). The court
placed Marvin in the same cup as Branson and found that neither party prevailed. "Both
suffered irreparable loss and this court refuses to compound the loss by awarding fees to
either party." (Id, R. 11353). Judge Low stated that Marvin's pre-trial attorney's fees and
costs, even though he prevailed on the majority of those motions would not be awarded for
the reasons above stated. (Id.). That is the sum total of the court's findings and they are
inadequate as a matter of law and insufficient to support the conclusion reached. In addition,
they are grossly mistaken regarding the attorney's fees incurred by Marvin Neff prior to trial
on enforcement of contract issues and avoiding Branson's attempt to rescind the contract.
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B.

Explanation of facts regarding attorney's fees on Manila Ranch.
5.

The attorney's fees for the Manila Ranch trial were based upon both contract

provisions and the trust documents as well as statutory provisions in the trust code. There is
no question that Branson misappropriated trust monies to his own private use, breached his
fiduciary duty to Marvin, misappropriated funds and failed to provide an appropriate
accounting or distribution to beneficiaries until Marvin actually forced the same with a
lawsuit. (R. 11484, pgs. 28, 30, 33, 55, 59, 60, 61, 117 and 115).
6.

Indeed the court found: "I think Marvin will prevail, unless there is something

astounding that you can show me." (Referring to Branson's attempt to offset.) (R. 11484,
pgs. 137-38). Branson never did show the court any offsets - so by implication, Marvin
prevailed on Manila Ranch.
7.

The trial court appropriately did not grant Branson any off-sets except for the

$8,999 jury verdict on breach of contract. (R. 11357). This left Branson owing Marvin a
substantial amount which Marvin still has never received and is forced to litigate just to
recover the same.
8.

When one analyzes the Manila Ranch case in isolation from the ABCO trial,

there is no question that Marvin prevailed, was the only party who prevailed, was awarded
what he sought, and had to incur substantial attorney's fees just to get that award. Even if
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combined with to the ABCO trial, and the offset of $8,999, Marvin still prevailed with an
award greater than Branson's (i.e. $27,865 plus over $15,000 interest less $8,999).
9.

The Manila Ranch attorney's fees were reserved, to be made later. (R. 11484

pgs. 140-143). Because the court's decision regarding the Manila Ranch offset issues was not
reached until July 25,2008, and because the court would hear no further requests, including
attorney fee requests thereon (R. 11357), Marvin was forced to appeal that decision to recover
his attorney's fees. (R. 11429).

II.

FACTS RELATING TO CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERROR AND
INTEREST
10.

Both parties agreed that Marvin was entitled to $27,865 in principal and the

court awarded the same on August 29, 2007. (R. 11484 pgs. 28, 30, 33, 55, 59, 60, 61, 117
and 155). But, by oversight, due to a delay of nearly a year, the court clerically erred when
awarding principal and interest on the Manila Ranch trial in the final order. (R. 113 57). The
interest on the principal was 10% and is easily calculated. (The proper calculation is 10% on
$7,548 from March 24, 2003 to August 29, 2007 or 4.33 years = $3,268.28). The 10%
prejudgment interest should have been carried forward to July 25,2008 (Final Order) which
is $27,865 * 10% *(11/12) = $2,554.29.
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III.

FACTS RELEVANT TO SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIM
11.

In 2000, Attorney Travis Bowen, as part of the buyout and division of property

through tax sheltered tax entities, erroneously prepared deeds to transfer the jointly held
property through Steelwater Investments L.P., (a clerical mistake), which was a non-existent
entity, rather than Steelwater Properties L.P., the actual entity. (Trial ex. 50-52,161-162 and
165).
12.

The property remained titled in this entity until Branson obtained a survey

dividing the farm from ABCO's land. (R. 11482, pgs. 29-31). Branson completed the survey
on July 13, 2001. (Id). (Trial Ex. 14c).
13.

Branson, at all times relevant to this case, was in full and complete possession

of his property, the farm and home, and exercised full control over the same. (R. 10565 ^j 15).
Branson never lost money on his property. (R. 11482, pgs. 31-33). In contrast, Marvin, lost
his sale on the Farr West property and on his home, in part due to Branson's refusal to sign a
new deed on Farr West or to remove the lis pendens. (R. 11482, pg. 30).
14.

On August 9, 2001 and December 31, 2001, Deeds were signed with only

Marvin's signature, transferring the farm and home to Branson's wife, which deeds were
recorded on July 16, 2002 and July 30, 2002, well before Branson brought the lawsuit on
October 29, 2002. (Addendum Exhibit J and K, Trial Ex. 274-275). This cured any alleged
problem with Branson's title. (R.l 1487, pgs. 503-504).
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15.

Marvin also signed deeds correcting his title himself in November 2006.

(Addendum Exhibit L, Trial Ex. 229). Travis Bowen indicated that either Marvin or
Branson could have corrected the title by simply signing a deed from Steelwater Investments
to themselves. (R. 11487 pgs. 503-504).
16.

Branson thereafter filed suit against Marvin and Travis Bowen on or about

October 29, 2002 alleging, among other things, slander of title to his farm and home. (R. 1).
17.

On or about November 15,2006, the court granted summary judgment in favor

of Defendant Travis Bowen against Branson because Branson could not prove damages from
the conduct of Travis Bowen. (Memorandum Decision, November 15, 2006, pg. 9). (R.
8527-28).
18.

Marvin also sought summary judgment on the slander of title claim. During

oral argument on Marvin's partial summary judgment motion, the court opined that he could
not see how Marvin would be responsible on slander of title, especially where Branson could
not show damages against Travis Bowen. (R. 11482, pgs. 31-33).
19.

On or about January 9,2007, the court also noted in his Memorandum Decision

on the issue that "the Plaintiff fails to present sufficiently disputed issues of fact whether
malice was present, and whether Defendant's statements caused actual or special damages,"
but allowed Branson an opportunity to prove otherwise at trial. (R. 8724, Addendum Exhibit
M,pg.l8).
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20.

Before trial, neither party objected to the jury instructions or verdict form. (R.

10564, Findings of Fact, June 19, 2007,12).
21.

After a two (2) week jury trial, the jury signed the verdict form finding Marvin

technically committed slander of title, but held that said conduct caused Branson zero
damages. (R. 9789 ^ 6.A, Addendum Exhibit M).
22.

The court found that all of the evidence produced before or at trial supported

the jury's award of zero damages. (Addendum Exhibit D, R. 10564, Findings of Fact, 12).
23.

The court ruled that Branson did not prevail on the whole, received a minute

portion of the damages sought, should never have brought the claim in the first place, and
awarded Branson no attorney's fees whatsoever. (Id).
24.

Despite the court's ruling that it was a violation of Rule 606(b) of the Utah

Rules of Evidence, Branson's attorney later sought an affidavit ofjurors, and recorded it after
the trial without notice to opposing counsel. (R. 10555-59). Now, counsel cites from that
affidavit on page 12 of Branson's Brief for record facts to support his attorney fee claim
under slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty. (The jury affidavit should be stricken and
all facts thereon barred from the record).

IV. FACTS RELEVANT TO BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
25.

The court's summary judgment decision of January 9,2007, held that "none of

Plaintiffs assertions were sufficiently supported with material facts in regards to Defendant's
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fiduciary duties prior to the parties' entering into the Property Settlement Agreement (of
December 8, 1999)." (R. 8718, Addendum Exhibit M, pg. 12).
26.

During trial, the court ruled there were no fiduciary duties owned by Marvin on

any of Branson land, farm or home. (R.l 1486, pg. 247).
27.

Although the court noted a few disputed issues of fact regarding events after

December 8, 1999 that possibly should go to trial on fiduciary status, the decision noted that
the issues "are more akin to breach of contract assertions than of breach of fiduciary duty."
(Id.) The findings and order actually limited Branson's fiduciary claims of winding up the
buyout to "breach of contract" claims. (R. 10188 Tf 1).
28.

Although the jury technically found Marvin had breached his fiduciary duty

(apparently on contract type issues),

the jury also provided that Branson suffered no

damages for said breach. (R. 9790, Addendum Exhibit N ^j 8A). Branson's only damage
awarded in the trial fell under his breach of contract claim for $9,000.00, consistent with the
court's order in paragraph 27 above. (Id).
29.

The court held that all evidence presented at trial supported the jury' s award of

no damages under breach of fiduciary duty and granted JNOV. (Addendum Exhibit D, R.
10564 ^16).
30.

Branson has speculated and made bald assertions regarding what he believes

were breaches of Marvin's fiduciary duties regarding Branson's continued work, health
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insurance, life insurance, equipment and tools, or Marvin's improper deductions (see pg. 17
to 19 of Branson's Brief). These speculations must be treated as contract breach issues, not
fiduciary duty issues. (R.10188, | 1). The jury gave Branson $9,000 under his breach of
contract claim but zero under fiduciary duty. (Addendum Exhibit N, R. 10564-65).

V.

FACTS RELEVANT TO MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM
31.

On or about June 5,2000, Judge Ben Hadfield issued a protective order against

Branson that prohibited him from, among other things, "directly or indirectly contacting,
harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating" with Marvin. (Trial Ex. 168, Protective
Order, pg. 2). This was issued against Branson because Branson entered ABCO's offices
and verbally and physically attacked and harmed Marvin while Marvin was at work.
(Addendum Exhibit H, R. 7299-7301) (which is Branson's own version of the event at the
ABCO office). Branson also admitted in an apology letter to assaulting Marvin. (Trial Ex.
72). Branson's statement of fact on page 15, sentence 2 is therefore a misrepresentation of
the actual record.
32.

On or about January 26, 2005, Branson, in violation of the protective order

stopped his vehicle near Marvin's driveway and talked to Marvin. (Addendum Exhibit I,
R.7124).
33.

This discussion became heated and Branson drove off fast. (Id). Marvin

grabbed Branson's truck window to keep from sliding under Branson's truck wheels and
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Branson drove off with Marvin hanging from the window of the truck and Marvin's feet
dragging on the road. (Id, R.7133). Marvin plead with Branson to stop before he was killed.
(«, R.7124,7133).
34.

The court found: "[Branson] knowingly carried [Marvin] a number of feet with

his truck until [Marvin] verbally expressed that the parties' actions qualified as a risk to his
life." (R. 7124, Addendum Exhibit M, pg. 15). Marvin fell and rolled as Branson sped away.
(Addendum Exhibit I, R. 7124).
3 5.

"(T)here *s n o dispute that [Branson's] actions may have qualified as an assault,

in that he alone controlled the speed of the vehicle." (Addendum Exhibit M, R. 8721).
36.

"[Branson] concedes that certain risks were present and perceived by [Marvin]

in relation to his driving of the vehicle and that he alone controlled the speed of the vehicle."
(id).
37.

Marvin cut his forehead and right hand, cut and scratched his right knee, and

lost his shoe and wrist bracelet. (R. 7121).
38.

The police responded to Alice Neff s 911 call and went directly to Branson's

home. Branson refused to open the door. When he finally did, he argued, resisted arrest and
got into a physical altercation with the police. Branson did not submit peacefully. (R. 7121,
Addendum Exhibit I, pg. 2).
39.

Branson was arrested on the spot for violation of a protective order. (R.7142).
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40.

Branson submitted a statement to the police where he admitted to stopping at

Marvin's, talking and arguing with Marvin, speeding off with Marvin pleading for his life,
and stopping fast so Marvin fell off to his injury. (Addendum Exhibit I).
41.

At Branson's preliminary hearing, Judge Hadfield found that there was

probable cause for all four (4) charges and bound Branson over for trial. (R.7154).
42.

On or about September 27,2005, Branson pled guilty to two counts: Violation

of a Protective Order and Interference with Arresting Officer. (R. 7980-88, Deferred
Judgment Agreement and Order, pg. 2).
43.

In exchange, Amy F. Hugie, the Box Elder County Prosecutor, deferred the

charge of aggravated assault without prejudice and committed to "refilling it as soon as the
civil action is complete." (R. 7149, Letter from Amy F. Hugie, pg. 1).
44.

The Court's (Judge Low) decision to dismiss Branson's malicious prosecution

claim held the finding of probable cause by the magistrate in the Plaintiffs criminal
proceeding is dispositive of the matter. (Addendum Exhibit M, pg. 15). The court also
stated there appeared to be no element of maliciousness by Marvin. (R. 8722).
45.

The Court's (Judge Low) specifically found that absent more proof, "the court

fails to discern how [Marvin's] action in calling the police and raising an allegation of assault
translates into any benefit in the parties' currently contested partnership dissolution
litigation." (Id).
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46.

The jury in Branson's civil case, also found Branson liable for assaulting

Marvin, and awarded Marvin all he asked for ($1.00). (R. 9792, Addendum Exhibit N).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

CROSS APPELLANT BRIEF

As stated in the trial court's final Memorandum Decision, this action arose primarily
from a "separation of two brothers from a business relationship" and Branson's acrimony,
discontent, jealousy, ill will and overall determination to undermine Marvin because of
Marvin's business successes without Branson. The trial court's final decision mentions
Branson's "general discontent...with the final results of the dissolution, separation and
success or lack thereof of the remaining separate business efforts and intents." Branson's
discontent with ABCO's "post-Branson" success and resulting ill will towards Marvin was
never more evident than when he testified at trial about the time he grabbed his gun, got in
his truck, and went looking for Marvin testifying that if he would have found Marvin, he
would have killed him. It is this ill will and jealousy towards Marvin that is the basis of the
multitude of Branson's unmeritorious claims that have forced Marvin's difficult and costly
defense. Branson's discontent, ill will, jealousy and resulting litigious nature against Marvin
has required Marvin to take an aggressive defense during the course of this matter's
extensive and drawn out litigation history.
After seven years of protracted litigation and an eleven month span since the most
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recent trial date on this matter, the trial court, in an admitted attempt to "bring matters to
closure," hastily entered a Memorandum Decision on July 25,2008. While, concededly, the
time had come to bring matters to a closure, the July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision did not
provide Marvin a sufficient and accurate closure to the remaining matters in three areas:
first, Marvin's requests for attorney's fees on the pre-trial ABCO case and the Manila Ranch
case1; second, Marvin's entitlement to prejudgment interest through the date of the final
judgment; and, third, a clerical error made by the trial court in memorializing relief granted to
Marvin during a prior trial.
The contract between the parties provides that attorneys fees shall be paid by the
"prevailing party." In this case, evidence shows Marvin was the prevailing party in regards to
the ABCO pre-trial and Manila Ranch matters and, thus, was entitled to an award of
attorney's fees in both ABCO pre-trial motions and the bifurcated Manila Ranch case.
However, in the aforementioned July 29,2008 Memorandum Decision, the trial court simply
stated, "the only feasible and reasoned decision relative to attorney's fees is that neither party
prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss, and this Court refuses to compound the loss by
awarding fees to either party." This assertion was supported neither by findings of fact, nor
analysis of the "flexible and reasoned" factors. Additionally, the July 25,2008 Memorandum
Decision stated the trial court would consider nothing more, and, thus, precluded Marvin

1. Note, the trial court seemingly foreclosed either party from an award of attorney's fees on the breach of contract issues
entertained during the ABCO trial (even though Marvin was never given an opportunity to seek those fees) (R.l 1190), but
reserved Marvin's right to seek pre-trial motion fees on the ABCO case and Manila Ranch trial. (R. 11484 pgs. 137,140-154).
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from supplementing and filing his drafted Motion for Attorney's fees regarding the Manila
Ranch trial, even though this issue had been preserved for the end of trial (as acknowledged
by the trial court), and even though the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure arguably provide
Marvin a five day window after judgment in which to file the motion. Thus, because no
findings of fact were given and because Marvin's procedural and statutory rights were
violated, there can be no meaningful appellate review, and Marvin's attorney fee request
should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Even if it is determined that
the findings of fact given were sufficient, the flexible and reasoned analysis, purportedly
used by the trial court, would clearly favor Marvin being deemed the prevailing party, and it
was an abuse of discretion to not award Marvin his attorney's fees pursuant the parties'
contract, and statute.
Second, Marvin is entitled to prejudgment interest from the time the trial court
determined Marvin's loss was "fixed" as of final judgment. As the name suggests,
prejudgment interest is to accrue through final judgment. The trial court properly awarded
Marvin prejudgment interest, but inexplicably determined Marvin was only entitled to
prejudgment interest until August 29, 2007, the date of the trial in which the prejudgment
interest issue was argued before the trial court. Utah law states that parties entitled to
prejudgment interest are entitled to damages for the loss of use of the money that, but for the
[other party's] breach and ensuing delay, would have been paid in satisfaction of their claim.
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Marvin was not paid the money due and owing him on August 29, 2007 nor on July 25,2008
(and, in fact, still has not been paid that sum), thus, in order to properly compensate Marvin,
the prejudgment interest award should be extended until final judgment, with post-judgment
interest accruing on that sum thereafter.
Finally, in its July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision the trial court committed a clerical
error, that it has failed to correct, in awarding Marvin $7,548.00 less than it previously and
undisputedly had during the August 29, 2007 Manila Ranch trial. This mistake is apparent
on the record and is undisputed between the parties. Thus, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(a), this matter should be remanded to the trial court to be corrected or corrected
sua sponte by the Supreme Court.

II.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Even after a two (2) week jury trial, Branson continues his litigation against his
brother Marvin. Branson's only goal is to be awarded attorney's fees. In spite of his
arguments, however, Branson is unable to show that Judge Low committed reversible error.
Branson did not appeal Judge Low's decision to not award Branson any attorney's fees. (R.
11190-91; R. 10563-10567). He only appealed the JNOV ruling on slander of title, breach of
fiduciary duty, and summary judgment on malicious prosecution, apparently seeking a refund
for attorney's fees spent on said claims.
The JNOV was justified because Branson failed to prove damages as a necessary
-34-

element for slander of title or breach of fiduciary duty. The jury found that Branson did not
suffer any damages. Branson never appealed this jury finding. Without the necessary damage
element to support the claims there can be no underlying cause of action.
Branson's sole award of damages came from breach of contract, not breach of
fiduciary duty or slander of title. Judge Low, who reserved the amount of attorney's fees
unto himself, refused to award Branson any attorney's fees on any of his claims. Therefore,
even if the court had mistakenly granted JNOV, it was harmless since Branson was not
awarded any attorney's fees and failed to appeal that portion of the decision.
The trial court was also correct in granting partial summary judgment against
Branson's malicious prosecution claim. Branson failed to prove any of the four necessary
elements to support his claim. Failure to prove one element is fatal. Essentially, the court
ruled that Marvin had reasonable probable cause, did not act with any improper purpose, and
Branson was not an innocent party, but pled guilty and that probable cause supported the
claims. The jury in this case also awarded Marvin $1.00 for Branson's assault, again
showing Marvin had probable cause and proximate cause on the assault. Probable cause was
also proven independently and affirmed by Judge Ben Hadfield at the criminal preliminary
hearing. Summary judgment was appropriate.
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ARGUMENT OF CROSS APPELLANT'S CLAIMS
I.

THE ISSUE OF MARVIN'S ATTORNEY'S FEES (REGARDING BOTH THE
ABCO PRE-TRIAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND MANILA RANCH TRIAL
ATTORNEY'S FEES) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

A.

The attorney's fees issues should be remanded to the trial court because the trial
court erred by not entering sufficient findings of fact in support of its July 25,2008
Order that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
The trial court erred by not entering sufficient findings of fact in support of its final

ruling that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. In Utah, an award of
attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d
226, 230 (Utah 1997). In exercising that discretion, however, a trial court must make
findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions. (Id.); Anderson v. Thompson,
2008 UT App 3, Tf 42, 176 P.3d 464; Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622,624 (Utah 1985); see
also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This enables an appellate court to determine if the trial court has
abused its discretion. Willey, 951 P.2d at 230. Without adequate findings of fact, there can
be no meaningful appellate review. (Id.); Anderson, 2008 UT App 3 at ^f 142.
Because it is not the role of an appellate court to find facts, an appellate court will
normally remand a matter to the trial court for further proceedings if it determines that the
findings of fact are insufficient to support the trial court's legal conclusions. Willey, 951
P.2d at 230; Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998). In this case, the trial court
failed to enter sufficient findings of fact in support of its final order that Marvin was not
-36-

entitled to an award of attorney's fees, thus, this matter should be remanded to the trial court.
On or about November 20, 2007, Marvin filed a separate affidavit and brief for
attorney's fees for prevailing on the numerous pretrial motions in the ABCO/ Aspen Springs
case. (See Addendum Exhibit F). It was argued in that affidavit and brief that Marvin is
entitled by law to attorney's fees under the contract for defending against Branson's attempt
to rescind or void the buyout contract. See generally Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, 38
P.3d 1001 (concluding that successfully defending against an opponents suit to rescind a
contract is deemed "litigation to enforce" the contract and, as such, entitles the party
successfully defending against the rescission of the contract to attorney's fees and costs
incurred in said defense). The trial court ultimately determined that the contract in the
ABCO/ Aspen Springs case was fully enforceable.
Marvin was also successful in the second part of the bifurcated proceeding, the Manila
Ranch trial. During that trial, Marvin voiced that he would seek attorney's fees. The trial
court told Marvin he could submit an affidavit and brief for attorney's fees. Marvin's
counsel prepared said documents and waited to supplement and file the documents until after
the trial court decided the offset claims made by Branson. As will be discussed in more
detail in a later section, the court waited eleven months before coming to a decision, and
when it did so, the order precluded additional filings, including the issue of Marvin's right to
Manila Ranch attorney's fees, which Marvin had preserved (and the court acknowledged said
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preservation) for the end of the proceedings.
After reviewing Marvin's pre-trial ABCO/ Aspen Springs written request for
attorney's fees, which was sufficient under Utah law, the trial court entered its July 25,2008
Memorandum Decision and summarily denied Marvin's requests altogether, both oral and
written. In that decision, the trial court stated that the "flexible and reasoned" approach was
appropriate under the facts of this case, but failed to enter proper findings of fact or
otherwise analyze the various factors involved in the "flexible and reasoned" analysis.
Under the flexible and reasoned approach (discussed in greater detail below), the court
must make specific findings of fact sufficient to lead the court to the conclusion of law as to
who, if anyone, is the "prevailing" or "successful" party. J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud,
2005 UT 39, ^[21, 116 P.3d 353. A successful party is one who successfully enforces or
defends against an action. EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanqffl 2008 UT App 284, f 14, 192
P.3d 296. Where it is not manifestly obvious which party was the "successful" one, courts
employ a flexible and reasoned approach to determine which party was victorious. (Id.)
Under this approach, the trial court must consider, at a minimum, the significance of the net
judgment in the case and the amounts actually sought and recovered. (Id.) It should further
consider and make findings on things such as contractual language; the number of claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc. brought by each party and their success on each of these
claims; the importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the
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context of the lawsuit considered as a whole; and the dollar amounts attached to and awarded
in connection with the various claims. R. T. Nielson Company v. Cook, 2002 UT 115 \ 25,40
P.3dlll9.
In its July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision (attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A),
the court made minimal or no findings of fact regarding the aforementioned "flexible and
reasoned approach factors" concerning either the ABCO/ Aspen Springs pre-trial request for
fees or the Manila Ranch trial attorney's fees issues. No findings of fact were made that lead
to the trial courts conclusion of law that "neither party prevailed." No findings of fact were
made as to why it was not manifestly obvious as to which party was successful. No findings
of fact were made showing that the trial court even considered the net judgment of the case in
comparison with the amounts actually sought and recovered by both parties.
Rather, the trial court simply stated that the "only feasible and reasoned decision
relative to attorney's fees is that neither party prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss, and
this Court refuses to compound the loss by awarding fees to either party." The trial court
then went on to say that its July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision "will constitute the final
order herein and any further relief is to be sought on appeal." These statements are
insufficient under the legal standard set forth above. In concluding that Marvin was not
entitled to an award of attorney's fees as requested, the trial court was under a legal
obligation to weigh the evidence presented, and thereafter enter detailed findings of fact that
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explicitly support its legal conclusion relative to any such award (or denial thereof). This is
particularly important in a case of this magnitude, where the facts are complex, and where the
trial court purportedly employed the multi-faceted "flexible and reasoned" approach for
purposes of its attorney fee decision.
Based on the language of the July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision, this appellate
court cannot possibly undertake a meaningful review of Marvin's attorney fee claim because
it has no way of knowing which factors the trial court considered (or failed to consider).
Based on seven years of extensive litigation in this case, it was entirely unfair and
inappropriate for the trial court to essentially dismiss Marvin's written request for attorney's
fees without providing any specific reasons in support of that dismissal other than the vague
assertion that "neither party prevailed" in the matter, and to thereafter refer the bulk of the
matter to the appellate courts who, in reality, are in a far less advantageous position to
consider the whole of the evidence and enter a proper ruling on Marvin's request for
attorney's fees.
In light of the foregoing, the trial court has failed to enter sufficient findings of fact in
support of its decision that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this
matter. Because the trial court has not satisfied its legal obligation in this regard, this issue
should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
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B.

The Manila Ranch trial costs/attorney'sfees issues should be remanded to the trial
courtfor further proceedings because the trial court erroneously denied Marvin of
a costs/attorney's fees award before Marvin was allowed to even request such an
award.
Marvin was denied of his statutory and procedural right to petition the trial court for

an award of attorney's fees incurred in the Manila Ranch Trial. According to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)(1) - (2), costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party and "the
party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon
the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of
his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct,
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding"
(Emphasis added).
During the bifurcated Manila Ranch trial, Marvin prevailed on his claim that Branson
did not properly administer the trust and was awarded a judgment in the amount of $27,865
principal plus prejudgment interest on this claim. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004
"[i]n a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court may, as justice
and equity may require, award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to
any party, to be paid by another party or from the trust that is the subject of the controversy."
This statutory provision clearly provides for a full and equitable restitution of a party's costs;
and those costs include a reasonable attorney's fee. Because Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004
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lumps attorney's fees into costs, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure § 54(d)(2), Marvin
should have been afforded five days after the entry of the Manila Ranch judgment to seek
costs, including the attorney's fees Marvin incurred in the Manila Ranch litigation.
Due to the procedural deficiencies of the trial court, Marvin was precluding from even
exercising his statutory and procedural right of seeking his reasonable costs which include
reasonable attorney's fees. Under the rules cited above Marvin is allowed to assert his
affidavit and memorandum seeking attorney's fees and costs at the conclusion of the entire
matter. The Manila Ranch trial was initially heard before the court on August 29,2007. The
court ruled in Marvin's favor awarding Marvin $27,865 plus prejudgment interest on a claim
that Branson did not properly administer the trust. However, the court left the judgment open
regarding Branson's offsets and statute of limitations arguments. Further, the court failed to
sign any of the proposed orders, findings of fact, or conclusions of law regarding the Manila
Ranch trial prior to its decision on the offset and statute of limitations issues.
Marvin's desire to seek an award of attorney's fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial
was made known to the court during this trial and the court told Marvin he could file for
attorney's fees. (See Addendum Exhibit A, pg. 5). Additionally, the court acknowledged
Marvin had reserved the right to seek an award of attorney's fees at the end of the
proceedings. (See November 6,2007 Memorandum Decision, Exhibit C). In reliance on this
reservation, during the eleven month span between the trial and the July 29, 2008 decision,
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Marvin's counsel prepared an affidavit and memorandum for attorney's fees in accordance
with the dictates of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 73, waiting to supplement and file it
after the decision was made as to the offsets and statute of limitations.
After eleven months of consideration, the court made its determination regarding the
remaining issues in the Manila Ranch trial (the offset and statute of limitations issues) in its
Memorandum Decision dated July 29, 2008. Rather than providing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and recognizing Marvin's reservation of the costs and attorney's fees
issues until after a decision was made on the offset and statute of limitation issues, the court
made a statement of frustration (deemed the court's "final order") attempting to "bring ...
matters to closure" and indicating neither party would be awarded attorney's fees in the final
judgment and no other motions or memorandum would be considered. See July 25, 2008
Memorandum Decision.
As a result, the court precluded further filings and never properly allowed Marvin to
claim, brief, or argue for costs/ attorney's fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial. The court
did not allow the benefit of the procedural rules, specifically, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 54(d)'s provision for five days after judgment to file for costs, which pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 75-7-1004 include reasonable attorney's fees.
Even if Rule 54(d), as applied in Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah
1998), does not provide a five day grace period with which to file a motion for the statutorily
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proscribed attorney's fees, the trial court erred by knowingly failing to honor Marvin's
reservation of the attorney's fees issues for the end of the trial phase. Rather, the trial court
"washed its hands" of this case and advised that if either party had any problems with the
way the case was handled, to take it up with an appellate court.
Thus, because the trial court failed to follow proper procedure, failed to honor
Marvin's reservation of the issues, and denied Marvin of the opportunity to seek attorney's
fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial, this matter should be remanded to the trial court with
instructions that it allow Marvin to submit and consider Marvin's previously drafted affidavit
and memorandum in support of attorney's fees.

II.

EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, THE TRIAL COURT DID ENTER SUFFICIENT
FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTING ITS CONCLUSION THAT MARVIN
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON THAT ISSUE WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE
MARVIN WAS THE "PREVAILING PARTY" IN THAT PORTION OF
LITIGATION.
If it is determined that the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient, then it should

be held that the conclusion of law that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees
was in error since the contract between the parties provided that, in the event of litigation, the
prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees. Marvin was indeed the prevailing party in the
Manila Ranch litigation as well as all pretrial motions for summary judgment in the ABCO/
Aspen Springs litigation.
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Whether attorney's fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law to be
reviewed by appellate courts for correctness. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85,
TJ22,100 P.3d 1200. In Utah, attorney's fees are awardable only if provided for by statute or
contract and, if by contract, only as the contract allows by its terms. Mountain States
Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah App. 1989); Crowley v. Black,
2007 UT App 245, \ 12, 167 P.3d 1087; A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy,
2004 UT 47 Tf7, 94 P. 3d 270. In observance of this rule, a trial court should grant
reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with a written contractual provision. Crowley, 2007
UT App. 245 at ^ 12 (Emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (2008). It is also important to note that in
cases where the various issues are inextricably tied together, Utah courts have awarded
attorney's fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may not have been incurred
solely on issues for which attorney's fees are customarily available. Brown v. David K.
Richards & Company, 1999 UT App 109, \ 16-24, 978 P. 2d 470.
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, each of the buyout agreements at issue
clearly provided that the "prevailing party" was entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the
event of litigation. For purposes of this provision, the term "litigation" includes attempts by
one party to rescind the contract at issue. See Chase 2001 UT App. 404 at ^j 11-17. (holding
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that when a party defends against a claim for contract rescission, that defense constitutes
litigation for purposes of attorney fee provisions). This is significant given the fact that the
majority of the parties' claims and defenses pertaining to the buyout agreements were
resolved judicially prior to trial.
Which party is a prevailing party is an appropriate question for a trial court. The
appellate court therefore reviews the trial court's determination as to who was the prevailing
party under an abuse of discretion standard. Crowley 2007 UT App 245 at ^f 6. Typically,
determining the "prevailing party" for purposes of awarding attorney's fees is quite simple.
{Id. at f 13). For example, "where a plaintiff sues for money damages, and the plaintiff wins,
the plaintiff is the prevailing party; if a defendant successfully defends and avoids adverse
judgment, the defendant has prevailed." {Id.) (Emphasis added).
In Mountain States, the Utah Court of Appeals outlined the "net judgment rule" for
determining which party was the "prevailing party." Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 551-57.
The net judgment rule simply requires the court to consider only which party recovered a net
judgment and award attorney's fees to that party. {Id. at 551). Under the circumstances of
Mountain States, the Court of Appeals held that the party receiving the "net judgment" is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees. {Id.)
The case at issue involved prolonged and complex litigation that resulted in bifurcated
trials. In the Manila Ranch trial the awards were straightforward and appropriate for analysis
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under the net judgment rule; Marvin was awarded over $27,865 plus prejudgment interest at
ten percent, while Branson was awarded nothing and was not successful in defending the
action. Thus, even if you consider Branson's $9,000 offset for the jury's breach of contract
judgment in the ABCO/ Aspen Springs case, there is no question that Marvin was the
prevailing party in the Manila Ranch trial since he was awarded in excess of $27,865 plus
pre-judgment interest at ten percent.
Under the net judgment rule it is also clear Marvin was the prevailing party when both
trials are considered together. The bottom line of the trial as a whole, awards over $42,000 to
Marvin ($27,000 judgment for Branson's improper administration of the trust plus $15,000
prejudgment interest), and only $9,000 to Branson ($9,000 breach of contract plus $1 for the
assault claim).
However, Utah courts generally hold the analysis is somewhat more complex when
both plaintiff and defendant obtained some monetary relief against the other. Mountain
States, 783 P.2d at 556. The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that a simplistic,
mechanical application of the net judgment rule is not appropriate in cases where both parties
obtained some type of recovery. Whipple, 2004 UT App. 47 at ffl[ 11-12. Instead, courts
should employ a common sense "flexible and reasoned" approach to resolving issues of this
nature. {Id) at ^j 11-14. The "flexible and reasoned" approach is particularly applicable "in
cases involving multiple claims and parties; the granting of non-monetary relief to one or
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more parties; and where the ultimate award of money damages does not adequately represent
the actual success of the parties under the peculiar posture of the case." Mountain States, 783
P.2d at 556, fn. 7 {internal citations omitted). The ABCO/ Aspen Springs trial falls clearly
within these parameters, and the "flexible and reasoned" approach is appropriate.
Under the Utah Supreme Court's "flexible and reasoned" approach, determining the
"prevailing party" depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case. R. T. Nielson
Company v. Cook, 2002 UT 11 at f 25. As such, appropriate considerations for the trial court
include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: (1) contractual language; (2) the
number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the parties; (3) the
importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the context of the
lawsuit considered as a whole; and (4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in
connection with the various claims. {Id.) This standard was designed to permit "a case-bycase evaluation by the trial court, and flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or
neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed." {Id.) Under the facts of this case,
Marvin should also be considered the "prevailing party" under the flexible and reasoned
analysis purportedly used by the trial court and should be reimbursed by Branson for the
considerable attorneys' fees and costs which he has incurred as a result of Branson's
unmeritorious legal action.
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A.

Application of the flexible and reasoned approach.
Instead of using the "net judgment rule" to determine the "prevailing party" in this

matter, the court could employ the "flexible and reasoned approach" and consider all of the
relevant factors. This case has evolved into approximately seven consecutive years of intense
motion practice and complex litigation between two brothers and several additional parties.
Originally, Branson asserted sixteen separate causes of action against Marvin alone,
and claimed that Marvin was liable for more than $3,000,000 in damages for his alleged
wrongful conduct on ABCO buyout plus $1,600,000 on Aspen Springs in addition to
attorney's fees which he also claimed Marvin should pay. As the litigation progressed,
however, it became abundantly clear that the large majority of Branson's claims were
unmeritorious, and those on which he was "successful" were miniscule in relation to the
totality of the relief sought. Of the sixteen separate causes of action Branson originally
asserted against Marvin (not to mention those which he asserted against other parties who
were ultimately dismissed), only his claim for breach of contract was successful. All of his
other claims, including his claims for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, money had
and received, disproportionate family payments, fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent
nondisclosure, malicious prosecution, retirement benefits, etc., were dismissed by the trial
court prior to a trial ever taking place. As stated by the trial court in its July 25, 2008
Memorandum Decision, "In light of the money damage claimed for over three million dollars
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plus punitive damages, [Branson's] recovery can only generously be described as nominal
and more accurately de minimus in it's nature and amount."
In obtaining these dismissals, Marvin filed at least six separate pre-trial motions
(together with several supplemental motions) for summary judgment, covering seventeen
(17) claims made by Branson, all of which were granted by the trial court. In addition to
these motions, Marvin also requested that the trial court enter partial summary judgment in
his favor and hold that the Salary Continuation Agreement entered into between the parties
was unambiguous and an asset of ABCO Construction, Inc. The trial court agreed with
Marvin on this issue, and entered partial summary judgment as requested.
Similarly, Marvin filed a pre-trial Motion in Limine requesting that the trial court
enter an order precluding Branson from introducing expert testimony concerning values of
various assets and properties using data after December 13, 1999. This information was
critical to Branson's case, and Marvin's motion was granted by the trial court thereby
prohibiting Branson from introducing evidence of this nature. Although Marvin did not
receive any monetary damages as a result of his success on these motions, the non-monetary
relief sought by and awarded to Marvin was significant and cannot be ignored or viewed as
inconsequential. By defeating the foregoing claims, Marvin avoided a considerable amount
of Branson's alleged financial damages, including punitive damages.
In addition to the various pre-trial motions set forth above, Marvin also prevailed over
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Branson on a variety of other significant issues prior to trial. For example, Branson filed a
pre-trial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requesting that the trial court rule that the
parties' Property Settlement Agreement was unenforceable. This motion was denied by the
trial court. Branson also made several arguments prior to trial that the buyout agreements
were not enforceable because Marvin had failed to satisfy a condition precedent, because
there was no meeting of the minds, because they were executed under fraudulent inducement,
fraud, or purely agreements to agree. Marvin disputed these claims, and Branson's claims
were summarily rejected by the trial court in favor of Marvin. Branson also attempted to
obtain a declaratory judgment on at least seven different issues, but prevailed on none. When
asked by the trial court to present prima facie evidence in support of his punitive damages
claim, the evidence submitted by Branson failed to prove that he was in any way entitled to
punitive damages against Marvin or Travis Bowen and Branson was awarded no such
damages. Branson also attempted to set aside the parties' buyout agreements based on parol
evidence, but failed, and then voluntarily dismissed his claim against Marvin for
"conversion" prior to trial.
Even after the foregoing issues were resolved in Marvin's favor, the claims tried by
Branson and submitted to the jury during the ABCO trial were almost entirely rejected. In
fact, of the fourteen claims submitted by Branson to the jury, the jury found in favor of
Branson on only one issue, breach of contract.
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Branson's failure in this regard is

compounded by the fact that the jury awarded Branson only $9,000 in damages despite his
claim for more than $879,000 (R. 10256) plus five times that for punitive damages
($4,395,000), plus an attorney fee claim.
By contrast, in connection with the ABCO trial, the jury ruled in favor of Marvin and
against Branson on Marvin's claims for breach of contract, assault and battery, breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. Although Marvin was only
awarded $2.00 in damages as a result of those verdicts, that amount was the full sum
requested by Marvin, and does not take into account the many forms of non-monetary relief
which Marvin received throughout the course of this extended litigation. Moreover, it was
the trial court's belief that "the jury could have found a whole lot more [damages in favor of
Marvin] had they been asked to. The evidence was certainly there..." (See July 29, 2008
decision). Marvin was also the only party to receive a monetary payout from the Manila
Ranch trial. In any event, the Manila Ranch payout came about as the result of Branson's
wrongful conduct in his trustee or fiduciary capacity.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Marvin was the prevailing party in this matter not only on the contractual claims, but on the majority of other claims which were, as a
whole, inseparably related thereto. Branson's ultimate jury award of $9,000 does not take
into consideration the fact that nearly all of Branson's claims and causes of action were a
total failure; does not take into consideration the fact that most of the significant disputes
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(both before and during the trials) were resolved in favor of Marvin; and does not take into
consideration the fact that Marvin was awarded the full amount of damages which he sought,
while simultaneously avoiding the imposition of more than $879,000 and $4,395,000 in
damages claimed by Branson.
Even considering Branson's $9,000 jury award for partial recovery on his breach of
contract claim during trial (which is the only evidence in support of the trial court's finding
that "neither party prevailed" and does support the trial court's November 6, 2007
Memorandum Decision finding that "neither party is justified in receiving attorney's fees in
regards to the breach of contract claim"), Marvin should still be deemed the prevailing party
with regards to the ABCO pre-trial matters, the Manila Ranch matters, and if the prevailing
party is determined by considering the case as a whole. Thus, Marvin is clearly entitled to an
attorney's fees and costs award regarding the ABCO pre-trial and Manila Ranch matters.
Under the totality of the circumstances, Marvin was clearly the "prevailing party" in
this matter, and the trial court erred by not awarding Marvin the attorneys' fees and costs he
requested.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD MARVIN
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 10% PER ANNUM FROM
AUGUST 29, 2007 THROUGH JULY 25, 2008.
The trial court erred by failing to award Marvin prejudgment interest at the rate often

percent (10%) from August 29, 2007 (the date of the Manila Ranch trial) through July 25,
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2008 (the date of final judgment) on the amounts he received in connection with the Manila
Ranch trial. In Utah, prejudgment interest is appropriate when the recipient's loss has been
fixed as of a definite time, and the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical
accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of damages. Iron Head Construction, Inc.
v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, ^ 11, 207 P. 3d 1231; Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kurzet, 876
P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, the trial court properly awarded Marvin
prejudgment interest at the statutory rate often percent (10%) per annum. Marvin does not
dispute this portion of the trial court's award. However, the trial court erroneously held that
prejudgment interest in the foregoing amount was to accrue only until August 29,2007 rather
than until the July 25, 2008 final judgment. It is this portion of the trial court's award with
which Marvin takes issue.
The purpose of an award of prejudgment interest is to compensate a party for the
depreciating value of the amount owed to that party over time and, as a corollary, to deter
parties form intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing. Iron Head,
2009 UT 25 at ^[10. Those who are awarded prejudgment interest "are entitled to damages
for the loss of use of the money that, but for the [other party's] breach and ensuing delay,
would have been paid" in satisfaction of their claim. {Id.)
An award of prejudgment interest, such as the award given by the trial court to Marvin
in this case, should accrue up until the date of final judgment. The phrase "prejudgment
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interest" itself suggests as much. This interpretation that prejudgment interest accrues until
the date of final judgment is further supported by a 2009 decision of the Supreme Court of
Utah. In Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, the Supreme Court of Utah was
considering the requirement of mathematical certainty for prejudgment interest. 2009 UT 7,
^f 67, 210 P.3d 263. Pertaining to this requirement, the Supreme Court of Utah stated "[the
mathematical certainty requirement] does not require, however, that a party must demonstrate
that its damage figures are known and static from the date the claim is filed through the
final judgment.*"

(Id.) (Emphasis added).

This consideration evidences a clear

interpretation by this supreme court that the "prejudgment interest period" runs "through the
final judgment."
In this case, the trial court's July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision awarded Marvin his
prejudgment interest through August 29, 2007 (i.e., the date of the Manila Ranch trial).
However, for no apparent reason, the trial court failed to take into consideration the fact that
the final judgment on the Manila Ranch matter was not entered until July 25,2008, due to the
trial courts consideration of Branson's offset claims and various other matters approximately eleven months after the original trial took place, during which Branson has
continued in possession of the money due and owing Marvin. By limiting Marvin's award of
prejudgment interest to August 29,2007, the trial court failed to compensate Marvin for his
inability to use the funds at issue during the time period between August 29, 2007 and July

-55-

25,2008. As such, Marvin has not received the full amount of prejudgment interest to which
he is lawfully entitled, and the very fundamental purpose of an award of prejudgment interest
has not been served in this case.
What the trial court should have done, by way of its final judgment and order, is award
Marvin prejudgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum on his damages up to
the date of July 25, 2008, the final order. Doing so would have fulfilled the purpose of a
prejudgment interest award by fully compensating Marvin for his loss of use of those funds
prior to the date of that judgment. Although the Manila Ranch trial took place on August 29,
2007, that date is not the date of final judgment and is, therefore, not relevant for purposes of
calculating prejudgment interest on the amounts awarded to Marvin in connection with the
Manila Ranch matter.
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred by not awarding Marvin prejudgment
interest through July 25, 2008 at the rate often percent (10%) per annum on all damages
which he received as a result of the Manila Ranch trial. As such, the trial court's decision on
this issue should be reversed and corrected.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A CLERICAL MISTAKE THAT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED WITH REGARD TO THE DAMAGES
AWARDED TO MARVIN IN MANIANILA TRIAL UNDER THE JULY 25,
2008 MEMORANDUM DECISION.
The trial court committed a clerical mistake in its July 25, 2008 Memorandum
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Decision by erroneously omitting $7,548 from the damages it had previously awarded to
Marvin during the August 29, 2007 Manila Ranch trial. This clerical mistake should be
remanded to the trial court for correction pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on
the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders.
UtahR. Civ. P. 60(a).
For purposes of this rule, a clerical mistake is a type of mistake or omission that is
"mechanical in nature" and is "apparent on the record" and "does not involve a legal decision
or judgment by an attorney." Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Company, 669 P.2d
1201,1206 (Utah 1983). "The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be undertaken for
the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties." Lindsay v. Atkin, 680
P.2d 401, 401 (Utah 1984).
In this case, the trial court awarded Marvin damages in the amount of $27,866.87
(plus prejudgment interest thereon at ten percent (10%)) during the August 29,2007 Manila
Ranch trial. Both parties made note of this amount during the Manila Ranch trial, and both
parties submitted this as the proper amount owed to Marvin in their respective proposed
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findings of fact and orders (none of which were signed or entered by the trial court). Based
on what transpired during the August 29, 2007 Manila Ranch hearing, and the subsequent
documents prepared and submitted to the trial court, it is clear that the trial court ordered, and
the parties understood, that Marvin was to receive a total judgment of $27,866.87 from the
Manila Ranch portion of this litigation, plus prejudgment interest on that amount at the rate
often percent (10%) per annum. In its July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision, however, the
trial court erroneously, and without explanation, noted that Marvin was entitled to receive
only $20,318.87, thereby reducing its prior award to Marvin exactly by $7,548 ($27,866.87$7,548 = $20,318.87). Coincidental^, this $7,548 reduction equals the amount that Marvin
was previously awarded during the August 19,2007 Manila Ranch hearing in relation to the
"real estate commission" issue ($5,000) and the "estate bank account" issue ($2,548).
Neither of those awards were referenced or noted in the trial court's July 25, 2008
Memorandum Decision, despite the fact that they had been clearly awarded to Marvin during
the August 29,2007 trial. As a result of this omission, there is no existing written order from
the trial court which requires the payment of the $7,548 that was undisputedly awarded to
Marvin during the August 29, 2007 Manila Ranch trial, and the court's final Memorandum
Decision has effectively revoked a portion of Marvin's prior award and deprived him of
funds to which he is rightfully, and undisputedly, entitled.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court has committed an obvious clerical mistake in
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its July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision by omitting $7,548 in damages that it had
previously awarded to Marvin during the course of the August 29,2007 Manila Ranch trial.
As such, this issue should be remanded to the trial court for correction, and the trial court's
final order should be modified to include this $7,548 damage award to Marvin, with
prejudgment interest accrued thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum through July
25, 2008.

ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT
L

JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS PROPER ON
ISSUES OF SLANDER OF TITLE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
BECAUSE THE NECESSARY ELEMENT OF DAMAGES WAS NOT
PROVEN BY BRANSON AND THE JURY FOUND NO DAMAGES.

A.

The jury erred as a matter of law in checking box 6.C and 8.C of the jury form
(attorney's fees) where no damages existed.
The jury found that Branson was not entitled to damages for slander of title or breach

of fiduciary duty. (See 6.A. and 8.A. of Special Verdict). The jury mistakenly went on to
conclude that Branson was entitled to attorney's fees, despite the plain language of the
special verdict form that instructed the jury to answer box 6.C. and 8.C. only if damages
were awarded in paragraph 6.A. or 8.A. The court properly corrected this legal error.
So long as the trial court was correct in concluding that there was no competent
evidence to support the jury verdict or conclusion, the court was justified in granting a
JNOV. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060,1066 (Utah 1996). Branson did
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not contest the jury's finding of no damages, but only the court's correction that without
damages there are no attorney's fees. Nor did Branson appeal the court's subsequent ruling
of no attorney's fees on any of Branson's claims. There is no case law holding that attorney's
fees, as special damages, are automatically awarded if there are no other general or special
damages to support the underlying claims.
Branson's argument that Marvin was required to marshal the evidence in his motion
for JNOV is legally in error. The marshalling requirement is actually Branson's, to be
applied on appeal, which Branson has failed to do. Fitz v. Synthes, 1999 UT 103, |8-9, 990
P.2d. 391. For this reason, Branson's appeal should be dismissed. In addition, Marvin's
JNOV motion did not attack the evidence, but instead attacked the erroneous legal conclusion
reached by the jury that suggested attorney's fees be awarded when damages are zero.

B.

JNOV, on the slander of title and fiduciary duty claims, was justified because
attorney's fees, standing alone, cannot satisfy the necessary damage element.
The law regarding an award of attorney's fees in slander of title or breach of fiduciary

duty cases is clear. Before either claim can actually withstand dismissal, the advancing party,
Branson, must show that he incurred actual or special damages that could support an attorney
fee award in the first place. Both claims have the necessary element of damages. See Bass v.
Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988) (Where all the elements
are necessary and must be proven by legally sufficient evidence before the claim is viable,
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and the slanderous statement must cause actual or special damages to the Plaintiff); Utah
Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1315
(D. Utah 1999) (Where the court explained that to prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty
claim, the Plaintiff "must demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as a result of the
alleged breach"). The real issue then, is whether attorney's fees incurred, without any other
damages proven, can support a claim for "special damages." The answer, based on case law,
reason and logic, is that attorney's fees, standing alone, without other special or general
damages, do not and cannot satisfy the damage element to make the claim viable.
For instance, in slander of title cases, the Plaintiff cannot prevail unless he alleges and
proves a pecuniary loss resulting from the act of the Defendant. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.,
208 P.2d 956, 958 (Utah 1949). Further, presumed or general damages are not sufficient to
support the claim. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,
1257 (Utah 1989). Proof of special damages usually involves demonstrating a sale at a
reduced price or at greater expense to the seller. Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders,
Inc., 944 P.2d 361,364 (Utah 1997). Additionally, attorney's fees on slander of title are
limited to those employed to correct the slanderous statement itself rather than to obtain
compensation for the slander. Banberry, 780 P. 2d at 1258. In Banberry, as in this case, the
incorrect title recording was voluntarily corrected and thus attorney's fees could not serve as
the required damages on the slander of title action. As stated in Bass, "Neither a judge or a
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jury can award gratuitous attorney's fees if the elements of the cause of action were not
proven." 761 P. 2d at 1258. "It is the jury's duty to determine the amount of damages a
plaintiff in fact sustained, but it is up to the court to conform the jury's findings to applicable
law." Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 9, Tf 34, 89 P.3d 109.
Only those attorney's fees actually incurred to cure the defect, correct the recording or
place the property in Branson's name prior to the lawsuit were awardable, and then only if
actual damages existed. However, any attorney's fees incurred prior to Branson's lawsuit
were actually performed by Travis Bowen, who did not charge either brother. Moreover,
Branson himself could have voluntarily corrected the problem by signing his own corrective
deed. (R. 11487, pg. 503-504). Note, Branson has failed to show one bit of evidence about
the amount of attorney's fees he specifically incurred to correct the slander of title prior to
filing the lawsuit. As a matter of law, he failed to prove any special damages.
Nor can Branson show he must receive attorney's fees on his breach of fiduciary duty
claim. A successful breach of fiduciary duty claim requires damages to the Plaintiff,
proximately caused by that breach. See Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 508 F.3d 277,
283 (5th Cir. 2007), Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009).
Utah courts have consistently held that a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim requires a
showing of actual damages before attorney's fees can be awarded. Free Motion Fitness, Inc.
v. Wells Fargo Bank West, NA, 2009 UT App. 120,128, 208 P. 3d 1066. In Free Motion
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Fitness the Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees without a showing of damages, and
the court ruled that Plaintiffs could not prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. (Id); See
also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (When a Plaintiff only recovers nominal
damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief,
".. .the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all").
The Federal District Court of Utah faced a similar issue in Utah Medical Products,
Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc, where the Court held the Plaintiff, "must
demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as a result from the alleged breach." 79 F. Supp.
2d at 1315. The Court also explained that, "the fact of damages is an essential element of the
cause of action that must be substantiated." (Id.) In other words, "because damage is an
essential element for a claim for breach of fiduciary duty," a claim without damages "fails as
a matter of law." (Id.)

C.

There are other reasons that JNOV was properly granted as a matter of law.
The trial court's decision is also justified by other valid reasons that defeated

Branson's claim for slander of title or fiduciary duty. For instance, slander of title requires
the statement to have been made with malice. The court in Banberry noted a "difference
between poor performance and malice." 780 P.2d at 1257. In Banberry, the mistake arose
when the bank made a clerical error in copying a verbatim description in the recorded Deed
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of Trust. {Id.) Although the statement was false, this court qualified that, "a published false
statement.. .does not constitute slander of title without the element of malice." {Id.) Malice
exists if there is, "willful and knowingly recorded a false and fraudulent instrument for the
purpose of slandering the Plaintiffs title." Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d
481, 486 (Utah 1975). In addition, a holder of title cannot act with malice against himself
where he is a joint owner on the property. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association v.
Bagley & Co.} 863 P.2d 1, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (reversed on other grounds); see also
JackB. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131,1134-35 (Utah 1988) (Noting that when
liquidation occurred before the title holder's interest was extinguished, the facts could not
sustain a claim for slander of title).
In this case, Branson and Marvin were joint owners on the property which was
transferred to Steelwater Investments, L. P. It was legally impossible to slander their own
title. The simple clerical error and recording did not have the requisite willfulness since none
of the parties knew about this mistake until afterwards. Travis Bowen then corrected this
problem by recording corrective deeds in July 2002 before the lawsuit ever began. Travis
Bowen was dismissed from the lawsuit because Branson could show no damages and the
court released Marvin as well because Branson could show no damages or malice.
Regarding breach of fiduciary duty, the court properly treated any windup of the
contract terms as a breach of contract rather than breach of fiduciary duty. The court ruled in
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the Findings and Order on Summary Judgment dated February 9, 2007 the fiduciary duty
claim will be treated as "breach of contract" claims. (R. 10188 ^ 1). Note, the court never
awarded any attorney's fees to Branson on any of his claims, including breach of contract. If
no attorney's fees were awardable on breach of contract that had $9,000 in damages,
certainly no attorney's fees would be awardable on a breach of fiduciary duty claim that had
zero damages.
Branson admits that the judge was to determine and award the amount of attorney's
fees. See Branson's brief, pg. 8. Branson also admits that both sides had the opportunity to
object to the jury instructions. Branson did not object to those instructions. According to
Branson, the instructions "accurately reflect the law and elements for the claims." See
Branson's brief, pg. 9. Branson cannot use the same jury instructions as both a sword and a
shield and the trial court's finding of no attorney's fees was not only proper under JNOV but
also under the subsequent order granting Branson zero attorney's fees. The court made
detailed findings and orders refusing to grant Branson's attorney fees, holding he was not the
prevailing party. (R. 10566). Branson did not appeal this part of the decision.

II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
CLAIM WAS PROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO GENUINE DISPUTE AS
TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.
A judge must grant summary judgment when one party has failed to present a genuine

dispute as to a material fact (i.e. a necessary element of the tort) and the other party is entitled
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to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a summary judgment
motion, a court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but
"bald statements do not suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact.55 Rawson v.
Conover, 2001 UT 24, ^25, 20 P.3d 876. "An adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.5' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). "Once the moving party
challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence that
is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact..." Shaw Resources Limited, LLC v.
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313, f 22, 142 P.3d 560. The judge in this
case granted summary judgment against Branson's claim of malicious prosecution because
Branson's elements were challenged and Branson could not supply proof of any material fact.
To establish a prima facie case for malicious prosecution, Branson must prove four
necessary elements: (1) Marvin initiated or procured the initiation of criminal proceedings
against an innocent Branson; (2) Marvin did not have probable cause to initiate the
prosecution; (3) Marvin initiated the proceedings primarily for a purpose other than that of
bringing Branson to justice; and (4) the proceedings terminated in favor of Branson, or the
accused. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). "The absence of
any one of the four elements is fatal to the cause of action.55 Callioux v. Progressive
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Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Emphasis added).

A.

Summary judgment was proper because Marvin did not instigate the prosecution
against Branson. Branson brought it on himself, he was not innocent; and, he pled
guilty to two counts.
Branson violated a protective order, then drove off recklessly, knowing Marvin was

hanging on the door for dear life. Branson controlled the speed of his vehicle and refused to
stop or slow down. He traveled a significant distance while Marvin begged Branson to stop
before Marvin was killed. Only then, after traveling several hundred feet, did Branson stop
and Marvin fell and skidded or rolled down the road. These facts were undisputed. The 911
call was made by Marvin's wife who feared for Marvin's safety. The police responded
directly to Branson's home and Branson gave them such a hard time he was arrested on the
spot and charged with violation of a protective order. The court opined that Marvin really
never instigated this claim because Branson brought it upon himself and the State of Utah
took over after the 911protective order violation call. The court made it clear in oral
argument that it makes no sense to subject a private citizen to malicious prosecution when
said prosecution is taken from the citizen's hands and controlled by the State. (R. 11482 pg.
22 to 23).
Nor was Branson an innocent plaintiff. In Hodges, the jury found by a special verdict
that the plaintiff was innocent; she did not commit the acts she was accused of. 811 P.2d at
158. Conversely, in the present case, Branson not only pled guilty to two charges brought
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against him in connection with Branson's attack on January 26,2005, but Branson admitted
to arguing with Marvin and driving away several feet with Marvin hanging on begging
Branson to stop before he was killed. Although the aggravated assault charge was deferred
until after the civil litigation, the civil jury subsequently found Branson had assaulted Marvin
and awarded Marvin $1.00, all he asked for.
In the eyes of the law, Marvin never advanced this case, the State did and Branson is
not an innocent plaintiff.

Branson was convicted and held liable for his actions. Thus,

Branson failed to present any genuine dispute as to the first or fourth element.

B.

Summary judgment was proper because both the accuser and the court had
probable cause to believe a crime had been committed.
Second, a malicious prosecution action must lack probable cause. The Supreme Court

of the United States has explained that lack of probable cause "must be proved by the
plaintiff by some affirmative evidence." Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544,550 (1861). Again,
to avoid summary judgment, an adverse party "may not rest upon... mere allegations." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Probable cause is a relatively low threshold. To have probable cause, "[t]he accuser
must have a reasonable basis for believing the accusation and must also subjectively believe
the accusation to be true." Hodges, 811 P.2d at 158. In Hodges, the accuser lacked probable
cause because he not only expressed doubt as to the guilt of the accused but also created a
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serious question as to his own culpability when he lied. (Id. at 158-59). To further explain
probable cause, the court also approved of a jury instruction that required the accusers to be
"sufficiently informed of the facts to initiate the criminal proceedings.55 (Id. at 160.)
Judge Hadfield's judicial finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing is an
absolute defense. Utah courts have long explained that "[i]f it is found that probable cause
did, in fact, exist, it would be a complete answer and defense . . . in all actions of malicious
prosecution.55 Singh v. MacDonald, 188 P. 631, 632 (Utah 1920). Similarly, where a criminal
trial resulted in "two findings of probable cause,55 the Court of Appeals of Utah noted that the
absence of probable cause in a malicious prosecution claim "cannot be proven.55 Calliovx v.
Progressive Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Emphasis added).
In this case, Marvin was not only the victim of a crime but also a person with full
understanding of Branson's violation of his own protective order since Marvin obtained that
protective order and knew its terms. Unlike the accuser in Hodges, Marvin knew of
Branson's guilt and called the authorities in response to a violent altercation. Unlike the
accuser in Hodges, Marvin was "sufficiently informed55 because he was the victim of a crime.
Marvin had actual knowledge of the circumstances and never denied them. Notably, Branson
has failed to provide any affirmative evidence showing that Marvin lacked probable cause.
To substantiate Marvin's probable cause, the jury in the civil case also believed and found
proximate cause when they awarded Marvin $1.00 (all he asked for) for Branson's assault.
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C.

Summary judgment was proper because the prosecution was initiated with a proper
purpose: to bring an offender to justice.
The third element of a malicious prosecution is improper purpose. In Hodges, the

accusers had an improper purpose because they used the threat of criminal prosecution as
leverage to force the accused to pay money that was missing. 811 P.2d at 161. Conversely, an
employee who initiated prosecution "for the legitimate purpose of protecting company
property" was not malicious. Agler v. Scheidle, 2006 UT App 495, \1. In affirming the trial
court's granting of summary judgment against a malicious prosecution claim, the Agler court
noted that "the record is void of any evidence beyond Plaintiffs speculation" of an improper
purpose. (Id.)
Unlike Hodges, Marvin did not use the criminal justice process to force Branson to
pay money or for any other improper purpose. He only asked for $ 1.00 for the assault. As in
Agler, the trial court in this case explained that "the record is void of any evidence beyond
[Branson's] speculation that [Marvin] initiated the prosecution allegations for any wrongful
or improper purpose." (R. 8722). This includes the neighbor's affidavit, which "is neither
conclusive of actual innocence (of Branson) nor is it sufficient proof of malice (by Marvin)."
(R. 8722). Thus, Branson failed to present any genuine dispute as to the third element.
As shown above, Branson did not obtain a favorable outcome. Rather, he pled guilty
to two criminal charges and the other was deferred until the civil trial which also found
assault. Even if Branson could satisfy one of the elements, the absence of any one of the four
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is fatal to his cause of action. Because Branson failed to present any genuine dispute as to
any of the elements of malicious prosecution, it was proper for the judge to grant summary
judgment against the claim as a matter of law.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL
Marvin respectfully requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs incurred in
connection with Branson's appeal and this cross appeal. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 33 provides, "if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just use damages, which may include
single or double costs.. .and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party."
Because Branson's appeal has no legal or factual basis, was meritless, and/or was
brought in bad faith, without marshalling the evidence, this court should determine it was
frivolous and award Marvin costs and attorney's fees. Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v.
Hall 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In the event this court determines Branson's
appeal has a reasonable factual and legal basis and, thus, determines attorney's fees and costs
are not appropriate under Rule 33, Marvin requests an award of costs pursuant to Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure Rule 34.
Further, Marvin is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in
connection with this appeal on the same grounds he was entitled to them at the trial level: by
the parties' contract and by statute. The Supreme Court of Utah has interpreted statutes and
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contracts broadly so as to award attorney's fees on appeal where a statute or contract initially
authorizes them.

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305, 319 (Utah 1998); see also

Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P.C. v. Pugh, 2006 UT App 68,115 (quoting R&R
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc. 936 P. 2d 1068,1081 "where party entitled to attorney
fees below prevails on appeal, attorney fee award on appeal proper"). On these grounds
Marvin is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees and costs he has incurred in relation to
this appeal.

CONCLUSION
I.

CROSS APPELLANT BRIEF

For the foregoing reasons, Marvin respectfully requests that this case be remanded so
the trial court can enter an award for Marvin's attorney's fees and costs on the ABCO pretrial motion practice and Manila Ranch trial in this matter, that it sua spontae Marvin be
awarded prejudgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum through July 25,
2008 on all amounts granted to him in connection with the Manila Ranch trial, and that the
trial court's final order in this matter be corrected as set forth herein to reflect that the total
principal amount of Marvin's award from the Manila Ranch trial is $27,865 principal and
$17,968.42 in pre-judgment interest, less $8,999 due Branson, for total final judgment due of
$36,834.42. Marvin also respectfully requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs in
connection with Branson's appeal and this cross-appeal.
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II.

APPELLEE BRIEF

As the Appellant explained, he "got his day in court." (Br. at 6.) Branson simply could
not sufficiently prove the elements of his claims for slander of title, breach of fiduciary duty,
or malicious prosecution. The trial court correctly denied the claims and did not award any
attorney's fees. Thus, this Court should affirm the decisions of the lower court regarding
JNOV and partial summary judgment.
DATED this < ^ T d a y of September, 2009.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
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I hereby certify that on this 2)4 day of September, 2009,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, postage
prepaid, to the following:

James E. Magleby
Magleby & Greenwood, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

J \MJG\Pleadmgs\neff\Utah Supreme Court\Bnef of Appellee and Cross Appellant 9-25-09(Leshe) 2 (1) doc
N-4759 10

-73-

Exhibit A

Page 1

^LexisNexis*
LEXSTAT URCP RULE 60
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All Rights Reserved
*** THIS DOCUMENT REFLECTS CHANGES RECEIVED THROUGH JULY 1, 2009 ***
STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
URCP Rule 60 (2009)
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party
and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with
leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
HISTORY: Amended effective April 1,1998
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. ~ The 1998 amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion the following: "(4)
when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action." This basis for a motion is not found in the federal rule. The
committee concluded the clause was ambiguous and possibly in conflict with rules permitting service by means other
than personal service.
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Any other reason justifying relief."
— Abuse of discretion
~ Default judgment.

Page 1

LexisNexis*
LEXSTAT UTAH R. APP. P. 33
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All Rights Reserved
*** THIS DOCUMENT REFLECTS CHANGES RECEIVED THROUGH JULY 1, 2009 ***
STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. App. P. Rule 33 (2009)
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The
court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the
party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A party may request damages
under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney
or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing.
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. - Rule 33 is substantially redrafted to provide definitions and procedures for assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court must award damages. This is in keeping with Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the amount of damages — single or double costs or attorney fees or both ~ is left to
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended to make express the authority of the court to impose sanctions upon the
party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid the conflict created for appointed counsel by Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168
(Utah 1981). Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by the defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
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LEXSTAT UTAH R. APP. P. 34
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
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All Rights Reserved
*** THIS DOCUMENT REFLECTS CHANGES RECEIVED THROUGH JULY 1, 2009 ***
STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. App. P. Rule 34 (2009)
Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall
be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an
award of costs for or against the state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or prohibited by
law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as
costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda and
attachments not to exceed $ 3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record,
including costs of the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for supersedeas or cost
bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees for filing and docketing the appeal.
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. A party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed with
the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified
bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection,
together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which
judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of
record. If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax
the costs and enter a final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the
same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the clerk shall be reviewable by
the trial court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment.
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters before the court, including appeals from an
agency, costs may be allowed as in cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the time in
which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an order denying such a petition, the party to whom
costs have been awarded may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party an itemized and
verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection
and a motion to have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within the allotted time, the
clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to
the cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax the same, and a
judgment shall be entered thereon against the adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the
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court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in the state,
who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court.
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1999
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Costs awarded.
Cited.
Costs awarded.
Although the court denied the award of attorney fees to husband under Rule 33(a) because the wife's appeal had a
reasonable factual and legal basis, costs were awarded to husband under Rule 34. Cooke v. Cooke 2001 Utah App.
LEXIS 28 2001 UTApp 110, 22 P.3d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. 2006 Utah
LEXIS 96.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. ~ 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 909 et seq
CJ.S. - 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 995
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VI. TRIALS
URCP Rule 52 (2009)
Rule 52. Findings by the court; correction of the record.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to
the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings
of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend
its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury,
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party
raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(d) Correction of the record. If anything material is omitted from or misstated in the transcript of an audio or video
record of a hearing or trial, or if a disagreement arises as to whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the
proceeding, a party may move to correct the record. The motion must be filed within 10 days after the transcript of the
hearing is filed, unless good cause is shown. The omission, misstatement or disagreement shall be resolved by the court
and the record made to accurately reflect the proceeding.
HISTORY: Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; July 1, 2009
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
URCP Rule 54 (2009)
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed
by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah,
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A
party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion
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to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment,
shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained.
The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof
in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
HISTORY: Amended effective January 1, 1985; November 1, 2003
NOTES: Compiler's Notes. - Subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the appellate court and
costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P.
This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References.-- Continuances, discretion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 40(b).
State, payment of costs awarded against, § 78B-5-806.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, U.R.C.P. 62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 78B-1-147.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.
— In general.
— Challenge of award.
— Depositions.
— Discretionary.
~ Expenses of preparation for action.
~ Extension of time for filing.
~ Failure to object.
— Liability of state.
~ Mediation.
~ Service on adverse party.
— Statutory limits.
~ Time for claiming
— Untimely filing of memorandum.
~ When not demanded.
Default judgments.
Effect of partial final judgment.
Final order.
— Appealability.
-- Attorney's fee award.
~ Certification.
~ Claims for relief.
— Complete disposal of claim or party.
~ Effect of counterclaim.
— No just reason for delay.
~ Review of finality.
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004
NOTES: Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 56, F.R.CP.
Cross-References.-- Contempt generally, § 78B-6-301 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Affidavit.
-- Bad faith
— Contents.
~ Corporation.
— Experts.
— Extension of time to submit
— Failure to submit.
— Inconsistency with deposition.
— Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
~ Objection.
— Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
~ Superseding pleadings.
— Unpleaded defenses.
~ Verified pleading.
-- Waiver of right to contest.
~ When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
— Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
~ Adversely affected party.
~ Standard of review.
Applicability.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Burden of proof
Compliance with rule.
Continuance for further discovery.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Effect of denial.
Evidence.
~ Admissions of plaintiff.
— Facts considered.
— Improper evidence.
— Proof.
— Unsupported motion
— Weight of testimony.
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
URCP Rule 56 (2009)
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7.
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to
file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART IX. ATTORNEYS
URCP Rule 73 (2009)
Rule 73 Attorney fees.
(a) When attorney fees are authorized by contract or by law, a request for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit
or testimony unless the party claims attorney fees in accordance with the schedule in subsection (d) or in accordance
with Utah Code Section 75-3-718 and no objection to the fee has been made.
(b) An affidavit supporting a request for or augmentation of attorney fees shall set forth:
(1) the basis for the award;
(2) a reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work performed, including for each item of work the
name, position (such as attorney, paralegal, administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate of the persons who performed
the work;
(3) factors showing the reasonableness of the fees;
(4) the amount of attorney fees previously awarded; and.
(5) if the affidavit is in support of attorney fees for services rendered to an assignee or a debt collector, the terms of
any agreement for sharing the fee and a statement that the attorney is not sharing the fee or any portion thereof in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.
(c) If a party requests attorney fees in accordance with the schedule in subsection (d), the party's complaint shall
state the basis for attorney fees, state the amount of attorney fees allowed by the schedule, cite the law or attach a copy
of the contract authorizing the award, and, if the attorney fees are for services rendered to an assignee or a debt collector, a statement that the attorney will not share the fee or any portion thereof in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.
(d) Attorney fees awarded under the schedule may be augmented only for considerable additional efforts in collecting or defending the judgment and only after further order of the court.

Amount of Damages, Exclusive of Costs,
Attorney Fees and Post-Judgment
Interest,
0.00
1,500.01
2,000.01
2,500.01
3,000.01

Attorney

1,500.00
2,000.00
2,500.00
3,000.00
3,500.00

Allowed
250.00
325.00
400.00
475.00
550.00
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3,500.01
4,000.01
4,500.01

4,000.00
4,500.00
or more

625.00
700.00
775.00

HISTORY: Added effective November 1, 2003; amended April 1, 2005
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. - The schedule does not limit the amount of a reasonable attorney fee if an affidavit is submitted. The schedule of attorney fees includes amounts for routine orders supplemental to the judgment and
routine collection writs. For attorney fees for collection efforts beyond such routine steps, the lawyer should apply to the
court under subsections (a) and (b).
Repeals. — Former Rule 73(a) to (g) and (m), relating to notice of appeal and the required bond, were deleted with
the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1,1985. For present provisions, see Rules 6 to
13, Utah R. App. P. The remainder of the rule, prescribing procedure for appealing a judgment of a city or justice court,
was repealed in 1990.
Amendment Notes.- The 2005 amendment deleted "No affidavit is required" from the beginning of Subdivision
(c), added the language beginning "and, if the attorney fees are for services rendered" at the end, and made related
changes.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Action against former client.
Compliance with rule
Reasonableness.
Action against former client.
Law firm's counsel was entitled to attorney fees in breach of contract action to recover for services rendered before
former client hired new counsel in an underlying dispute; the fee contract clearly provided for such fees and the work
performed on the firm's complaint for breach of contract was inextricably mixed with the defense on the client's counterclaims based on the client's belief that the firm had not properly represented her in the dispute. (Unpublished decision.) Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P.C. v. Pugh 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 70.
Compliance with rule
The affidavit submitted by the prevailing party's counsel satisfied the requirements of this rule; while only one attorney from the firm submitted an affidavit, the affiant stated that he was operating from personal knowledge and he
included the firm's billing records with his affidavit. The entries in the billing records stated the work performed, the
person performing the work, and the hourly rate charged by the person performing the work. Kenny v. Rich court of
Appeals of Utah 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 189 2008 UT App 209, 186 P3d 989, 0809141711 OASIS (Utah Ct. App.
2008), cert, denied, 2008 Utah LEXIS 191 (Utah Sept. 17, 2008) .
Reasonableness.
Attorney fee award of $ 885 to a recipient of unwanted email under former § 13-36-105(2)(b) was a reasonable exercise of the trial court's discretion. Although claimant had requested over $ 4000 in attorney fees, reduction was reasonable because plaintiffs attorneys did not reasonably need to expend all of the time they claimed in researching, discussing, and documenting the case; the requested hourly rate exceeded the customary fees charged in the locality for the
type of work performed; and the requested fee was far in excess of the $ 10 in damages awarded. Amyx v. Columbia
House Holdings court of Appeals of Utah 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 114 2005 UTApp 118, 110 P.3d 176 (Utah Ct. App.
2005).
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES
Utah R. Evid. Rule 606 (2009)
Rule 606. Competency of juror as witness.
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which the
juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the
presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict
or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement
by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with Rules 41 and 44, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), and Utah case law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 R2d 662 (1972).
Cross-References.-- Judge or juror may be witness, § 78B-1-133.
Jurors, Rule 47, U.R.C.P.
Misconduct of jury, proof by juror's affidavit, Rule 59(a)(2), U.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Validity of verdict or information.
~ Outside influence.
Cited.
Validity of verdict or information.
Evidence by affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received to impeach or question the jury verdict or to show
the grounds upon which it was rendered, or to show their misunderstanding of fact or law, or that they misunderstood
the charge of the court, or the effect of their verdict, or their opinions, surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at
a verdict. State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972).
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TITLE 75. UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
CHAPTER 7. UTAH UNIFORM TRUST CODE
PART 10. LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES AND RIGHTS OF PERSONS DEALING WITH TRUSTEE
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004 (2009)
§ 75-7-1004. Attorney's fees and costs
(1) In a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court may, as justice and equity may require,
award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party orfromthe
trust that is the subject of the controversy.
(2) If a trustee defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, the trustee is entitled
to receivefromthe trust die necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-7-1004, enacted by L. 2004, ch. 89, § 109.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. - Laws 2004, ch. 89, § 123 makes the act effective on July 1, 2004.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle,
or title.

Exhibit B

In the First Judicial District Court
In and for Cache County, State of Utah
BRANDON NEFF
Plaintiff(s),

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Case Number: 030100275

MARVIN NEFF

JUDGE: GORDON J LOW
Defendant(s).

On the 7th day of February, 2008, Judge Thomas L Willmore, Presiding Judge of the First
District Court Ordered that all remaining and outstanding issues in this case were to be
adjudicated by Judge Gordon J Low the undersigned Judge. In accordance with the said order,
the undersigned has received the file and the outstanding unresolved motions and issues
addressed therein and issues this Memorandum Decision.
It should be noted that requests have been made for oral argument, but the Court has
before it five (5) years of pleadings, comprising of forty-one (41) volumes, conducted numerous
hearings and presided over a ten (10) day trial. The Rules do not provide for further hearings nor
will the Court or parties be benefitted thereby. It is time to bring those matters to closure and this
Memorandum Decision is the Court's best efforts in doing so.
It is first to be noted that on the 6th day of November, 2007, the Court issued a
Memorandum Decision denying attorney fees to either side. That ruling addresses the issues
raised relative to the Motions for Reconsideration.
On the 24th day of January, 2008, the Defendant filed a second Request to Submit for
Decision requesting the Court to address the final Order on Manila Ranch, Statute of Limitations,
-1-

Offsets and Amounts Due and Pre-Trial attorney fees claimed by the Defendant.
On the 30th day of January, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a document styled, Clarification
Regarding Outstanding Motion Submitted for Decision. Therein he identified the following:
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike or in the Alternative, Stay Marvin's (Defendant's)
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs.

Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Consideration of Plaintiffs Motion to
Strike, or in the Alternative, Stay Marvin's Motion for Entry of Judgment for
Attorney Fees and Costs.

Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion to Enlarge Time to Respond to Marvin's Motion for
Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs.

The Plaintiff also identified by reference to the Court's above referenced
Memorandum Decision issued on the 6th day of November, 2007, the Defendant's
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs, Offsets and
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order on
the Manila Ranch.
It should also be noted that filed on the 30th day of November, 2007, by the Plaintiff, was
filed a Request to Submit for Decision requesting a ruling on his Motion to Enlarge Time to
Respondent's (Marvin) Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs and the
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Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motions Expedited Consideration of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike, or in the
Alternative, Stay Marvin's (Defendant's) Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and
Costs.
The Court had neither seen nor ruled upon the last two (2) motions immediately identified
above until now, nor has the Defendant responded to the same. The motions are conflicting as
one requests an enlargement of time to respond before ruling, the other for an expedited
consideration of the Motion to Strike. In any event, it has now been six months since those last
two request, no responses have been filed by the Defendant and no proposed response by the
Plaintiff for which the enlargement of time was requested.
Consistent with the Court's repeated admonition relative to unnecessary, cumulative and
overly technical motions, the Court will address the heart of the matter without further motions,
memoranda or other supporting documents or oral argument.
This action was initiated by, the Plaintiff Branson Neff, by thefilingof a complaint
against multiple Defendant's, all of whom were removed as the litigation proceeded, except the
Defendant Marvin Neff Though the complaint named at least seventeen different primary
causes of action, they all arose from the family, brotherly relationship of the final two parties.
The claims or causes of action were variously styled, but all related to the separation of the two
brothers from a business relationship and the acrimony, misunderstandings, distrust lack of
communication and general discontent of the parties, (primarily that of the Plaintiff) with the
final results of the dissolution, separation and success or lack thereof of the remaining separated
business efforts and intents.
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In motion practice and at trial by jury, the Plaintiff failed to recover or succeed on the
majority of his claims. On a single claim described as a breach of contract, the Plaintiff did
receive a judgment in the sum of nine thousand dollars ($9,000.00). In light of the money
damage claimed for over three million dollars plus punitive damages, the recovery can only
generously be described as nominal and more accurately de minimus in it's nature and amount.
The Plaintiff however, seeks an award of attorney fees on the breach of contract claim on
the basis that he prevailed in a large fashion thereon extend-limited as it may be.
Claims, except breach of contract by the Plaintiff were voluntarily withdrawn by the
Defendant before the matter was submitted to the jury. On the Defendant's breach of contract he
requested and was awarded one dollar ($1.00).
Both parties cite the contractual language and case law in support of their claims. The
Defendant also graphically sets forth the Plaintiffs claims and the Plaintiffs failure to receive
any awards thereon.
The case law supplied by the Defendant is persuasive and a flexible and reasoned in
approach is appropriate. However this entire, unfortunate lawsuit arises not so much out of a
breach of contract or proven non-breach, but rather out of the tragic breakdown of family
relationships, convoluted, complicated and infused with emotion, both healthy and unfortunately
unhealthy. To cast the whole controversy as one of breach of contract, though there was a
contract and to consider or not consider the other claims does not adequately describe or address
the terrible mess these two brothers created for themselves. The attorneys fees expended and
incurred on both sides are enormous, the time and energy spent, the precious family ties and
relationships lost, the public's forum and taxes, money wasted can all only be adequately
-4-
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described as a disaster. The only feasible and reasoned decision relative to attorney's fees is that
neither party prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss and this Court refuses to compound the loss
by awarding fees to either party.
The jury's award of nine thousand dollars ($9,000.00) for breach of contract to the
Plaintiff as well as it's award of one dollar ($1.00) to the Defendant are both unsupportable and
without basis under the facts of the case. Though the Court will not sua sponte set them aside,
nor solicit or entertain motions to do so, the Court is not bound by the award to find therefrom a
"prevailing party' in this catastrophic litigation, and no fees to either side are awarded.
The Defendant has also sought his Pre-trial attorney fees and costs as they relate to the
Aspen Spring/ABCO portion of this bifurcated action. He seeks these under both the language of
the contract(s), the outcome of the litigation, both ultimately and on various Pre-trial motions
and pursuant to Rule 54 (d) U.R.C.P (costs) and under §78-27-50.5 UCA. The Court questions
the application of the provisions of the Code section to this action, but regardless, the Court for
the reasons above stated declines to award fees. As no fees are awarded the issues of whether the
fees were properly applied for and will not be addressed.
As to this motion and ruling, and in order to avoid additional objections or further motion
practice, this is the formal and final Order. Neither party need submit any further pleadings on
Proposed Orders.
On the 29th day of August, 2007, a hearing was conducted on what is variously described
as the Manila Ranch or Estate matter. The hearing was in the form of a bench trial and Rule 56
hearing, and resulted in a number of stipulations involving claims, merits, statute of limitations,
offsets, defenses, money sums and of course attorneys fees. Some settlement discussions also
-5-
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occurred and assignments were given to counsel relating to supplemental memoranda and/or
orders. Exhibits were received subject to objections.
Since the hearing, the Plaintiff filed a Proposed Order on the 17th day of September, 2007.
On the 19th day of September, the Defendant filed an objection to the Plaintiffs Proposed Order
and his own Proposed set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. On the 3rd day of October,
2007, Plaintiff filed his objections to the Defendant's Proposed Order and a Response to
Defendant's Objection. On said date was alsofiledby the Plaintiff a memorandum regarding
Plaintiffs claimed offsets. The Court then received the Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs
Objection on October 7, 2007.
Some argument is addresses by the parties regarding style, order, procedure, and
timeliness. Those issues are secondary and by this time now moot.
On the 16th day of October, 2007 Defendant filed his memorandum regarding Plaintiffs
claims for offsets. The Plaintiff on November 16th, 2007 filed his reply as invited by the Court
relative to his claim for offsets.
Addressing first the issue of offsets, the Court has found, and the trial was conducted on
the basis that the contract for separation, dissolution and dividing up of the assets as between
these two family members was binding, though the actual litigation involved far more than a
simple "arms length contract".
Whatever else the parties were trying to achieve, in all this was a global settlement,
resolution, separation and division of their relationship, business and economic entanglement.
The claims by the Plaintiff regarding breach of contract, accounting, breach offiduciaryduty,
damages, offsets and the like related to ABCO and Westco were resolved either in pre-trial
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motion rulings or at trial by the jury and they cannot be revisited here. The above relates as well
to the claims of disproportionate payments to family members. Specially relative to those claims,
the Court ruled on Statute of Limitations grounds, but regardless they were part of the
dissolution. The only way they could have survived the merged dissolution is on the grounds of
fraud, which the court ruled on in motions prior to trial. The Court is precluded now from
revisiting those matters.
Each of the Plaintiffs claims were either ruled upon in pre-trail motion practice, or
merged and tried before the jury. Though the Dan James Report regarding the some of eighteen
thousand dollars ($18,000.00) has been referred to in support of Plaintiff s claim, it is not
evidence upon which this Court can rely in adjudicating the issue before it. It is not competent
evidence to be received under the Rules and cannot be reviewed as evidence of offset. As to
Claims for offset, affirmative defenses, counter-claims on both sides, the Court on Motion,
already ruled thereon or it was necessarily part of the jury's adjudication. The Claims simply
cannot survive the trial given the fact it was a trial on, among numerous other claims, breach of
contract, fraud, fair dealing, misrepresentation, damages, conversion and a whole host of other
claims.
Plaintiff, in both his initial memorandum regarding offset, and more particularly in his
Reply, suggests the Defendant misses the mark and ignores the Court's rulings on offsets as they
affect the accounting and relief sought regarding the Manila Ranch on Estate Matters.
At the outset, telling in this litigation is the footnote on page 4 of Plaintiff s Reply
Memorandum. This Court has been equally unable to congratulate either side for its acrimonious
actions and forest destroying the approach to this litigation. Both havefiredoff reams of
-7-

paperwork. The Defendant is even criticized for dismissing the claims made. In this Courts
view, both parties should have done so before any action was even filed. It has largely been a
war of attrition over family relationships gone bad and over what could have been a happy filial
separation that has turned into the War of the Roses. All of the issues regarding the payments to
the parties children were barred as above stated either on statute of limitations,
integration/merger, lack of standing (they are after all claims of the children supposedly for
services rendered and not claims of the parties) or by adjudication by the Court or jury. The
argument that the Court, in pre-trial, ruled on certain claims, but left others viable, results in the
opportunity to at once have the jury address them, they cannot now be adjudicated as offsets
against the bifurcated issues in relation to the Manila Ranch/Estate case.
Through the Statue of Limitations ruling does not alone bar offset, that does not negate
the Plaintiffs burden to show that either the claims were not, or could not have been adjudicated
at trial, and also that the offset claims are supported (proven) by the facts in evidence.
The Plaintiff is correct that the statue of limitations bar the claim for relief, but does not
bar the claim as offset. That however was a trial issue by the jury and should have been made
there. To the extent it was made and proven or not proven, the Court must assume that the jury
considered it. No specific findings were made by the jury so it can only be considered as part of
the general verdict and is now res judicata.
The claims of fraud, conversion, disproportionate payments, breach of trust or fiduciary
duty, constructed trust were all elements of the claims either for fraud pre-trial or of breach of
contract at trial. They either explicitly were part of the claim before the jury or could have been,
or should have been and were either considered by the jury or not. With respect to the two
-8-
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conflicting proposed orders submitted by the parties, and based upon the proffers, exhibits,
stipulations, and interim rulings on the 29th day of August, 2007, the Court here rules, without
finding breach of fiduciary duty or otherwise that the Defendant is entitled to receive from the
accounting the following:
1. Ranch. Payment
$6,951.61

Principle

$5,387.49

Interest

2. Oil Royalty
$2,141.64

Principle

$1,568.41

Interest

3. Cattle Sale
$11,225.62

Principle

$4,957.70

Interest

Against those sums, Plaintiff is entitled to offset of $8999.00 plus interest at the judgment
date.
The money inter pled into the Court are to be paid out to the parties evenly after reflecting
the above stated offsets and accounting.
This will constitute the final order herein and any further relief is to be sought on appeal.
Dated thjjfrfS

day of July, 2008.
BY THE COURT

Neff vs Neff 2008-07-25/GJlVjl
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
BRANSON NEFF,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
Case No: 030100275

vs.
MARVIN G. NEFF, et al,
Defendant.

Judge: Gordon J. Low

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs Request for
Reconsideration or Modification of June 19,2007, Order. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs
Request, Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Request for an Order on Attorney Fees,
Plaintiffs Notice of Docketing Error in Entry of Findings and Order Dated June 19,2007,
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike, Defendant's Reply and
Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Notice of
Docketing Error, and relevant case law and statutory provisions.
The contractual language indicated that the prevailing party may be awarded attorney
fees. The Jury found that both parties prevailed on the Breach of Contract and that both parties
breached their contractual obligations. The Jury awarded Plaintiff $9,000.00 and the Jury found
$1.00 for Defendant.
Even though Defendant reserved attorney's fees to be determined at the end of trial, the
Court finds that neither party is justified in receiving attorney's fees in regards to the breach of
contract issue. The Court finds that even if the parties were justified in receiving attorney's fees,
the fees would offset one another.

Therefore, Attorney's fees in regards to the breach of contract issue will not be awarded
to either party.
In the case of Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, PI (Utah 2006) the Utah Supreme Court
states, we "absolutely rejecting the practice of filing postjudgment motions to reconsider. We
also warn that future filings of postjudgment motions to reconsider will not toll the time for
appeal and therefore may subject attorneys to malpractice claims." The Court will not reconsider
or modify its June 19,2007, Order.
Therefore, Plaintiffs Request for Reconsideration or Modification of June 19,2007,
Order is denied. In denying Plaintiffs Request the Court finds that the parties other Motions,
Objections, and Notices in regards to the issue at hand are moot. Defendant's counsel is directed
to prepare an order in conformance herewith.
Dated this Qr- day of November, 2007.
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Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
jjames C. Jenkins (#1658)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
(Attorneys for Defendants
130 South Main, Suite 200
p.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
[Telephone: (435) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
[BRANSON G. NEFF, an individual,
Plaintiff,
NS.

MARVIN G. NEFF, an individual,
nTRAVIS L. BOWEN, ESQ., an individual,
fTRAVIS L. BOWEN, P.C, a Utah
professional corporation, ABCO
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
corporation, and WESTCo, an unregistered
bartnership between BRANSON G. NEFF
|and MARVIN G. NEFF,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT AND
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES

Civil No. 030100275
Honorable Gordon J. Low

Defendants.

This matter came before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge, upon Plaintiffs
[Motion for Attorneys Fees and Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
[The Court having considered the record of this case, having conducted the trial herein, and
-IOGGAN, P.C.
IEYS AT LAW

paving considered memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties and oral arguments presented

MAIN, SUITE 2 0 0
BOX 525

after hearing on April 16, 2007, now enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

vH 84323-0525
752-1551

Law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the written contracts between the parties provides for the

recovery of attorneys fees to be awarded to the prevailing party.
2.

Neither party objected to the jury instructions or verdict form.

3.

Plaintiff in this action asserted multiple claims against the Defendants.

4.

The jury verdict provides that Plaintiff Branson G. Neff suffered no damages for

slander of title. The evidence at trial supported the jury award of no damages to be awarded to
Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cause of action for Slander of Title.
5.

The jury verdict provides that Plaintiff Branson G. Neff suffered no damages for

breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The evidence at trial supported the jury award of
no damages to be awarded to Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing
6.

The jury verdict provides that Plaintiff Branson G. Neff suffered no damages for

breach of fiduciary duty. The evidence at trial supported the jury award of no damages to be
awarded to Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.
7.

The jury verdict provides that Plaintiff Branson G. Neff suffered no damages for

breach of salary continuation agreement. The evidence at trial supported the jury verdict against
Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of salary continuation agreement.
8.

The Special Verdict Instructions to the jury regarding the cause of action for

Slander of Title, provides under instruction 6C, that it is to be answered only if the jury found
damages under instruction 6A. Because there were no damages awarded under Special Verdict
6A, the jury should not have answered Special Verdict 6C.
9.

The Special Verdict Instructions to the jury regarding the cause of action for

Breach of Fiduciary Duty, provides under instruction 8C, that it is to be answered only if the jury
found damages under instruction 8A. Because there were no damages awarded under Special
Verdict 8 A, the jury should not have answered Special Verdict 8C.
10.

Plaintiff sought an award of attorney fees for substantially all his claims, except for

those relating to the dismissed claims against Defendants Travis L. Bowen and Travis L. Bowen,
P.C.
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11

Plaintiff failed to allocate the attorneys fees to specific causes of action or to causes

of action for which recovery of attorneys fees might be allowed..
12.

Prior to trial, most of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed. Plaintiff proceeded at trial

against the Respondent on causes for Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Slander of
Title, Assault/Battery, Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Breach of Salary
Continuation Agreement.
13.

At trial, Plaintiff sought monetary damages in excess of one million dollars for

[those causes of action.
14.

Plaintiff incurred his attorneys fees primarily on causes of action which were either

dismissed or for which attorneys fees are not recoverable. For instance, Plaintiffs claim to set
aside the subject contract on grounds of fraud consumed substantially all of the pre-litigation
motions and was totally unmeritorious. After four years of litigation, Plaintiff could not
substantiate the fraud claim with any evidence. Regarding Plaintiffs claims for recovery of
personal property under the contract, such personal property was junk or of little or no actual
value.
15.

The Court finds that Plaintiff, at all times relevant to this case, was in possession of

his farm and home, and exercised control over the same.
16.

Despite seeking hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages for breach of

contract, Plaintiff was awarded a verdict of only $9,000.00 under that cause of action. The Court
finds that the jury verdict supports the Court's finding that substantially all of Plaintiff s claims
were unmeritorious.
17.

The Court finds that Plaintiff unnecessarily and unmeritoriously required

Defendants to participate in the litigation, to assert defenses, and to defend against Plaintiffs
claims at trial.
18.

At trial, Defendants only requested damages of $1.00 for Breach of Contract,

Defendants only requested $1.00 for Assault; Defendants only requested $1.00 for Slander of
Title, Defendants only requested $1.00 for Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and
Defendants only requested $1.00 for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

4

[

19.

At trial, the jury by verdict, found that Plaintiff had breached the contract with

Defendant, and awarded damages of $1.00 to Defendant.
!

20.

At trial, the jury by verdict, found that Plaintiff had assaulted Defendant and

awarded damages of $ 1.00.
21.

At trial, the jury by verdict, found that Plaintiff did not slander Defendant's title.

22.

At trial, the jury by verdict, found that Plaintiff had breached his duty of good faith

and fair dealing owed to the Defendant but awarded no damages.
23.

At trial, the jury found by verdict that Plaintiff breached his fiduciary duty to

Defendant but awarded no damages.
24.

The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact now enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that attorneys fees may be awarded to the

prevailing party in this case on issues of contract.
2.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff is not the prevailing party on the issues of

contract.
3.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that the jury erred and failed to follow the

Court's instructions, regarding the Special Verdict and instructions 6C and 8C.
4.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that Defendants' Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict should be granted.
5.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees is unreasonable.

6.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery of

attorneys fees against the Defendants, and that no attorneys fees should be awarded to the
Plaintiff.

7.

The Court notes that Defendants have remaining claims to be adjudicated in the

bifurcated trial regarding Manila Ranch and estate distribution. Trial on these issues is scheduled
to commence August 28, 2007.
DATED this
lis \\^ , day ofShy, 2007.
BY THE COURT

Approved as to Form:

James E. Magelby
Attorney for Plaintiff
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MAILING AND RULE 7(f) CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and

I Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict
and Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees, to James E. Magleby of Magleby & Grenwood,
P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage paid in Logan,
I Utah, this J X day^f May, 2007.
"Pursuant" to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if no objection to this
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict and Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees is submitted
to the Court and counsel within five (5) days after service, the original will be filed with the
Court for signature.

J:\JCJ\PLEADINGS\Neffi FOF> COL, Mtn Judg, Atty Fees 5.17.07

Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
James C. Jenkins (#1658)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
130 South Main, Suite 200
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: (435)752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
BRANSON G. NEFF, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARVIN G. NEFF, an individual,
TRAVIS L. BOWEN, ESQ., an individual,
TRAVIS L. BOWEN, P.C, a Utah
professional corporation, ABCO
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
corporation, and WESTCo, an unregistered
partnership between BRANSON G. NEFF
and MARVIN G. NEFF,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
VERDICT

Civil No. 030100275
Honorable Gordon J. Low

Defendants.
This matter came before Judge Gordon J. Low for hearing on April 16, 2007, on
Plaintiffs request for costs and attorneys fees, and upon Defendants' Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict. Both parties have supplied briefs and affidavits, and presented oral
argument on the issues. The Court, having read the briefs and exhibits, heard oral argument, and
having fully considered the matter and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
k HOGGAN, P.C.

now therefore Ordered as follows:

RNEYS AT LAW
H MAIN, SUITE 200

1.

Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is granted.

2.

Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees is denied and the Plaintiff is awarded no

5. BOX 525
TAH 84323-0525
5)752-1551

attorneys fees.
NTON OFFICEEAST MAIN
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3.

Defendants still have claim to be adjudicated in the bifurcated trial regarding

[Manila Ranch and estate distribution. Trial is scheduled to commence August 28,2007.
DATED this _j^_ day of May, 2007.

'JUKI/

Approved as to Form:

James E. Magelby
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING AND RULE 7(f) CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing Order on Plaintiffs Motion
for Attorneys Fees and Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict, to
James E. Magleby of Magleby & Grenwood, P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, postage paid in Logan, Utah, t h ^ T l ^ i a ? of May, 2007.
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if no objection to this
foregoing Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Defendants' Motion foi
Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict is submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days
after service, the original will be filed with the Court for signature.

Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees
And Defendants9 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict
Neffv.Neff
Civil N. 030100275
Page 2 of 2
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Exhibit E

Property Settlement
12/08/99
1 Pay off pickup

$30,000 or payment MN discretion

2 Cash now (Dec 1999)== $50,000
Cash spring of 2000==$52,000
Cash Dec of 2000==$25,000
Cash Spring of 2001 ==$25,000
Cash Dec of 2001 ==$25,000
Cash spring of 2002==$25,000
Cash spring of 2003==$25,000
Cash Spring of 2004==$25,000
Note: No interest on lump sum amounts
option to pay off sooner
3 Health Insurance
Starting Jan 2000 pay $3,000 per year for 3.5 years to age 65
4 BG has use of equipment and tools from Company for personal/farm use.
Company will have use of tractor.disk, eta and has maintained.
5 Westco to make farm payment this year, due this month.
6 Farm to BG, personal Guardian Policy to BG
MN has residence & land bank descnption, horse pasture and shed, shop, office
and yard, Lincoln, Farrwest, ABCO to MN
7 BG to continue and finish up Buck, Bayview etc.
8 Buy/Sell insurance policy owned by BG sold to MN for cash value
rather than lapsed. (Cash Value $16>230)
9 Request for BG to bid and sell work, run work as desires.and receive
payment well worth while

Signed

Signed

///J^U<X4^
MawnG Neff
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Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
James C. Jenkins (#1658)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
130 South Main, Suite 200
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: (435) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER

BRANSON G. NEFF,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARVIN G. NEFF
Defendants.

;
i
")
)
)
1

MARVIN'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS (ASPEN
SPRINGS/ABCO)

]

Civil No. 030100275

)

Judge Gordon J. Low

COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through counsel Olson & Hoggan, P.C, and submits
the following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and
Costs in relation to the Contract/Buyout involving Aspen Springs, disproportionate payments to
family, contract enforcement and fraud pursuant to Rule 73 and Rule 54 of Utah Rules of Civil
k HOGGAN, P.C.
RNEYS AT LAW

Procedure.

TH MAIN, SUITE 2 0 0
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INTRODUCTION

JTAH 84323-0525
15)752-1551

The Court previously bifurcated this lawsuit to separate the general Aspen
5NTON OFFICE
3 EAST MAIN
O BOX 1 15
TON, UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
15) 257-3885

Springs/ABCO claims in the Buyout from the Manila Ranch claims. This memorandum

concerns the Aspen Springs/ABCO Buyout claims.

Branson Neff ("Branson") filed a

Complaint, as amended, against Marvin Neff ("Marvin") containing 17 different primary
causes of action. Branson sought general damages from Marvin of over $3 million in addition
to punitive damages. Notwithstanding Banson's numerous claims and excessively litigious
nature, Marvin was 100% successful in defending against Branson's contract rescission claims.
In addition, this Court dismissed on the merits prior to trial numerous claims asserted by
Branson, and then the jury only awarded Branson nominal damages on a single contract claim
for $9,000.00.

Marvin was successful in defending against lost development claims

($425,068.00), Branson's request for one-half (V2) of the equipment ($425,068.00), wages
claimed ($425,068.00 +), salary continuation claim ($210,822.00), quiet title claim to 4.12
acres ($250,000.00), bonding claims, claims of slander of title ($425,068.00+), breach of
fiduciary duty ($425,068.00), $24,000.00 to remodel, $27,574.00 on Buy/Sell policy and
Health Insurance ($4,861.00) claims.

Accordingly, Marvin is the prevailing party for

defending or avoiding an adverse judgment. He is entitled to his attorney fees and costs on his
enforcement of the contract. Marvin is also entitled to fees for successfully defending against
the slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Marvin has separated his attorney fees
on these issues from the breach of contract issues.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marvin Neff received a successful ruling on several of the pretrial summary
judgment motions. Branson brought 17 causes of action in his Amended Complaint.
The dollar amounts attached to and awarded for each claim is discussed immediately
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below. Many of the facts and damages claimed by Branson overlap between his various
claims. Marvin prevailed on the following pretrial claims:
1.

Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Breach of Fiduciary

Duty Claims (including the related claims of constructive trust, money had and received, and
disproportionate family payments) was granted.

See this Court's January 9, 2007

Memorandum Decision. Branson claimed damages of $975,000.00.
2.

Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Fraud, Fraudulent

Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims regarding Aspen Springs (including the
related claims of constructive trust, money had and received, and disproportionate family
payments) was granted. See this Court's January 9, 2007 Memorandum Decision. Branson
claimed damages of $975,000.00.
3.

Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Lost Corporate

Opportunity claim regarding Aspen Springs (this claim was based on fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty theories) was granted. See this Court's January 9, 2007 Memorandum Decision.
Branson claimed damages of $975,000.00.
4.

Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Fraud, Fraudulent

Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure Claims on ABCO's value was granted. See this
Court's January 9, 2007 Memorandum Decision. Branson claimed damages of $623,000.00.
5.

Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's other Fraud, Fraudulent

Concealment, Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims was granted. See this Court's January 9, 2007
Memorandum Decision.

Branson claimed damages any where from $63,000.00 to

$623,000.00.
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6.

Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Misrepresentation

claims was granted.

See this Court's January 9, 2007 Memorandum Decision.

Branson

claimed damages of $975,000.00.
7.

Branson's Motion to Void the Contract, stating it was an Agreement to Agree,

was denied. See ruling dated July 6, 2006. Branson claimed damages between $623,000.00 to
$3,552,496.00.
8.

Branson's Claim that there was No Contract Due to a Failure of Condition

precedent was denied. Branson claimed damages of $623,000.00 to $3,552,496.00.
9.

Branson's Claim that there was No Contract since there was No Meeting of the

Minds was denied. Branson claimed damages of $623,000.00 to $3,552,496.00.
10.

Branson's Claim that there was Fraud in the Inducement to Sign the Contract

was denied. Plaintiff claimed damages of $623,000.00 to $3,552,496.00.
11.

Branson's complete attempt to Rescind the Contract for fraud, material

misrepresentation, mistake, failure to perform, incomplete contract, failure and condition
precedent, and every other claim was also denied. Branson claimed damages of $623,000.00 to
$3,552,496.00.
12.

Branson's attempt to obtain Declaratory Relief on the Salary Continuation Plan

was denied. Plaintiff claimed damages of $210,822.00.
13.

Branson was required by the Court to submit proof of his Prima Facie Case

Regarding Punitive Damages; however the Court determined that Marvin had already
submitted enough financial discovery. Plaintiff claimed treble damages under the tort claims,
all of which were dismissed either pre-trial or during the trial.
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14.

Marvin filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Branson's Expert Witnesses and

Appraisals regarding damages all calculated after December 13, 1999, and the Court granted
Marvin's request and denied Branson the ability to bring in expert witnesses on values that had
nothing to do with the contract. Plaintiff claimed damages of $3,552,496.00.
15.

Branson's attempt to bring in Extrinsic and Parole Evidence to Set Aside the

Contract was denied and the court limited parole evidence merely to explain ambiguous terms
regarding the contract, finding the contract was partially integrated. (January 9, 2007 decision.)
16.

Branson's claims for Malicious Prosecution and Civil Contempt were denied.

See this Court's January 9,2007 Memorandum Decision.
17.

Branson voluntarily dismissed his claim for conversion, because it was based on

the same facts as in the fraud type claims.
After addressing the foregoing claims prior to trial, the Court allowed Branson to try the
following claims before the jury:
1.

Branson's Salary Continuation Plan claim in the context he could have worked

ten years for ABCO under paragraph 9 of the contract. Branson sought $210,822.00 in present
value damages, or $112,500.00 for ten years, or about $131,00.00 in cash surrender value, but
was awarded nothing.
2.

Branson's claim to health insurance until 65 under paragraph 3 of the contract

with gap coverage for six months.

Branson sought $3,600.00 plus $1,261.00 in interest

($4,861.00) but was awarded nothing.
3.

Branson's claim to one-half of the equipment of ABCO under paragraph 4 of the

contract for loss of use. Branson sought $250,000.00 plus interest of $175,068.00 (total
$425,068.00); however, Branson was awarded nothing.
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4.

Branson's quiet title claim to 4.19 acres behind Marvin's house under paragraph

6 of the contract, Branson sought $250,000.00 plus interest of $175,068.00 (total $425,068.00)
but was awarded nothing.
5.

Branson's claim that he lost the ability to work or use his home and farm to

bond with as well as the Guardian insurance policy under paragraph 6 of the contract and his
inability to work Big Sky construction jobs. Branson sought over $250,000.00 plus interest of
$175,068.00 (total of $425,068.00); however, Branson was awarded nothing.
6.

Branson's claim that he lost profits when he could not build a subdivision on his

farm property or bond under the claim of slander of title or under paragraph 6 of the contract.
Branson sought over $250,000.00 in lost sales (less $55,200) or $194,800.00, plus $180,000.00
in lost building profits (total of $374,800.00); however, Branson was awarded nothing and the
claim was treated as unmeritorious.
7.

Branson's claim for Marvin's nonpayment of $16,230.00 for the buy/sell policy

plus interest of $11344.00 (total of $27,574.00) under paragraph 8 of the contract. Branson
was awarded nothing.
8.

Branson's claim that he was entitled to one-half of the profits from the Buck and

Bawiew jobs under paragraph 7 of the contract. Marvin was granted a directed verdict and
Branson was awarded nothing.
9.

Branson's claim for breach of fiduciary duty for failure to wind up the division

of the partnership timely and various claims in relation thereto. Branson was awarded zero
damages and the Judge held this claim as unmeritorious.
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10.

Branson's claim for breach of contract in the performance of paragraph 4 the

contract. Branson sought $8,200.00 for the missing tractor blades and $5,742.00 in interest
(total of $ 13,942.00). We believe the jury awarded Branson $9,000.00 related to this claim.
11.

Branson's parole evidence claim for damages to repair the farm and remodel the

rental home for over $24,000.00. Branson was awarded nothing.
12.

Branson's claim for assault and battery. Branson sought $1.00; and Branson

was only awarded $1.00 (this is not a compensable attorney fee claim).
13.

Branson dismissed his claims for defamation/false light/invasion of privacy at

trial when he realized Marvin would call a witness who would corroborate the truth behind
Branson's actions.
14.

Branson's claim for farm payments and Westco accounting under paragraph 5 of

the contract. Branson had been paid and Branson was awarded nothing.

I.

MARVIN IS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THE ASPEN SPRINGS/ABCO
PORTION OF THIS BIFURCATED LAWSUIT
A.

Award of attorney fees based on the Contract Buyout documents. This Court

has already ruled that the Buyout documents and employment agreement in this case had
specific provisions awarding attorney fees to the non defaulting party, or non-breaching party,
or the prevailing party. The language of the Stock Redemption Agreement of December 20,
1999 paragraph 9.11 contract specifically states:
"The parties agree that should either party default in or be in
breach of any of the covenants, or agreements or representations,
or warranties herein contained, the non defaulting party, or the non
breaching party (or in the event litigation was commenced, the
prevailing party) shall be entitled to all costs and expenses,
including reasonable attorneys' fees and expert witness' (whether
an action has been commenced or not) which may arise or accrue
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from enforcing any of the terms of this agreement or terminating
this agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or
by applicable law (before or after judgment).5'
Notice, this includes enforcing any terms of the agreement (i.e. before trial).
In Mountain States Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 116 P.2d 643 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) the Court set forth the ground rules for determining who is the prevailing party. The
Court, in simple cases, used the "net judgment" rule and in complex cases, the "flexible and
reasonable approach":
"Typically, determining the prevailing for purposes of awarding
fees and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues Defendant for money
damages; if Plaintiff is awarded a judgment, Plaintiff has
prevailed, and if Defendant successfully defends and avoids an
adverse judgment. Defendant has prevailed. However, this simple
analysis cannot be employed here because both Plaintiff and
Defendant obtained some monetary relief against the other. A
review of the relevant case law convinces us that under the
provision at issue, there can be only one prevailing party even
though both Plaintiff and Defendant are awarded some damages
on claims arising from the same transaction.... We hold that in
the present circumstances the party in whose favor the "net"
judgment is entered must be considered the prevailing party and
is entitled to an award of it's fees." Id. at \ 648. {emphasis
added)
In addition, Mountain States held in footnote number 7 the following:
"The determination of a prevailing party becomes even more
complicated in cases involving multiple claims and parties; the
granting of non monetary relief to one or more parties; and where
the ultimate award of money damages does not adequately
represent the actual success of the parties under the peculiar
posture of the case. These cases demonstrate the need for a
flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases
who actually is the prevailing party." (Emphasis added).
The case of Branson Neff v. Marvin Neff involves multiple claims and parties. Marvin
Neff successfully defended against and avoided adverse judgments in hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Marvin was granted non-monetary relief in several of the pretrial summary judgment
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motions or defenses during the jury trial. If you added up all the damages avoided, Marvin
would prevail under a net judgment rule. Marvin Neff s ultimate award of $1.00 breach of
contract damages, which is all he asked for, does not adequately represent the actual success of
Marvin Neff under the particular posture of the ABCO/Aspen Springs case. For that reason,
this Court should rule Marvin prevailed under either the net judgment rule or under the
"flexible and reasoned" approach.
A flexible and reasonable approach to determine who is actually the prevailing party
was flushed out in the case of R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook 2002 UT 11 at 1f25, 40 P.3d 1119
(Utah 2002) as well as J. Pochynokco., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, 116 P.3d 353 (2005);
A.K.R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270 (2004). The
appropriate consideration in determining the prevailing party under the reasonable and flexible
approach include:
1.

Looking at the contractual language;

2.

Considering the number of claims, counterclaims and cross
claims etc;

3.

Considering the importance of the claims relative to each other;

4.

Considering the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in
connection with the various claims. R. T. Nielson Co., at

125.
The Court already considered these same factors when it looked at Branson's request
for attorney fees under breach of contract. The Court found that the contractual language
already allows the prevailing party to be awarded attorney fees. The Court found that both
parties had brought numerous claims under the Complaint and Counterclaim. The Court
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specifically stated that many of Branson's claims were brought unmeritoriously and he so ruled
and gave an example of that of fraud. The Court found "After all the time spent litigating that
issue, the Plaintiff was unable to show any evidence to support the claim of fraud" in trying to
set the contract aside or seeking one-half QA) of Aspen Springs value. Regarding the third
element, the Court already held that much of the focus of the Plaintiffs lawsuit was on fraud,
allegations of fraud, breach of contract, protective orders, assault claims and property. The
Court held that the property issues were basically worthless. Most of the property was junk and
pure unadulterated garbage. The Judge specifically held that those claims by Branson were
unmeritorious. The breach of fiduciary duty and slander of title claim were also ruled as
unmeritorious. Branson suffered no damages, there were no damages presented, there was no
evidence competently received in support of any damages. The Court stated "Frankly I think
his (Branson's) claim for slander of title damages, if made at all, was entirely unmeritorious".
When the Court looked at the importance of the claims, the number of the claims and the dollar
amounts that were awarded in connection therewith, the Court basically found under the
"reasoned and flexible approach" that Branson was not the prevailing party and awarded him
no attorney fees. I might add that under the Mountain States decision there can be only one
prevailing party, and since Branson was not the prevailing party, Marvin Neff must be, at lease
on all the pretrial recession attempts by Branson.
Branson asserted at least fourteen different claims at trial, seeking a combined total of
$1,931,204.00 in damages, and Branson only received $9,000.00 in contract breach related
damages. The Court has ruled that neither party will be awarded attorney fees on the contract
breach claims, but has yet to rule or even consider the enforcement of the contract prior to trial
and Marvin's successful avoidance of adverse judgment on several issues. Moreover, as for
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issues of contract, Marvin prevailed by directed verdict at trial on 4 of the 9 contract issues and
by jury verdict on four (4) or more contract issues. Thus Marvin prevailed at trial on eight (8)
out of nine (9) contract claims by defending and enforcing the contract.
With respect to Marvin's five simple counterclaims, the most important of which was
the breach of contract claim, the jury found that Branson had breached the contract with Marvin
and awarded Marvin 100% of the damages sought. The Court has ruled that neither party will
be awarded attorney fees on the breach of contract issues. However, Marvin's main focus was
not on breach of the contract, but only to defend against and avoid Branson's claims to set the
contract aside. Marvin proved he had performed the contract.
When looking at the case as a whole, Branson asked for over $3,500,000.00 in damages
related to this litigation; however, the jury only awarded him a total of $9,001.00 in damages.
Since Marvin prevailed on all pretrial issues, prevailed on all but one contract issue during trial
(either by directed verdict or verdict), and was awarded everything he asked for on his breach
of contract claim and assault claim, this Court should determine that Marvin is the prevailing
party under either the flexible approach on net judgment rule on the contract rescission claims
in enforcing the contract and in avoiding an adverse judgment.
II.

MARVIN IS ENTITLED TO HIS PRETRIAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
IN THE ASPEN SPRINGS/ABCO PORTION OF THIS BIFURCATED
LAWSUIT

Pretrial Contract Enforcement
This Court has already determined that the contracts at issue in this case are valid and
enforceable.

Moreover, since the parties to this litigation have acknowledged during this

litigation that the contracts are subject to an attorney fees provision, an award of attorney fees
to the prevailing party for enforcing the contract is proper. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust,
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2004 UT 85, ^[23. Consequently, as the prevailing party with respect to validating, upholding
and enforcing the contract, Marvin is entitled to his attorney fees and costs.
Branson has argued vigorously to rescind, set aside, or undue the contract under several
complicated theories. Consequently, Marvin had to strenuously defend his position that the
contracts were valid and enforceable. As previously mentioned, this Court determined that the
contracts were in fact valid and enforceable, and the parties subsequently acknowledged that
the prevailing party is allowed to recover his attorney fees pursuant to the contracts. Id. Utah
law provides that when a party has to defend against a claim for contract rescission, such a
defense is litigation to enforce the contract; and if a party mounts a successful defense of the
contract, he is entitled to attorney fees and costs as provided in the contract. Bilanzich v.
Lonetti, 2005 UT App 522, f3; Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, f 17. Note the majority, if
not all of Branson's claims, related to setting the contract aside for fraud, fraudulent
inducement, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, no meeting of the minds,
unenforceable agreement to agree, parole evidence, condition precedent, duress, or for other
reasons. Marvin successfully defended against each claim and should be awarded attorney fees
to enforce the contract.
In addition to his attorney fees related to motions for summary judgment on the contract
enforcement issue, Marvin is entitled to his litigation costs that would be included under a
regular Rule 54(d) cost award as well as those litigation expenses not normally included under
a regular Rule 54(d) cost award. Chase at %LQ\ Utah R. Civ? P. 54(d). The contract states
Marvin is entitled to all costs and expenses, including expert witness costs.
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III.

MARVIN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES TO SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND
AGAINST BRANSON'S TORT CLAIMS OF SLANDER OF TITLE AND
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY.
The Reciprocal Statute on attorney fees § 78-27-56.5 allows Marvin to an award of fees

to successfully defend the slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The statute on
reciprocal attorney fees, § 78-27-56.5 states:
"A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the
provisions allow at least one party to recover attorney fees."
Although this reciprocal application is for written contracts, it should by analogy
likewise apply in breach of Fiduciary Duty and Slander of Title claims (i.e. torts). The Court
has already said Branson's breach of fiduciary duty claim sounds in contract breach and the
slander of title claim was for failing to timely sign contract deeds. Both parties have already
agreed, by jury instructions and case law, that attorney fees are awardable for slander of title
and breach of fiduciary duty. When Marvin successfully defends against these tort claims and
avoids adverse judgment, he should be treated as the prevailing party. Defendants should
receive all their costs and fees to successfully defend and avoid Branson's claims for judgment.
See generally, Crowly v. Black, 2007 Utah App. 245; 582 Utah Adv. Rpt. 6; 2007 Utah App.
Lexis 247. Marvin prevailed on the slander of title defense with a Judgment N.O.V. The jury
awarded no damages on the breach of fiduciary duty claim so Marvin successfully defended as
the Court has already held.

13

IV.

MARVIN HAS PROPERLY APPLIED FOR HIS ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS.

Marvin considers the Court's previous Order awarding neither party attorney fees on
contract breach claims improper sine Marvin had not yet filed a request and no evidence was
before the court. Nonetheless, Marvin is now filing a request on non-breach issues.
In Utah, an attorney fee application must reasonably allocate time incurred between
compensable and non-compensable claims. Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App
109, f l 5 . Unlike Branson's application for attorney fees, Marvin is not arguing that he is
entitled to attorney fees for assault, Bowen cross claim, protective orders, restraining orders, or
other non-compensable claims. Nor is Marvin arguing that Brown entitles him to all of his
attorney fees that are indirectly related to compensable claims that are tangentially linked to the
contract claims upon which Marvin prevailed. Rather, Marvin is seeking attorney fees and
costs for the clearly compensable contract enforcement claims, including successfully
defending against Branson's contract rescission attempts, and defense of slander of title and
breach of fiduciary duty claims.
As required, Marvin has submitted in the accompanying Attorney Fee Affidavit, in
sufficient detail, his attorney fees and costs related to the compensable claims upon which he
prevailed. Marvin has reviewed the billing records and eliminated any fees and costs related to
non-compensable claims or work and separated the Manila Ranch case and Travis Bowen cross
claim entirely out.

For instance, Marvin never included any fees for general discovery,

protective orders, assault, the trial for breach of contract, or other non-compensable claims.
With respect to the reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs, the factors enumerated
in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985) are helpful to the Court's determination.
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The Cabrera court stated that court may consider, among other factors, the difficulty of the
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the
number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and
experience of the attorneys involved. Id; see also Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 , 893
(Utah 1996).
Marvin's fees are reasonable. While the claims in the litigation were complex and
convoluted, Branson's unrelenting litigious nature and persistence that the contract was void
for fraud made the litigation even more difficult. Marvin was efficient and reasonable in the
presentation of the case by voluntarily limiting his claims and issues and engaging in litigation
only when forced to defend himself from Branson's numerous unsuccessful and unmeritorious
positions. Marvin tried to eliminate several of Branson's claims using the statute of limitations
or other pre-trial motions. In a demonstration of reasonableness, Marvin's attorney's hourly
rate is significantly less that Branson's attorney's hourly rate. Moreover, the aggregate time
spent by Marvin's attorney on the case is significantly less than the time Branson's attorney
spent on the case. With respect to experience and expertise, Marvin's attorneys have been
litigating for nearly 22 to 30 years, respectively. Marvin had set forth several settlement offers
to Branson prior to trial that exceeded the jury verdict by thousands of dollars. Marvin tried to
work this out without litigation but was left without a choice. To let Branson financially
destroy his brother through years of litigation on unmeritorious claims is unjust. Marvin is
entitled to a significant attorney fee award to send a message this litigation needs to end.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Marvin respectfully requests that the Court award him
$$300,592.50 in attorney fees and $56,474.86 in costs associated with the aforementioned
compensable claims. Marvin also requests that the Court make specific findings of fact to
support the award of attorney fees and costs.
DATED this _ _ ^ day of November, 2007.
OLSON & HOGGAN P.C.

~^m

Marlin J.
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this d\0 day of November, 2007, I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MARVIN MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ENTRY

OF JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND

SPRINGS/ABCO, postage prepaid, to the following:
James E. Magleby
Magleby & Greenwood, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

C:\MyFi\cs\FlLESNMJG\neff.aspeii springs.memorandum in supportattorney fees 9-1-07.doc
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|James C. Jenkins (#1658)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
\Attorneys for Defendant
130 South Main
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER

BRANSON NEFF,

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF MARLIN J. GRANT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS IN
THE ABCO/ASPEN SPRINGS
BUYOUT CASE

MARVIN G. NEFF, et al,

Civil No. 030100275

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Box Elder

)

Judge Gordon J. Low

COMES NOW, Marlin J. Grant, of Olson & Hoggan, P.C, being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.
HOGGAN, P.C.
NEYS AT LAW
I MAIN, SUITE 2 0 0
BOX 5 2 5
TAH 84323-0525

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and state the same to be true,

except as to those matters of opinion, which I submit as an expert and believe the same to be true.
2.

I am a licensed and practicing attorney since 1985 in the State of Utah. I have

practiced law primarily involving civil and criminal litigation for more than 22 years. My practice

) 752-1551

has been centered in Cache County, but I have practiced in many counties throughout the State,
•JTON OFFICE
EAST MAIN
BOX 1 15
DN, UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
) 257-3885

Martin J. Grant's Affidavit in Support ofMotion for Attorney Fees
and Costs in the ABCO/Aspen Springs Buyout Case
Branson Neffv. Marvin G. Neff et. al
Civil No. 0300100275
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including having conducted a number of cases situated in Box Elder County, Weber County, Davis
County, and Salt Lake County. I have tried numerous bench trials, many of them before Judge
Gordon Low.
3.

The law firm of Olson & Hoggan, P.C. is an AV rated firm by Martindale Hubbell.

4.

I am the attorney of record in the above entitled case and have personal knowledge of

the issues of this controversy. I have represented Marvin Neff and ABCO Construction Company for
approximately eight (8) years, been a city attorney for Tremonton City, trying hundreds of cases
involving petty theft, shoplifting, and various dishonest misdemeanors. I am also very familiar with
trusts, wills, and probate matters, having drafted hundreds of wills and trusts for clients and trying
several probate actions.
5.

Attorney fees in Box Elder and Cache Counties are customarily contracted for and

charged on an hourly basis. Cases of contingency fee are only a small minority of those cases
handled by attorneys in those counties. Hourly rates customarily charged by attorneys for cases in
those counties for the period of time between February 2005 through August 2007 (when this lawsuit
and counterclaim was filed) ranged from $100.00 to $200.00 per hour, with the average rate during
that same period of time being between $125.00 to $150.00 per hour. However, fees charged and
paid between $ 150.00 to $200.00 per hour for that same period of time were customarily for services
rendered by attorneys withfifteen(15) or more years of experience, and who, through professional
experience, have developed a high and outstanding professional reputation.
6.

Jim Jenkins and myself customarily charged $200.00 per hour during that time and

David Larsen, an attorney of several years who is a member of our firm, charged $175.00 an hour.
Kelly Smith, another attorney, charged $135.00 an hour, and our paralegals charged $35.00 an hour.
Any initials of "cm," "mde," were paralegals. Our law clerks charged $65.00 an hour. Our legal
associates charge approximately $125.00 an hour. These are the rates customarily charged in both
locales of Cache County and Box Elder County and are needed in litigation trial work because much
of the research, deposition reviews, and exhibit gathering, is done by paralegals, clerks or associates
at a greatly reduced price for the benefit and efficiency of the case.
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7.

Branson Neff had told Marvin Neff as well as Mike Gale and others that he did not

care how much he spent suing Marvin Neff and that one of his primary objectives was to financially
destroy his brother for allegedly cheating him out of ABCO.
8.

Mike Gale specifically testified at trial that Branson Neff was jealous of Marvin, that

he couldn't accept the fact that ABCO continued to make money without him, and that he was going
to destroy Marvin Neff and ABCO.
9.

From the very beginning, Marvin Neff had to defend against several unmeritorious

claims brought by Branson Neff (Bransonfiledover 17 claims against Marvin Neff, some of which
overlapped one another).
10.

Marvin Neff tried to settle the case at the veryfirst,informing Branson that there was

a valid and binding contract signed by the parties that would be enforced and to just resolve any
outstanding issues under the contract. Branson refused, claiming that the contract was merely an
agreement to agree, was not binding, was void for fraud, and that he was going to set it aside and
obtain one-half Q/i) of Aspen Springs as well as his rightful one-half QA) of the total value of ABCO
as of the date of the lawsuit.
11.

To begin this procedure, Branson argued in Court before Judge Low that he needed

the books opened on ABCO, that he felt there were two sets of books, that Marvin had been cooking
the books and had embezzled money from him, and brought up the fact that Marvin Neff had
obtained a $1 million life insurance policy paying a $20,000.00 premium in 1999 without his
knowledge, which he considered outright fraud.
12.

The Court ordered the accounting, and the brothers paid over $20,000.00 a piece to

James & Co. The James and Co. Report in Finding on Insurance Policies, Appendix D, page 25,
Finding #C. 1 .A. had total premiums paid by ABCO of at least $ 193,261.00 for Branson Neff, and at
least $127,140.00 for Marvin Neff. Thus, Branson actually outspent Marvin on life insurance
premiums by over $66,121.00. Notice also in that very same Finding in paragraph C. 1 .B. and C. that
Branson took $13,788.00 out of a cash surrender value policy and paid another premium on himself
and let the policy lapse. Regarding Branson's allegedfraudclaim that Marvin had embezzled a $1
million life insurance, Finding CLE. specifically stated that in 1998 Marvin applied for a policy
Marlin J. Grant's Affidavit in Support ofMotion for Attorney Fees
| and Costs in the ABCO/Aspen Springs Buyout Case
| Branson Neff v. Marvin G. Neffet. al
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with Guardian and received several different proposals, but in December of 1998 a policy was issued
with a death benefit of $677,578.00 (not the million dollars claimed by Branson, and the annual
premium was only $15,600.00 (not the $20,000.00 claimed by Branson). Again, even with this
entire premium as paid on the policy included in the James Report, Branson still outspent Marvin
$66,000.00 in insurance benefits taken from the company.
13.

I might also addfromAppendix C of the James and Co. Report, page 28, paragraph F

regarding the Salary Continuation Policy, the accountant specifically found that the Salary
Continuation Policy remained with ABCO because Branson Neff did not fulfill his obligation of
remaining in the employment of ABCO until retirement at age 67. Nonetheless, this Court knows
that Branson continued to fight the Salary Continuation Policy all the way through the jury trial
where they clearly issued a jury verdict that the Salary Continuation Plan was part of ABCO's assets,
which had already been split between the brothers. Branson was not entitled to anything more,
| exactly what Dan James found in the first place. I point this out to show Branson's litigious nature
and unwillingness to acceptfindingsthat he now claims to rely upon.
14.

After the James and Co. Report came out, Judge Low stated that if we are only

$ 18,000.00 apart, that Judge Low could see absolutely no reason why the two brothers were fighting
over such a small amount. We agreed and would have paid that and more to settle the case, even
though the Findings by Dan James left out over $57,000.00 Marvin paid personally to ABCO on the
Aspen Springs claim.
15.

In fact, mediation was held with Paul Felt in October of 2004 (the James and Co.,

Report was issued February 12,2004) where Marvin Neff attempted to settle this entire claim out of
Court. At this mediation, Marvin Neff offered to let Branson Neff have all of the Manila Ranch
J Property, including Marvin's one-half (Yi) share, which we valued on October 4,2004 to be worth
$100,000.00, plus 26 more acres that were worth about $50,000.00, fox a total of $150,000.00.
Marvin also was willing to pay Branson's Salary Continuation benefits over the next ten (10) years at
$10,000.00 a year, or $100,000.00. The Court first ruled Branson was not entitled to the Salary
Continuation, then ruled regarding the Salary Continuation benefit during trial that if it indeed was
not part of ABCO assets or the value in the buyout, then Branson would be awarded a portion of
\ Martin J. Grant9s Affidavit in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees
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those benefits, which the Court found to be approximately $ 10,000.00 each year over ten (10) years.
Branson refused to settle on these numbers and instead sought a value of over $250,000.00 for lost
wages and over $210,000.00 on the plan itself. Branson also countered in mediation asking for well
over $800,000.00 to $900,000.00.
16.

I point this out because Branson was only awarded $9,000.00 from the jury on the

entire case. Marvin Neff was willing to help his brother in any way he could, even though he never
owed it to him, just to avoid further litigation. Branson continued to litigate over unmeritorious
claims, rejecting all reasonable offers and running up attorney fees needlessly.
17.

Branson Neff turned Marvin Neff over to the Bishop and Stake President to be

excommunicated during the lawsuit, claiming that Marvin Neff had stole his house and farm out
from under him. Branson continued all the way through the trial to claim that Marvin Neff had
stolen his house and farm seeking $425,000.00 plus in slander of title damages. This Court warned
Branson Neff in the January 9,2007 Memorandum Decision that the slander of title claim was not
supported by any damages, and could probably be dismissed but let Branson try to prove damages.
Branson wasted the entire trial trying to prove slander of title damages, and the jury awarded zero
damages, and the Court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Branson, failed to
show any damages.
18.

This was consistent with Branson's litigious nature in view of unmeritorious claims

and his desire to spend whatever it took tofinanciallyruin Marvin Neff and ABCO.
19.

Branson Neff continued to use a shotgun approach, seeking any theory to avoid his

arms length bargain with Marvin Neff on the buyout.
20.

Branson Neff sought millions of dollars in damages regarding Aspen Springs, and

millions of dollars of damages on the value of ABCO, using theories of fraud, fraudulent
concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, breach of fiduciary duty and other
similar misrepresentation type claims to convince the Court that he was entitled to have everything
set aside and to start over from scratch. After more than four (4) years of litigating those issues, the
Court held in the January 9, 2007 ruling, that after exercising patience with the parties' excessive
briefing practice and an effort to properly sift through the materiality of the presentment of an
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exuberant number of facts in light of the arguments proffered, that it was going to decide once and
for all if Plaintiff had made any showing offraudto support his claims. The Court ruled on page 9
and 10 that Plaintiff had not substantiated any evidence of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. The
Court waited for over four (4) years for Plaintiff to advance a legitimate argument onfraud,and since
none existed, granted summary judgment. The Court also went on to hold that the Property
Settlement Agreement, although vague in parts, was a partial integration given Defendant's receipt of
significant benefits of the Agreement. The Court stated:
"In harmony with previous Court decisions, the Court holds under the undisputed
facts, that the Property Settlement Agreement was entered into after the parties
discussed the overall worth of ABCO and coming to some resolution regarding a
dissolution that Plaintiff would get the farm plus some cash incentives, and the
Defendant would get the corporation's, business assets, minus some use and value
given to Plaintiff."
The Court further held in April 16,2007 decision that Branson's claims, which were largely founded
on fraud were entirely unmeritorious.
21.

Because Marvin had to defend himself against Plaintiffs continual and repeated

attack on all of these issues, the fees were reasonably and legitimately incurred to defend, uphold,
and enforce the contract.
22.

Marvin filed a Motion for Summary Judgment early on in this case to uphold the

binding nature of the contract and the Court was ultimately granted that Motion. Marvin tried to
efficiently resolve this case by pairing down the relevant issues to what was truly just and legitimate
for the jury.
I

23.

Marlin Grant has personally reviewed all of the Olson & Hoggan bills for attorney

ifees relating solely to enforcing the contract documents in the Buyout case.
24.

Proving and defending the contracts enforceability was a very tedious and

complicated process, because Branson continued to assert it was void for fraud. Branson thought of
nearly every theory available to set the contract aside, and Marvin had to vigorously defend.
25.

Marvin successfully defended the contract and its enforcement. Marvin reduced the

issues for trial, shortened the trial time greatly, and prevailed 100% on the pre-trial issues.
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26.

Marvin prevailed 100% on his breach of contract claim as noted in the jury verdict,

but the Court granted no attorney fees for this.
27.

The total fees expended prior to trial to enforce the contract (in this very complicated

case, which was made worse by Branson's recalcitrance and desire to financially destroy Marvin &
ABCO) was $300,592.50. (See attorney fee worksheets attached). We eliminated all fees incurred
during trial to avoid any argument on whether those were for the issue of breach of contract.
28.

The total costs incurred, including deposition fees, witness fees, expert witness fees,

and counterclaim filing fees, totaled $56,474.86.
29.

The accounting records are kept by Olson & Hoggan in a normal course of business

and are a true and accurate representation of the reasonable attorney fees and the reasonable costs
expended in the Buyout case. (See print out attached) We have excluded all fees incurred on noncompensable issues such as assault, protective orders, malicious prosecution defense, Travis Bowen
issues, and others.
30.

The fees and costs listed were for the contract enforcement claims upon which Marvin

was the prevailing party and which fees were necessarily incurred.
DATED this "%b day of November, 2007.

OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Marlin J. Grant's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees
and Costs in the ABCO/Aspen Springs Buyout Case
Branson Neff v. Marvin G. Nefif et. al
Civil No. 0300100275
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STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Box Elder

)

MARLIN J. GRANT, beingfirstduly sworn on oath, deposes and says: That he has read the
foregoing Affidavit, knows and understands the contents thereof, and that the same are true of his
own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and belief; and as to such believes
them to be true.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

^

day of November, 2007

NOTARYPUBUC

ASHLEY BROOKE CREECH
My Commission Expires
10-16-20 T1
130S Main Suite 200
Logan, Utan 84321

.

mTSQFUTdB

NOTARY PU

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this $ft*

day of November, 2007,1 mailed a true and correct copy

of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARLIN J. GRANT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS IN THE ABCO/ASPEN SPRINGS BUYOUT CASE,
postage prepaid, to the following:
James E. Magleby
Magleby & Greenwood, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

C:\MyFiles\FILES\MJG\NEFF.AFFIDAVIT OF MARLIN IN SUPPORT OF ATTY FEES.aspen springs.doc
N-4759.10
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NEFF VS. NEFF

N-4759.10

EXHIBIT ON
ATTORNEY FEES

Total attorney fees incurred between October 2002 and February 28,
2007:

$410,889.00|

Of the total attorney fees incurred in the entire case, the following
attorney fees were attributable to items that were either noncompensable
or unrelated to our current attorney fee request.
a.

Change of Venue Motion and Order, in November 2002
and February 2003.

$900.001

b.

General Discovery Requests and General Disclosures of

$5,950.001

c.

Letters and meetings with Dan James, where motions
regarding Dan James

$9,281.501

d.

Salary Continuation arguments, since the Salary
Continuation did not have an attorney fee clause.

e.

Lis Pendens. Marvin Neff s lis pendens argument
somewhat related to the slander of title argument, and
since Mr. Neff was awarded no damages thereon, attorney
fees argued for were deleted.

$3,427.50

Mediation with Paul Felt on October 12 to October 19,
2004

$1,800.00

Manila Ranch portion of the case during the above time
frame

$15,378.50

f.
g.
HOGGAN, P C
NEYS AT LAW
MAIN, SUITE 2 0 0

h.

Assault and Battery Claim

$2,570.00

i.

Involvement with Travis Bowen

$2,956.00

j.

Protective Order Arguments

$350.00

k.

Punitive Damage Responses

$366.00

BOX 5 2 5
AH 84323-0525
) 752-1551

4TON OFFICE
EAST MAIN
BOX 115
DN, UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
) 257-3885

1-

Defense against Branson's Attorney Fee Claim

$16,718.01

m.

Trial Attorney Fees

$50,599.0(

TOTAL:
$110,296.50

-

$410,889.00
$110,296.50
$300.592.50

3.

4.

All attorney fees attributable to either enforcing the contract,
defending the contract, or prior to trial are: (See detail of
attorney fees attached)

$300,592.50

Costs incurred to defend the contract:
a.

Payment to Dan James & Company for audit

$20,691.04

b.

Payment to Brad Townsend of Norman & Townsend as
an expert witness.

$20,535.06

c.

d.

e.
f.

Payment to Senior Judge Sawaya to sit as a Special
Master during depositions.

$ 1,962.501

Deposition Fees
1.

Q&A Reporting

$5,080.861

2.

Depomax Reporting*

$2,888.281

3.

Q&A Reporting*

$5,045.621

Witness Fees*
Cost of Filing Counterclaim*

TOTAL COSTS:

$181.50
$90.00
$56.474.86

*Note that the total costs on above items through that date was $13,202.57 just on depositions,
witnesses and Court costs and we left out all of the photo costs, faxes, Kinkos, and other research costs.

C:\MyFiles\FILES\MJG\NEFF.EXHIBIT ON ATTORNEY FEES.doc

OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
88 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 525
LOGAN, UT 84323-0525

Invoice submitted to:
ABCO CONSTRUCTION
1835SHWY89
PERRY, UT 84302,

February 28, 2007
In Reference To: N-4759

Professional Services
Hours Tax# _

Amount

BRANSON NEFF/N-4759.010
11/4/2002- MJG Office visit.

4.00

600.00

11/7/2002- MJG Phone call.

0.25

37.50

11/8/2002 - MJG Review of file; visit with Marvin.

4.00

600.00

5.00

750.00

3.00

450.00

2.50

375.00

11/15/2002- MJG Countercliam drafted.

1.50

225.00

11/18/2002- MJG Phone call.

0.50

75.00

11/25/2002 - MJG Drafting counterclaim and crossclaim matters.

2.00

300.00

11/26/2002 - MJG Finalize counterclaim.

1.00

150.00

J 11/11/2002 - MJG Drafting motion for change of Venue; drafting answer and
•—
office visit with Marv.
11/12/2002 - MJG Phone calls and drafting counterclaim and answer changes.
/ ^ Q 1 / 1 4 / 2 0 0 2 - MJG Drafting motion to strike/t> fr^v/WVf '

/

/ft

if

12/20/2002 - JRG

Legal research Parol evidence cases and integretion contract
clauses; draft motion for summary judgment.

2.60

169.00

12/23/2002 - JRG

Legal research Summary Judgment memorandum.

5.20

338.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

1/17/2003-

MJG Review of file and placing items in organized fashion

Amount

1 00

150 00

5 00

750 00

100

150 00

1/21/2003 • MJG Disclosure of witness and matters

100

150 00

1/22/2003 • MJG Looking over documents

100

150 00

1/23/2003 • MJG Phone calls and drafting initial disclosures

150

225 00

150

225 00

0 75

112 50

MJG Drafting complaint and matters

1 00

150 00

MJG Finalize papers

0 25

37 50

MJG Reviewed all disclosure documents and office visit with Marv

125

187 50

MJG Finalizing discovery matters and letter on medical insurance

100

150 00

1 50

225 00

2/3/2003 • MJG Phone call to Marv, review, and objections reviewed

0 50

75 00

2/4/2003 - MJG Review of documents and matters

0 50

75 00

MJG Letter to Marv on additional notes

0 25

37 50

MJG Drafting reply to motion to appoint and matters

4 00

600 00

MJG Finalize and reply

0 50

75 00

MJG Finalize response on special master

1 00

150 00

MJG Drafting order on change of venue, phone call to Marv

1 00

150 00

MJG Office conference with Marv on case

2 00

300 00

MJG Research on promissory and recession

0 75

11250

MJG Drafting Summary Judgment

3 00

450 00

MJG Motion for Summary Judgment

0 50

75 00

MJG Finalize affidavit and exhibits and Summary Judgment motion

1 50

225 00

1/20/2003 • MJG Going over documents, initial disclosures
MJG Office conference

MJG Drafting complaint and matters
1/24/2003 • MJG Letter

Z^I/27/2003

y

2

/1/28/2003-

r \t

1/30/2003 • MJG Review of disclosure letters

Page

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
Hours Tax#
I

4/3/2003 - MJG Drafts sent out and exhibits prepared.

3

Amount

0.50

75.00

MJG Drafting Summary Judgment and changes.

2.00

300.00

^ r l__ 4/28/2003 - MJG Drafting written deposition on Richard Pett.

1.00

150.00

4/29/2003- MJG Review.

0.50

75.00

4/30/2003 - MJG Office conference.

1.00

150.00

5/2/2003 - MJG Letter and matters.

0.50

75.00

5/12/2003 - MJG Review of interrogatories and request for production of
documents.

0.50

75.00

5/14/2003-

0.50

75.00

5/20/2003 - MJG Office conference with Marv Neff on preparation for hearing.

2.00

300.00

5/21/2003 - MJG Motion for protective order.

1.50

225.00

5/27/2003 - MJG Hearing preparation, arguments and answers to discovery
and letter to Magelby.

2.50

375.00

5.00

750.00

6/2/2003 - MJG Office conference with Marv on several issues.

3.00

450.00

6/3/2003 - MJG Review of order and letter.

0.50

75.00

2.50

375.00

1.00

150.00

0.75

112.50

2.50

375.00

0.50

75.00

0.75

112.50

5.67

198.33

1 33

46.67

4.00

600.00

A. 44/9/2003 -

itf-

i*t-

/
y

MJG Phone call.

\ 5/29/2003 - MJG Review of records; drafting answers and interrogatories.

"6/4/2003 - MJG Drafting reply in support.
- MJG Abco's audit report.
6/16/2003 - MJG Phone calls and letters on accountant.
V

I 6/17/2003 - MJG Phone calls; review of reply and affidavit and matters on
CPA's.
6/18/2003 - MJG Review and thoughts.
6/19/2003 - MJG Phone calls on accountants and issues.

A

r 6/20/2003-

RML Researched accord satisfaction issues; drafted office
memorandum to Marlin in re: of research.

-

RML Researched pension vesity issue for ABCO's salary plan.

-

MJG Office conference and matters.

Page
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Hours Tax#

6/23/2003 -

MJG

<—v

Subpoenas, Richard Pett and Dean Udy, and answers to

4

Amount

2.00

300.00

2.00

300.00

1.00

35.00

Interrogatories.
6/24/2003 -

MJG

Visit in Salt Lake City with Bowens attorney.

\ 6/25/2003 -

RML

Copied and highlighted cases for accord and satisfaction
issues.

RML

Researched and drafted memorandum to Marlin regarding
ABCO/Neffs salary continuation agreement and contract
issues.

2.17

75.83

-

MJG

Reply and phone calls.

0.50

75.00

6/27/2003 -

MJG

Subpoenas on Udy and Pett.

0.50

75.00

6/30/2003 -

MJG

Review of insurances at Udy Group.

1.00

150.00

-

MJG

Issues and facts to Gibbs.

0.50

75.00

7/2/2003 -

RML

Research contract issue in regards of Neff V. Neff buy
agreement dispute and fraud issue.

7.83

274.17

-

MJG

Phone call.

0.25

37.50

7/3/2003 -

RML

Research for Neff V. Neff buyout agreement.

6.00

210.00

7/7/2003 -

RML

Researched issues for Neff V. Neff buyout agreement.

8.00

280.00

7/8/2003 -

RML

Researched issues and began drafting reply memorandum in
support of defendant's motion for Summary Judgment.

7.67

268.33

-

RML

Researched issues and began drafting reply memorandum in
support of defendant's motion for Summary Judgment.

2.83

99.17

7/10/2003 -

RML

Researched issues and drafted reply memorandum in
support of defendant's motion for Summary Judgment.

8.17

285.83

7/11/2003 -

RML

Researched reccession issue and drafted reply
memorandum in support of defendant's Summary Judgment
motion.

2.33

81.67

7/14/2003 -

RML

Researched issues and drafted reply memorandum.

5.17

180.83

-

MJG

Phone calls.

0.25

37.50

£/15/2003 -

MJG

Review of law and reply.

0.50

75.00

7/18/2003 -

RML

Researched and prepared list of witnesses and facts for reply.

6.00

210.00

i

r-

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

Amount

7/21/2003 - RML Researched facts and witnesses for reply.

0.67

23.33

- MJG Review of Marv Neff statements.

0.50

75.00

0.75

112.50

8/6/2003 - MJG Looking over site.

0.50

75.00

8/8/2003 - MJG Review with Marv Neff and all accountants issues.

2.50

375.00

8/11/2003 - MJG Office conference and drafting letter to accountant.

3.00

450.00

8/12/2003-

0.25

37.50

0.25

37.50

1.00

150.00

9/3/2003 - MJG Stipulation drafted and matters on accounting.

0.50

75.00

9/5/2003- MJG Phone call.

0.25

37.50

9/9/2003-

1.00

150.00

1.00

150.00

9/19/2003 - MJG Review of file, letter to Magelby, phone call with Marv and
phone call to Magelby.

1.00

150.00

10/3/2003 - KJS

2.90

319.00

10/6/2003 - MJG Office conference with Marv.

3.00

450.00

10/8/2003- MJG Letter to auditor.

2.00

300.00

10/15/2003 - MJG Letter to Don James and confidentiality.

0.50

75.00

10/20/2003- MJG Phone call with Marv.

1.00

150.00

10/21/2003- MJG Phone calls.

1.00

150.00

10/23/2003 - MJG Review of accounting reports.

1.00

150.00

10/24/2003 - MJG Review of accounting reports and drafting letter to Don
James and motion to continue.

4.50

675.00

10/27/2003 - MJG Finalize items on accounting to Don James.

1.00

150.00

7/22/2003 - MJG Finalize discovery responses and phone call with Marv.

MJG Finalize letter.

- MJG Letter to James Magelby.
8/18/2003 - MJG Responses reviewed, and letters reviewed.
j

5

MJG Letter to Magelby.

\ 9/16/2003 - MJG Phone calls, CPA letter and matters.

Conference with Marlin Grant; review of file; allegations by
Branson; memorandum to Miles Jensen concerning
insurance policies; review pleadings.

Page
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Hours Tax#

K

6

Amount

> " , 0/28/2003 -

MJG

Hearing and argument; review of tape.

3.50

525.00

11/6/2003 -

MJG

Phone call.

0.25

37.50

11/12/2003-

MJG

Phone calls.

0.50

75.00

11/19/2003-

MJG

Letter to Magelby.

1.00

150.00

1/25/2003 -

MJG

Reply to discovery motion.

0.50

75.00

11/26/2003 -

MJG

Review of discovery and reply.

1.00

150.00

12/1/2003 -

KJS

Research; draft defendant's reply to motion to compel;
research on questions to ask in Branson deposition.

2.40

264.00

12/2/2003 -

KJS

Research; finished drafting questions to ask Branson during

2.00

220.00

0.50

75.00

4.00

600.00

0.50

75.00

0.25

37.50

0.50

75.00

1.00

150.00

1.00

150.00

0.50

75.00

\p

his deposition.

112/3/2003 -

MJG

Drafting; reply to discovery.

1 12/10/2003 -

MJG

Visited with accountant and matters.

12/23/2003-

MJG

Reply.

1/13/2004-

MJG

Letter

1/16/2004 -

MJG

Phone call with Dan James

-

MJG

Letter; phone call

1/21/2004 -

MJG

Review of letter; review of motion for dismissal of claims

1/23/2004-

MJG

Matters

"\

I

2.50

375.00

1/27/2004 - MJG Letter to Dan James and Jim Budge; phone call to Mary
1/28/2004 - MJG Work on Motion to Dismiss for Statute of Limitations; Note to
Bank; reply and counter on Accounting items compelled

4.00

600.00

1/30/2004 -

MJG

Letters; reviews; finalize documents

1.50

225.00

r" 2/2/2004 -

MJG

Finalize letter to Dan James

0.50

75.00

2/3/2004 •

MJG

Discussion on phone

0.50

75.00

2/4/2004 •

MJG

Trip to Ogden; preparation and discussions

5.00

750.00

2/9/2004 •

MJG

Letter to Richard

0.25

37.50

(kwf

Page
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7

Amount

/ 2 / 1 1 /2004 - M JG Phone calls; review of letters

0.50

75.00

\

2/18/2004 - MJG Phone calls; review; matters

0.50

75.00

2/23

4.00

600.00

3/1 /2004 - MJG List of Discovery

1.00

150.00

3/2/2004 - MJG Phone call; finalize letter and discovery; review of Reply to
Motion for Statute of Limitations

2.50

375.00

3/3/2004 - KJS

Memorandum from Marlin Grant; review pleadings and
documents; work on research to object to Branson's Motion
to Stay Proceedings (case law research - 56(f) Motion to
Continue Discovery)

3.20

352.00

3/4/2004 - KJS

Telephone conference with Marlin Grant; draft Affidavits of
Oleen Bunderson, Melanie Bingham and Michelle Huff; work
on objection to Branson's Motion

2.10

231.00

3/9/2004 - KJS

Draft objection (response) to Branson's Motion and
Memorandum to Stay; telephone conference with Marlin
Grant; incorporate Branson's letter and Affidavits

3.20

352.00

3/10/2004 - KJS

Telephone conference with Marlin Grant; update response to
Motion to Stay

0.90

99.00

3/11/2004 - KJS

Memorandum to Marlin Grant; finalized draft of Objection to
Branson's Motion to Stay; updated case law research

1.00

110.00

3/16/2004 - KJS

Update response to Branson's Motion to Stay; memorandum
from Marlin Grant; conference with Marlin Grant

0.80

88.00

3/17/2004 - KJS

Telephone conference with Ken Oakesen; finalize Affidavits

0.40

44.00

1.00

150.00

1.00

150.00

2.50

375.00

0.25

37.50

3.20

352.00

94 - MJG Preparation; review of accounting findings; argument in
Court, office meeting

of Melanie Bingham, Oleen Bunderson, and Michelle Huff
3/18/2004 - MJG Letter and review
3/19/2004 - MJG Letter to Jim Magelby and to Brad Townsend
3/22/2004 - MJG Office visit on Marv's documents
3/24/2004- MJG Review of letters
3/25/2004 - KJS Research case law (Utah) dealing with valuation of goodwill
in business divisions; conference with Marlin Grant

Page
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Hours Tax#

220.00

MJG Matters

1.00

150.00

3/29/2004 - MJG Matters with Branson

0.50

75.00

Research on goodwill of construction business;
memorandum to Marlin Grant

3.20

352.00

4/7/2004- KJS

Telephone conference with Ken Oakeson; search for
information on Michelle Huff; telephone conference (leave
message) for Michelle; review pleading documents

1.00

110.00

4/8/2004- KJS

Telephone conference with Ken Oakeson of ABCO;
conference with Marlin Grant; telephone conference (leave
message) with Michelle Huff

0.40

44.00

Memorandum to Britta Berge; memorandum to Marlin Grant;
update response

0.70

77.00

0.75

112.50

1 4/2/2004

KJS

4/12/2004- KJS

Update Response to Branson's Motion to Stay; further
research on goodwill valuation for business dissolutions

1^4/14/2004 • MJG Letters to Magelby
4/15/2004-

MJG Phone calls on property sale and lis pendens

0.50

75.00

4/16/2004-

MJG Research on Lis Pendens problems and phone calls

1.00

150.00

4/20/2004 • MJG Phone calls

0.50

75.00

4/21/2004 • KJS

1.20

132.00

1.50

225.00

Telephone conference with Marlin Grant; update response;
prepare exhibits; file responsive pleading

4/23/2004 - MJG Drafting Protective order and letter

k.

Amount

2.00

3/26/2004- KJS

A
Y

8

5/10/2004-

MJG Phone call

0.25

37.50

5/11/2004-

MJG Phone call

0.25

37.50

6/2/2004 • MJG Phone call

0.25

37.50

6/4/2004 • MJG Review of Bonding around lis pendens

1.00

150.00

0.30

33.00

Research business valuation

2.00

130.00

Research goodwill valuation; draft memorandum

5.50

357.50

1.00

150.00

/ V l 1/2004-

KJS Telephone conference with Marlin Grant; telephone
conference with Julio Lopez

6/14/2004

JAS

5/2004 - JAS
\

MJG Phone call to Brad Townsend and review of goodwill; also
phone call with Larry Vaughn and attorney in California on
the sale

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

/ 6/17/2004 - MJG Review of 7 page letter of Magelby, phone call

Amount

0 50

75 00

1 50

225 00

7/1/2004 - MJG Drafting three different letters and phone call to Marv Neff

2 50

375 00

7/6/2004 - MJG Letter to Mabelby and review his declaration for judgement

1 00

150 00

7/7/2004 - MJG Draft response to Jim Magelby

0 25

37 50

7/12/2004 - MJG Review letter from Magelby

0 25

37 50

7/13/2004-

2.00

300 00

7/14/2004 - MJG Letters, motions, and replies

2.50

375 00

7/19/2004 - MJG Office visit regarding issues with brother

1.00

150 00

7/20/2004 - MJG Review, letters, subpoenas, Quit Claim Deed, and matters

2.00

300 00

7/22/2004 - MJG Letter on lis pendens

1.00

150 00

7/27/2004 - MJG Letters, faxes, and responses

1.00

150 00

0 25

37 50

MJG Phone calls with Marv on house and other problems

0 50

75 00

MJG Matters

100

150 00

8/5/2004 - MJG Drafting motion to expedite and several phone calls

1 00

150 00

8/6/2004 - MJG Phone calls, finalize motion to expunge the lis pendens, and
drafting release and deed

3 00

450 00

8/9/2004 - MJG Hearing, negotiations, and phone calls

2 00

300 00

8/10/2004 - MJG Review stipulation and negotiations on lis pendens

2 00

300 00

8/16/2004 - MJG Review and revision of stipulation and deeds

1 00

150 00

8/17/2004 - MJG Notice of Bond and matters

0 50

75 00

8/19/2004-

MJG Office visit

0 25

37 50

8/23/2004-

MJG Phone calls

0 25

37 50

100

150 00

6/29/2004 - MJG Letter to Magelby, phone call

MJG Draft letter to Magelby

8/2/2004 - MJG Review of matters
V'

9

J 8/3/20048/4/2004-

8/24/2004 - MJG Letter on house - specific performance

A ^ O / . i

Page
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)

10

Amount

8/27/2004 • MJG Review and advice on contract sale of house

0.50

75.00

8/31/2004-

0.25

37.50

0.25

37.50

MJG Phone call

9/9
9/9/2004
• MJG Phone call on house and Branson
9/13/2004-

MJG Discussion with Marv Neff; review appraisal; draft letter to
Brad Townsend; and draft notice to submit

1.75

262.50

9/16/2004-

MJG Phone calls with Marv and phone calls with Brad Townsend

0.50

75.00

9/17/2004-

MJG Review evaluations and appraisals

3.00

450.00

0.30

33.00

2.00

300.00

9/28/2004 - MJG Drafting statute of limitations argument

4.00

€00.00

9/29/2004 - MJG Research

2.00

300.00

9/30/2004 - MJG Further research, drafting arguments, and preparation for
hearing

6.00

900.00

10/1/2004- MJG Drafting affidavits; phone calls to Marv and office visit

6.00

900.00

10/6/2004- MJG Hearing, preparation and arguments

3.00

450.00

10/7/2004- MJG Review of motion to stay and rule 56 motion; affidavit of Jim
Magleby and responses

2.00

300.00

10/8/2004- MJG Work on affidavit and motion

1.00

150.00

9/20/2004 - KJS

Review documents and pleadings for hearing; telephone
conference with Leslie

MJG Hearing and matters

C ^ / l 0/12/2004-

MJG Phone calls and drafting response to Paul Felt

1.50

225.00

^

J 10/13/2004-

MJG Drafted Paul Felt summary

1.00

150.00

l 10/14/2004-

MJG Finalize brief to Paul Felt

0.50

75.00

[10/19/2004.

MJG Mediation

9.00

1,350.00

1.00

150.00

f 11/15/2004 - MJG Review of matters and setting deposition
11/18/2004-

MJG Reviewing evidence

1.00

150.00

11/22/2004-

MJG Review of files, tax returns, and letter to Magelby

2.00

300.00

MJG Review

0.25

37.50

12/3/2004-

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

12/6/2004- MJG Phone calls

11

Amount

0 50

75 00

12/13/2004 - MJG Status review, letters drafted, amended counterclaim, file
reviewed, office visit with Marv

3 00

450 00

12/15/2004 - MJG Draft changes to counter claim Amendments, affidavit for
sister and Marvin Neff, corrections to court letter and matter

2 00

300 00

12/16/2004 - MJG Letters to sisters, affidavit, revocation and appointment,
phone call and review issues

3 00

450 00

12/22/2004 - MJG Phone calls with Pallesen, Ken and Marv and changes to
Affidavit

1 00

150 00

12/23/2004 - MJG Boyd Palleson Affidavit finalized, drafted documents and
reviewed

1 50

225 00

12/29/2004 - MJG Reviewing emails and counter-claim changes

1 00

150 00

1/3/2005 - MJG Organized file, letter to Palleson, and phone call to Marvin

1 50

225 00

1/4/2005-

0 25

37 50

MJG Phone calls

1/5/2005 - JCJ

Calls with Leslie, review file indexes, initial review of
pleadings

438 00

1/6/2005 - JCJ

Further review and outline of pleadings, preliminary planning

788 00

- MJG Letter to James Magleby
1/7/2005 - JCJ

0 50

Conference with Marlin Grant and case planning

75 00
263 00

1112/2005 - MJG Phone calls and Matters

1 00

150 00

1/18/2005-

0 50

75 00

MJG Edie Pallesen

^1/19/2005 - JCJ
1/21/2005 - KJS

Email exchange with Leslie
Consultation with Marlin Grant Review file documents,
correspondence and pleadings Draft Motion and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Protective Order
(re seeking to deny Branson's request for discovery of
Marvin's stock accounts)

^*0$'

2 80

308 00

1/25/2005 - MJG Amended Complaint, Letter, Phone Calls and Matters

4 00

600 00

1/27/2005 - MJG Phone call with Marv on Branson's Tr^bk Attack/Assault,
^
Phone Call on Scheduling and Review of Interrogatory by
Bowen

2 00

300 00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

H_J/28/2005"

»

MJG

Amended

Complaint; Office Visit

1/31/2005 - MJG Office visit; Review of Facts; Drafting Salary Continuation;
Motion
2/1/2005 - MJG Issues; Motion to Enter Amended Counterclaim
2/2/2005 - JCJ
- KJS

txtfft

i/^^

&

"

MJG

/2/3/2005 - JCJ

A B C 0 vs

-

Branson s ,tems

'

; Review of Boxes

375.00

0.50

100.00
263.00

1.70

187.00

5.00

1,000.00
132.00

0.90

99.00

- MJG Office visit on issues

1.00

200.00

- MJG Review of Tax Returns; Cory Johnson Box and Issues

2.00

400.00

0.60

66.00

2.00

4oo.'o~cr

Research on Summary Judgment Motion (re: Salary
Continuation Agreement).

Reviewed Documents and Pleadings. Reviewed Attorney
Marlin Grant's notes on Summary Judgment Motion. Work
on Summary Judgment Motion.

- MJG Review of Manila documents and other Letters

2/9/2005 - MJG Manila Ranch Letters to Sunrise Title and Dale Dorius and
Issues

ir

2/10/2005 - MJG Review of Facts

j^fr k5 2/11/2005 - JCJ
J ^ *f\

/

2.50

800.00

2/8/2005 - KJS

*^

•v "150.00

4.00

2/7/2005 - KJS

A^

1.00

Complete review and revisions to Amended Counterclaim
and Cross-claim

- MJG Review of Second Box

*rti
f\r

Amount

Review and revise Motion to Amend pleadings and Amended
Counterclaim, discussion with Marlin Grant
Consultation with Marlin Grant. Begin preliminary work and
research on Summary Judgment Motion (re: Salary
Continuation Agreement).

12

2.00
1.00

,

400.00
200.00
117.00

Conference with Marlin Grant to discuss deposition
preparations and case planning
2.00

400.00

2/14/2005 - MJG Court telephone conference with and amended depositions

1.00

200.00

2/15/2005 - MJG Deposition matters; phone call

3.00

600.00

2.50

87.50

- MJG Deposition preparation

- LAB

Telephone call with computer services re: software; pull Itrs
from disclosures CD in preparation for depositions; organize
in chronological order

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

V!/ 2/15/2005-

b

2/16/2005-

LAB

Organize file and report status

JCJ

Case planning with Marlin Grant

1.00

13

Amount
35.00
88.00

MJG Review of Bowen Letters; Deposition questions

4.50

900.00

LAB

3.00

105.00

8.00

1,600.00

8.00

280.00

Pull Itrs from disclosures CD in preparation for depositions;
organize in chronological order

2/17/2005 - MJG Depositions; Exhibits and reviewed all boxes
- LAB
2/18/2005 - JCJ

Prepare exhibits for Branson Neff Deposition
Review deposition exhibits and consult with Laura Boyd,
case planning with Marlin Grant

132.00

- MJG Deposition preparations

3.00

600.00

- LAB

8.00

280.00

2/22/2005 - JCJ

Prepare exhibits for Branson Neff Deposition
Work on deposition exhibits, conference with Marlin Grant
review deposition strategy, work on relocating deposition, call
to Leslie, review notices, calls to Skolnick, calls to court to
schedule conference call, call to Sawaya, conference with
Marlin Grant

263.00

- MJG Deposition preparations

8.00

1,600.00

- LAB

8.00

280.00

Revise Deposition exhibit index and prepare additional
deposition exhibits

2/23/2005 - JCJ

- MJG Depositions in Salt Lake City
2/24/2005 - MJG Depositions in Salt Lake City
2/25/2005 - MJG Depositions in Salt Lake City
3/1/2005 - JCJ

88.00

Review exhibit book, further case planning

Case planning with Marlin Grant, review documents

- MJG Phone calls
3/3/2005 - JCJ Prepare for deposition, conference with Marv and Marlin
Grant
MJG Deposition preparation

11.00

2,200.00

11.00

2,200.00

10.00

2,000.00

1.00

175.00

0.25

50.00
656.00

3.00

600.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

J/8/2005
,v^l

3/9/2005
'3/10/2005

\

3/11/2005

Amount

MJG Work on Answers to Interrogatories and Phone Calls

2 00

400 00

MJG Phone calls and issues

0 50

100 00

12 00

2,400 00

1 00

200 00

MJG Attend depositions in Salt Lake City
MJG Letter to Michael Skolnick
JCJ

Conference with Marlin Grant, research file records

MJG Attend depositions in Salt Lake City
4^^

14

JCJ

438 00
12 00

Call from Marlin Grant review findings and discuss case plan

MJG Attend depositions in Salt Lake City

2,400 00
44 00

10 00

2,000 00

3/14/2005-

MJG Phone calls, Review of Information on Gale

0 75

150 00

3/16/2005-

MJG Phone call and letter

0 50

100 00

3/23/2005

MJG Letters

0 25

50 00

3/30/2005 • MJG Work on Affidavit of Mike Gale

0 50

100 00

3/31/2005-

1 00

200 00

4/1/2005 • MJG Letter on Federal matters, Fax and Letter to County Attorney,
Letter on Manila Ranch

0 75

150 00

4/5/2005 • MJG Work on Attorney General Letter

0 50

100 00

MJG Work on Assignment of water shares and Phone Calls

1 00

200 00

MJG Letter to Merv Glines and Gayle McKeachnie, Request for

1 00

200 00

0 25

50 00

0 90

108 00

4 00

800 00

/4/13/20054/14/2005-

MJG Letter to Jim Magleby & Gayle McKeachnie

Reconveyance, exhibit and review of Manila Ranch
4/18/2005-

MJG Phone call

4/19/2005-

KJS

Review Notes and File Update Motion for Summary
Judgment (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Salary
Continuation Plan)

MJG Work on Motion to Interplead, Affidavit and Order

\ &

/4/21/2005 - MJG

Revise Affidavit, Order and Motion to Interplead Funds, letter
to Mike and Jim re depositions

1 00

200 00

/ 4/25/2005 - MJG

Phone call to Gayle McKeachnie

0 25

50 00

Page

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Hours Tax#

15

Amount

„JlC

4/26/
4/26/2005-

MJG

Phone call with Gayle

0.25

50.00

^

4/27/2005 -

MJG

Work on Letter & Stipulation on Manila Ranch

2.00

400.00

5/3/2005 -

MJG

Jim Magleby Letter and Change to Stipulation

0.50

5/9/2005 -

KJS

Work on Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment.

1.20

132.00

-

MJG

Email and phone call

0.50

100.00

5/13/2005-

MJG

Phone calls

0.50

100.00

5/16/2005-

MJG

Depositions

9.00

1,800.00

5/17/2005-

MJG

Depositions

9.00

1,800.00

5/18/2005-

MJG

Depositions

9.00

1,800.00

5/25/2005-

MJG

Letter to Jim Magleby

0.25

50.00

5/26/2005-

MJG

Phone calls

0.25

50.00

5/27/2005 -

MJG

Letter to Magleby and Fax

1.00

200.00

5/31/2005 -

KJS

Work on on Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (re: Salary
Continuation Plan).

0.90

99.00

-

MJG

Deposition Review with law clerk

0.25

50.00

6/6/2005 -

CTB

Review Deposition of Branson Neff and pull quotations

4.60

299.00

6/13/2005-

KJS

Review Notes and File. Case law research for Summary
Judgment (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Salary
Continuation Plan).

1.70

187.00

6/14/2005 -

CTB

Search Branson Neffs deposition for admissions

1.70

110.50

6/15/2005-

MJG

Matters

0.25

50.00

6/21/2005 -

CTB

Search Branson Neffs Deposition

1.00

65.00

6/22/2005 -

CTB

Continue to search Branson Neffs deposition

2.10

136.50

i^v | 6/23/2005^ j \ ^

CTB

Draft memorandum in opposition to Branson's motion to
release funds

1.20

78.00

\

Page
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Hours Tax#
6/23/2005 -

MJG Work on replies

200.00
169.00^

2.60

\ 6/28/2005- CTB

Draft Response to motion to release Manilla Ranch funds

1.10

71.50

1.00

200.00

0.25

50.00

2.00

400.00 /

MJG Work on Response on Manila Ranch money

' 6/29/2005- MJG Matters on Manila Ranch
A . <•
7/5/2005 - MJG Review of Depositions on Aspen Springs Argument
^
>.rj/6/2005- MJG Letter to Sunrise

V

0.25
1.00

200.00

1.00

200.00

0.50

100.00

7/20/2005 - MJG Letter regarding various lawsuits and issue on Request for
Reconveyance

1.00

200.00

7/21/2005 - CTB

2.50

162.50

0.50

100.00

7/22/2005 - MJG Work on Aspen Springs and Statute of Limitations

1.00

200.00

7/26/2005 - CTB

Review of Branson Neff s deposition

1.90

123.50

7/27/2005 - CTB

Review Branson Neff s deposition and categorize; Review
Branson Neff s Reply Memorandum re: farm equip, and
Manilla ranch escrow; Review and research summary
judgment and motion to dismiss

2.60

169.00

7/28/2005 - CTB

Prepare and revise Affidavit of Marvin Neff re: Dale Dorius
letter; Review and research summary judgment and motion
to dismiss;

3.25

211.25

MJG Matters and Reply

0.50

100.00

7/29/2005

CTB

Finalize and fax Affidavit of Marvin Neff; Review and
research summary judgment and motion to dismiss

4.00

260.00

8/1/2005

CTB

Review and research statute of limitations and discovery rule;
and Research which party has the burden of proof of
fiduciary duty

3.90

253.50

- MJG Review of Deposition on Aspen Springs
7/7/2005 -

^4

1.00

Draft Response to motion to release Manilla Ranch funds

,

J

Amount

^6/27/2005 - CTB

M
^

16

MJG Review of Deposists

7/8/2005 - MJG Telephone call

Draft Memorandum opposing return of farm equipment

MJG Reply to Equipment Motion

'•

J
^

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

Amount

8/1/2005- MJG Affidavit and phone call

1.00

200.00

8/2/2005 - CTB

4.00

260.00

4.70

305.50

5.10

331.50

2.80

182.00

12.00

2,400.00

4.20

273.00

r.

^A*
r

17

Research what constitutes a prima facie case for fraud; draft
supplemental brief supporting dismissal; research whether
statutory discovery rule should be left for jury

8/3/2005 - CTB

Research and draft supplemental brief supporting dismissal

8/4/2005 - CTB

Draft supplemental brief supporting dismissal

8/8/2005 - CTB

Search Branson's deposition regarding Aspen Springs

- MJG Depositions and travel time
8/9/2005 - CTB

Summary of Branson's deposition volume 5 and volume 1
10.00

2,000.00

- MJG Deposition and travel time
8/10/2005 - CTB Summary of Branson's deposition volume 1 and volume 2;
and discussion of supplemental brief supporting summary
judgment and revision of supplemental brief

4.00

260.00

8/11/2005 - CTB

2.00

130.00

2.20

143.00

2.00

400.00

0.50

100.00

1.50

300.00

1.30

156.00

0.25

50.00

Revision of supplemental brief and summarize Branson
deposition volume 2

8/12/2005 - CTB

Summarize Branson deposition volume 2 and volume 3

8/15/2005 - MJG Review of Affidavits
8/18/2005-

MJG Letters

8/22/2005 - MJG Review of Depositions
8/26/2005 - KJS Review Notes and File. Work on Motion for Summary
Judgment (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Salary
Continuation Plan).
- MJG Memorandum regarding Salary Continuation Plan
8/27/2005 - KJS

Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan).

0.80

96.00

8/29/2005 - KJS

Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan). Review
Salary Continuation Agreement, notes from Richard Pett and
Property Settlement Agreement.

1.90

228.00

Page

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
Hours Tax#
8/29/2005 - MJG Changes to Affidavit, items in Motion for Summary Judgment
9/2/2005 - KJS

Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan).

- MJG Drafting Final Argument

18

Amount

3.00

600.00

0.90

108.00

1.50

300.00

9/3/2005 - KJS

Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan).

0.40

48.00

I/5/2005 - KJS

Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan).

1.20

144.00

9/7/2005 - MJG Organizing Arguments

1.00

200.00

9/8/2005 - MJG Letter to Magleby on Bond

0.50

100.00

9/9/2005 - KJS

0.60

72.00

1.00

200.00

2.30

276.00

1.50

300.00

0.90

45.00

9/16/2005 - MJG Phone call on Federal ATF case

0.25

50.00

9/19/2005 - MJG Oral Argument

2.00

400.00

9/30/2005 - MJG Letter to Magleby

1.00

200.00

10/5/2005 - MJG Jason Townsend Phone call and Letter

0.75

150.00

0.80

96.00

Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan).

- MJG Finalize the Statute of Limitations Argument
9/12/2005 - KJS

Memo to Attorney Marlin Grant. Work on Motion for
Summary Judgment (Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding
Salary Continuation Plan).

MJG Phone call on Criminal Case and Finalize S/L Memo
- MMW Review case with attorney concerning waiver, estoppel and
merger issues; research Utah case law concerning issues.

10/13/2005 - KJS

Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Review Branson
Neffs Motion and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Begin work on
Response.

r\ 4 -4 nr~ n

Page
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Hours Tax# _

1

Amount

10/14/2005 - MJG Work on Salary Continuation Plan Summary Judgment

2.00

400.00

10/15/2005 - KJS

1.40

154.00

1.50

300.00

10/18/2005 - MJG Continue work on Salary Continuation Motion

2.00

400.00

10/19/2005 - MJG Continue work on Salary Continuation Argument and other
issues

1.00

200.00

Discussion with Marlin Grant about Neff case and needed
research; Discuss Neff case and my role in preparing
research with Kelly; Reading motion for summary judgment
and accompanying materials; Began researching contract
issues: specific performance, recission, breach, partial
performance; Review motion for summary judgment and
depositions, photocopying motion for summary judgment;
Read complaint, outlined allegations, reviewed motion for
summary judgment. Researching contract issues raised in
complaint and motion for partial summary judgment.

6.40

416.00

Researching contract issues: ratification, recission, "meeting
of the minds," - case law and statutes for response to motion
for summary judgment; Case law research on ratification

4.60

299.00

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

3.80

456.00

Research - Brown's Shoe Fit case and other cases cited in
motion for partial summary judgment. Also reviewed motion
and outlined arguments for research memo. Continued
research case law for: ratification, partial performance,
meeting of the minds, right of first refusal, and agreement to
agree.

4.50

292.50

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for

1.80

216.00

0.75

150.00

1.70

204.00

8.10

526.50

Memo Attorney Marlin Grant. Preliminary work on Opposition
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

0/17/2005 - MJG Continue work on Salary Continuation

* /

- CM

10/20/2005- CM

KJS
10/21/2005- CM

- KJS

Partial Summary Judgment.
10/24/2005 - MJG Phone call with Marvin
- KJS
- CM

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
Reading and review case law research. Drafting memo to
Marlin Grant and Kelly Smith summarizing research and
arguments; Researching case law for ratification, equitable
estoppel, meeting of the minds, in other jurisdictions.

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

10/25/2005 - MJG Research on Brief, Reply Brief

20

Amount

6 00

1,200 00

CM

Research - equitable estoppel, editing memo to Marlin Grant
and Kelly Smith Adding case law citations to memorandum,
Discuss further research for case with Marlin Grant, Filing
research, reading Kelly's response to the motion for partial
summary judgment, outlining arguments and preparing
research, begin research,

4 20

273 00

10/26/2005- KJS

Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant Work on Opposition
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

160

192 00

- CM

Review complaint and cross complaint - revisit factual
allegations, Research Utah Rules of Civil Procedure summary judgment, form of pleadings, amending pleadings,
Spoke to James Jenkins about J Earl case he had in the
80's concerning partial payment Researched partial payment
and J Earl Ut Supreme Court case/partial performance,
Research recission, offer/acceptance - case law - UT courts
Reading research accumulated throughout the day

4 90

318 50

Look up cases for Marlin Grant's review

0 20

7 00

10/27/2005- KJS

Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant Work on Opposition
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

0 80

96 00

CM

Reviewing research on rescission/mutual mistake of fact, etc
Reviewing Kelly Smith's draft for opposition to motion for
partial summary judgement Drafting and Editing memo to
Marlin Grant and Kelly Smith on rescission and mutual
mistake research, Researching Offer and Acceptance,
contract formation, substantial performance Reviewing
research

6 70

435 50

5 00

1 000 00

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

5 90

708 00

Further research on offer/acceptance, accord/satisfaction,
equitable estoppel, and UCC offer and acceptance Reading
research Drafting research memo on offer/acceptance
common law and UCC provisions, Discussing appropriate
citations (bluebooking) with Carrie, Drafting and editing
memo on offer/acceptance, rejection, accord/satisfaction,
equitable estoppel Revising memo - bluebooking Further
research on estoppel

8 50

552 50

CC

MJG Review of Depositions and Drafting Summary Judgment
10/28/2005- KJS
CM

r* -1 -* r\ r» 9**
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21

Amount

10/28/2005 - MJG Work on Summary Judgment

3.50

700.00

10/31/2005 - KJS

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

0.70

84.00

Editing and finalizing memo on offer/acceptance,
accord/satisfaction, equitable estoppel. Reviewing rules on
summary judgment. Shepardizing cited cases. Bluebooking
citations. Filing research - cases- summary of memoranda for
research file; Discussion with Marlin Grant about further need
for research for response to motion for partial summary
judgment: Specific performance, substantial performance,
etc. Also, instructions to go to Hancey law office for R-2
Contracts; Went over to Mark Hancey's law office - borrowed
Restatement 2d of Contracts - researching and photocopying
partial performance, substantial performance, uncertainty of
terms; Reviewing research on partial/substantial
performance, uncertainty of terms, etc.

6.00

390.00

2.00

400.00

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

3.60

216.00

Reading research on partial/substantial performance reading cases cited in opposing party's brief. Reviewing
cases on agreement to agree/executory contracts.
Researching executory contracts; Researching cases cited
on rebuttal, brief discussion with Marlin about further
research; Drafting and editing research memo on cases cited
in opposing party's memorandum in support of motion for
partial summary judgment and rebutting arguments in that.

6.80

221.00

1.50

300.00

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

2.80

168.00

Researching executory contracts/binding
agreements/earnest money agreements. Reading and
reviewing research on partial/substantial performance;
Drafting and editing research memo on executory
contracts/earnest money agreements, and partial/substantial
performance. Bluebooking memorandum; Organizing file,
organizing case law, filing research and memorandum;
Discussion with Carrie about Neff filing and case numbers.
Finding and reviewing Share Redemption Agreement-'98.
Researching merger doctrine and integration. Reviewing
merger doctrine research.

5.60

182.00

- CM

- MJG Matters
11/1/2005- KJS
- CM

MJG Reading Travis Bowen's Deposition
11/2/2005- KJS
- CM

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

1/2/2005 - MJG Interpleader Order drafted and research

iX

22

Amount

2 00

400 00

11/3/2005 - KJS

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

190

114 00

- CM

Researching merger doctrine, integration, and parole
evidence rule - Reading research - outlining memo on
merger, Brief discussion with Kelly Smith about needed
research, merger doctrine, motion for summary judgment,
Research on integration, parol evidence, verbal/oral
modification of contracts Drafting research memo

5 20

169 00

5 50

1,100 00

MJG Research and Drafting Reply to Summary Judgment and
work on Bnef
1/4/2005- KJS

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

1 80

108 00

11/5/2005 - KJS

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

2 00

120 00

11/7/2005 - KJS

Consultation with paralegal (Caitlan), update and work on
Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

1 20

72 00

Reading and editing Defendant's reply and objection to
Branson Neffs motion for Summary Judgment, Discussion
with Kelly about reviewing and editing our motion in reply to
Branson's motion for partial summary judgment,

4 60

148 00

3 00

600 00

- CM

- MJG Drafting Brief
11/8/2005- KJS

Further work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment

1 20

72 00

CM

Reading and editing Kelly Smith's additions to Defendant's
reply and objection to the motion for partial summary
judgment, Brief discussion with Marlin Grant about progress
of reply and objection to Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment

1 20

39 00

3 00

600 00

5 20

169 00

MJG Facts and Brief
11/9/2005- CM

Review and revise draft of reply to motion for summary
judgment, Brief discussion with Carrie concerning new draft
of reply to motion for summary judgment and appropriate
citations

0" i n•) n
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1,600.00

1.30

78.00

4.00

800.00

Consultation with Caitlan. Work on Exhibits to go with the
Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

3.60

216.00

Final reply and objection to Branson's motion for partial

1.00

32.50

2.00

400.00

4.20

252.00

3.90

234.00

5.90

191.00

MJG Brief; Visit with Marvin

3.50

700.00

KJS

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (and exhibits).

3.20

192.00

Further review and revision to memo replying and objecting
to Branson's motion for partial summary judgment

5.80

188.00

0.25

50.00

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (and exhibits). Consultation with
Attorney Marlin Grant and Caitlan.

3.40

204.00

Further review and revision of memo replying and objecting
to Branson's motion for partial summary judgment; and
review with Kelly Smith and Marlin Grant

3.00

97.50

11/10/2005- KJS

ir
-

Amount

8.00

11/9/2005- MJG Work on Brief

V^

23

Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Work on Opposition
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Begin review of Branson Neff s Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Salary
Continuation Agreement.

MJG Work on Brief

11/11/2005 - KJS

- CM

summary judgment and review with Kelly Smith
-

MJG Draft another Statute of Limitation Argument

11/12/2005 - KJS

11/14/2005 - KJS

- CM

11/15/2005

- CM

Further work on Exhibits to go with the Opposition
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Update Partial Summary Judgment Memorandum.
Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant and Paralegal
Caitlan. Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (and exhibits).
Review and revise memo replying and objecting to Branson's
motion for partial summary judgment; review with attorney;

- MJG Finalize Statute of Limitations
11/16/2005 - KJS

- CM

y-v .A
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24

Amount

11/16/2005 - MJG Read Branson's Depositions vol. 1 & 2, Statute of Limitations
and meeting of minds strategy

4.00

800.00

11/17/2005 - KJS

Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (and exhibits).

2.90

174.00

Compile Merger and Integration research, notations for Kelly
Smith; continue to revise reply and objection to Branson's
motion for partial summary judgment.

3.70

120.00

4.00

800.00

4.60

276.00

- MDE Legal research regarding contract law - merger, prior
inconsistent statements nullified, and fully integrated contract.

3.00

52.50

- CM

Further review and revision of memo replying and objecting
to Branson's motion for partial summary judgment; review
with attorney

6.00

195.00

- MJG Research Branson Deposition and case planning. Drafting
new Motion for Summary Judgment on Merger.

2.50

500.00

- CM

- MJG Drafting Summary Judgment Facts and Brief
11/18/2005 - KJS

Work on Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Salary Continuation Agreement.

11/19/2005 - KJS

Work on draft of Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the Salary Continuation
Agreement.

2.30

138.00

11/21/2005 - KJS

Work on and finalize draft of Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Salary
Continuation Agreement.

1.10

66.00

3.00

600.00

1.90

114.00

5.25

1,050.00

1.20

72.00

5.00

1,000.00

MJG Manila Ranch & Estate Documents reviewed in Dale Dorius
Deposition; Merger doctrine reviewed and partial summary
judgment
11/22/2005 - KJS

Research and work for draft of Summary Judgment (re:
Merger argument).

- MJG Notice of Entry of Order; and Preparation for Dale's
Deposition; Drafting Reply brief to Salary Continuation and
Reply in Support of brief on Contract
11/23/2005 - KJS

A H

\

Research and work for draft of Summary Judgment (re:
Merger argument).

MJG Dale Dorius Deposition and visit with Marvin; Two letters to
Jim Magleby to get records and set depositions

< < < >
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11/25/2005- KJS

Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment
(re: Merger argument).

2.80

168.00

11/28/2005- KJS

Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment
(re: Merger argument).

3.90

234.00

Research and final editing of Memorandum replying and
objecting to Branson's motion for partial summary judgment.

7.10

230.00

Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment
(re: Merger argument).

2.10

126.00

MJG Letter to Magleby, finalize Briefs

2.00

400.00

KJS

1.30

78.00

MJG Finalize Briefs

3.00

600.00

KJS

2.30

276.00

MJG Finalize Salary Continuation Objection; Reply in Support

3.00

600.00

KJS

1.90

228.00

2.00

400.00

CM
11/29/2005- KJS

1/30/2005-

12/1/2005

12/2/2005

Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment
(re: Merger argument).

Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment
(re: Merger argument).

Work on Motion and Memorandum for Motion in Limine to
Exclude all Prior Inconsistent Statements (re: Merger
argument).

MJG Merger Argument
12/3/2005- KJS

Work on Motion and Memorandum for Motion in Limine to
Exclude all Prior Inconsistent Statements (re: Merger
argument). Memo to Attorney Marlin Grant.

2.80

336.00

12/5/2005- KJS

Work on Motion and Memorandum for Motion in Limine to
Exclude all Prior Inconsistent Statements (re: Merger
argument). Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant.

1.90

228.00

1.00

200.00

MJG Merger Argument and Deposition Pages Cited
12/6/2005- KJS

Work on Final Draft of Motion in Limine to Exclude all Prior
Inconsistent Statements Regarding the Settlement
Agreement and for Partial Summary Judgment based on the
Doctrine of Merger and Integration.

1.90

228.00

12/7/2005- KJS

Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Finalize Motion in
Limine to Exclude all Prior Inconsistent Statements
Regarding the Settlement Agreement and for Partial
Summary Judgment based on the Doctrine of Merger and
Integration.

0.90

108.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page

Amount

Hours Tax#

12/7/2005- MJG Merger Argument

12/8/2005-

6

l*ifC

s

iJA

r

1.00

200.00
312.00

CM

Reading depositions of Marvin Neff. Making notes, outlining
topics to summarize.

4.80

KJS

Review Motion to Compel from Branson. Begin work on
Response to Motion to Compel.

1.80

- MJG Merger Argument

1.50

- CM

Continue reading depositions, outlining and summarizing
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in
depositions.

6.90

Review Motion to Compel from Branson. Work on Response
to Motion to Compel.

2.90

12/9/2005 - KJS

26

- MJG Finalize Merger Argument

1.50

300.00

- CM

Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I

7.20

468.00

Work on Response to Motion to Compel.

1.80

(

216.00

Work on Response to Motion to Compel. Review deposition
transcripts and summaries.

1.60

V

192.00

12/10/2005 - KJS
I 12/
12/12/2005- KJS
_

- MJG Statute of Limitations Case and Notice to Submit

2.00

400.00

- CM

Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I

6.70

435.50

Work on Response to Motion to Compel. Review deposition
transcripts and summaries.

0.90

2/13/2005 - KJS

« / &

- MJG Finalize Matters, Second Notice to Submit

1.00

200.00

- CM

7.20

468.00

0.50

100.00

6.10

396.50

Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I

12/14/2005 - MJG Telephone conference on Schedule; Letter to Dale Dorius
- CM

Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I

Page
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12/15/2005 - CM

Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I

5.80

377.00

12/16/2005- KJS

Work on Response to Motion to Compel. Review deposition
transcripts and summaries.

1.40

168.00

Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I

0.80

52.00

J 12/17/2005- KJS
L_^_

Work on deposition transcripts and summaries for Travis
Bowen deposition. Work on Response to Motion to Compel.

1.80

216.00

12/19/2005 - KJS

Work on deposition transcripts and summaries for Travis
Bowen deposition. Work on Response to Motion to Compel.

0.80

96.00

1.50

300.00

Review Memorandum Decision (re: statute of limitation).
Work on Response to Motion to Compel.

0.70

84.00

Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I

2.60

169.00

1.00

200.00

Work on Objection to Motion to Compel.

0.80

96.00

Final revisions and editing of Summary of Marvin's
deposition. Formatting Summary. Create and edit Summary
TOC.

7.00

455.00

Work on Objection to Motion to Compel. Consultation with
Attorney Marlin Grant (re: status of current motions, case,
etc.).

5.60

672.00

4.00

800.00

3.90

468.00

1.00

200.00

- CM

c

MJG Depositions set up; phone call with David Carter; review of
Judge Low's decision; phone call to Marvin

12/20/2005 - KJS
- CM

- MJG Finish Affidavits and Reply
12/21/2005 - KJS
- CM

12/22/2005 - KJS

- MJG Draft Order on Statute of Limitations and Objection to
Complaint and Deposition
12/23/2005 - KJS

Work on Objection to Motion to Compel. Memo to Attorney
Marlin Grant. Review Branson Neff depositions for evidence
to use in Motion to Compel.

- MJG Work on Findings and Order

flUoeo
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28

Amount

12/27/2005-

KJS

Continue review of Branson Neff depositions for evidence to
use in Motion to Compel. Begin work on Motion to Compel.

2.50

300.00

12/28/2005-

KJS

Work on Motion to Compel.

0.70

84.00

-

MJG

Phone call and Letters to Magleby

2.00

400.00

12/31/2005-

KJS

Work on Motion to Compel.

1.80

216.00

1/2/2006-

KJS

Work on Motion to Compel. Review deposition transcripts of
Plaintiff Branson Neff.

1.10

61.00

1/3/2006-

MJG

Review of Dale Dorius matters, Phone Call to Dale and
Motion to Strike Dale's Deposition; Review of all depositions
set

1.50

300.00

1/4/2Q06'-

MJG

Phone calls; Review of Dale Dorius File; Preparation of Alice
Neff for depositions and various matters

7.00

1,400.00

1/5/2006-

MJG

Mike Gale - phone calls, letter and affidavit; Review of new
scheduling order; Review of Dale Dorius information and
exhibits for deposition

2.50

500.00

CM

Outline and summarize inconsistencies and hurtful
statements in Marvin Neff deposition Vol I. Read Vol. II

7.40

240.00

1/6/2006-

MJG

Dale Dorius Deposition; Review of box that Alice brought in

2.25

450.00

1/9/2006-

MJG

Reviewed water records, reviewed Magleby's arguments;
phone call to Marvin

3.00

600.00

1/10/2006-

KJS

Further review of deposition transcripts of Plaintiff Branson
Neff (re: Motion to Compel - documents Branson has failed to
produce).

1.40

77.00

1/11/2006-

MJG

Review of all various Motions by Branson and legal research
letter to Magleby; Review of Orders

4.00

800.00

-

CM

Reading Marvin Dep. V-ll, outline deposition

1.30

42.00

1/12/2006-

KJS

Review documents from Attorney Magleby. (re: Compel
Motions). Review transcripts from Marvin and Branson's
depositions.

1.50

82.50

-

MJG

Draft Notice to Submit re: Salary Cont., Reply Supporting
Motion

1.50

300.00

-

CM

Reading Marvin Dep. V-ll, continue outlining and
summarizing.

3.00

97.50

-

Page
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29

Amount

KJS

Final Review of transcripts from Branson's depositions.
Review documents produced by Branson. Memo to
File/Attorney Marlin Grant. Conference with Attorney Grant.

3.40

187.00

CM

Reading Marvin Dep. V-lll, outlining and summarizing

4.00

130.00

1/14/2006 • KJS

Review file. Prepare notes for upcoming depositions. Memo
to file.

1.30

71.50

1/16/2006-

KJS

Conference with Attorney Grant (re: most recent pleadings
from Attorney Magleby). Review documents from Attorney
Magleby. Review Second Amended Complaint and compare
with Initial Complaint. Begin work on Answer/Opposition to
Second Amended Complaint.

4.50

247.50

-

CM

Reading Marvin Dep. V-lll, outlining, summarizing, and
identifying harmful statements and inconsistencies.

7.00

227.00

-

MJG

Finalize Reply; Notice to Submit; discussions on case with
Kelly; Deposition Preparation

6.00

1,200.00

Review Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum for
Reconsideration. Begin Research on Opposition to Motion
for Reconsideration.

3.90

214.50

Reading Marvin Dep. V-IV, reading and outlining

7.60

247.00

5.00

1,000.00

Research on Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.
Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant.

3.70

203.50

CM

Reading Marvin Dep. V-IV, outlining, summarizing and
identifying harmful statements and inconsistencies.

6.70

217.00

MJG

Deposition of Richard Pett, Con Roper and Review of
Documents

8.00

1,600.00

Research on Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.

3.30

181.50

Drafting list and summary of all inconsistencies, harmful
statements, and lapses in memory in all 4 volumes of
Marvin's deposition.

7.80

253.00

4.00

800.00

2.90

159.50

1/13/2006-

1/17/2006- KJS

- CM

- MJG Deposition preparation
1/18/2006- KJS

1/19/2006- KJS
- CM

- MJG Drafting Reply upholding the findings
1/20/2006 - KJS

Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Work on Opposition
to Motion for Reconsideration.

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

1/20/2006 - CM

Creating list of possible issues of inquiry for Branson and
Sandra Neff

- MJG Drafting Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

7.60

247.00

5.00

1,000.00

Work on draft of Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.

4.20

231.00

1/23/2006 - KJS

Work on draft of Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.

3.80

228.00

1.50

300.00

1.30

78.00

2.00

400.00

2.50

150.00

5.00

1,000.00

Finalize work on Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration
(re: payment to children argument). Memo to Attorney Marlin

3.50

210.00

- MJG Drafting Reply to Reconsideration Motion, Notice to Submit, 3
new depositions dates and various matters

2.00

400.00

1/27/2006 - MJG Reply to Motion to Reconsider; Exhibits on Accounts and
Deposition Preparation

5.00

1,000.00

1/30/2006 - MJG Finalized Reply to Motion to Reconsider; Exhibit for
Deposition
i
,

3.00

600.00

1/31/2006 - MJG Dale Dorius and Don Johnston Deposition Preparation

1.50

300.00

2/1/2006 - MJG Phone call to Richard Pett, Review of Don Johnston Issues

1.00

200.00

2/2/2006 - MJG Letter to Magleby and prepare Exhibits for Depositions

1.25

250.00

2/3/2006 - KJS

1.35

162.00

8.00

1,600.00

1/24/2006 - KJS

Work on draft of Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.

- MJG Finalize Reply to Reconsideration
1/25/2006 - KJS

Review updated draft of Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration. Work on Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration (re: payment to children argument).
Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant.

- MJG Reviewed Manila Ranch and Estate File in Salt Lake City;
and Finalized Motion and Notice to Submit

sfiKV

Amount

1/21/2006 - KJS

- MJG Drafting Reply to Motion in Limine

\

30

1/26/2006 - KJS

Finalize Motion to Compel and Memorandum in Support
thereof. Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Review
Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Third Motion to Compel.

- MJG Depositions in Brigham City - Dale Dorius and Don Johnston

ft 7 • 9 Q e:
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2/8/2006 - MJG Preparation for Branson's Deposition, Review of all materials
in bank accounts, Subpoena
2/9/2006-

MJG Preparation for Branson Neff deposition; and advise
regarding liquidation damages

- MDE Research case law to find cases regarding contract law &
litigated damages - owner delay.

31

Amount

4.00

800.00

4.00

800.00

1.35

47.25

2/10/2006-

MJG Deposition preparation for Ken Oakeson and visit

2.00

400.00

2/13/2006-

MJG Draft Chris Bowen Affidavit and Preparations for Branson's
Deposition

5.00

1,000.00

2/14/2006 - MJG Deposition - Branson Neff

8.50

1,700.00

2/15/2006-

MJG Deposition - Ken Oakeson

6.00

1,200.00

2/16/2006-

MJG Letter to Marvin Neff regarding retention matters

1.00

200.00

2/22/2006-

MJG Reviewed letters of Mike Gale and Richard Pett

0.50

100.00

1.00

200.00

$Ek

2/24/2006 - MJG Deposition preparation
2/27/2006-

CM

Reading Marvin Neff Deposition IV: outlining, summarizing,
and identifying harmful statements and inconsistencies.

3.95

256.75

2/28/2006-

CM

Reading Marvin Neff Deposition V-IV, reading and outlining

3.80

247.00

3/1/2006-

KJS

Reviewed incoming documents from Attorney Magleby (re:
Memorandum in Opposition to Marvin Neffs Motion to
Compel Discovery and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion to Quash Subpoena Upon Mountain West Bank, or in
the Alternative, Motion for Protective Order).

0.55

66.00

CM

Reading Marvin Dep. V-IV, outlining, summarizing and
identifying harmful statements and inconsistencies;
Discussion with Marlin as to reply to their response to our
motion to compel discovery. Reading their response and
exhibits, as well as our motion to compel. Outlining replies to
Branson's motion and reply memorandum.

3.80

247.00

3.00

600.00

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

0.45

54.00

Reading pleadings on Motion to compel, motion to quash,
and opposition to Marvin's motion to compel. Compiling
relevant documents from files for responses. Reviewing
interrogatories and requests for documents.

2.10

136.50

f^/

V
3/2/2006-

MJG Exhibit on Amount Branson Stole - $98,000; Letter to Magleby
KJS

- CM

CONSTRUCTION
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3/2/2006-

MJG Letter to Jim Magleby

3/3/2006 - KJS

- CM

32

Amount

0.25

50.00

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery - update with statements from Branson's
Deposition Testimony.

0.85

102.00

Reviewing all correspondence from Marlin to Magelby,
looking for requests for discovery and other items. Reviewing
files and pleadings.

3.10

201.50

1.00

200.00

- MJG Letter to Magleby; Second Set of Discovery Drafted
3/4/2006 - KJS

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

0.65

78.00

3/6/2006 - KJS

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

0.35

42.00

Searching correspondence, copying relevant documents for
exhibits. Brief discussion with Carrie Crossland as to
discovery documents and files. Outline arguments for reply to
opposition to motion to compel.

2.50

162.50

3/7/2006 - KJS

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

0.40

48.00

3/9/2006 - KJS

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

0.45

54.00

3/10/2006 - KJS

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

0.20

24.00

3/13/2006 - KJS

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

0.75

90.00

Reading documents, drafting response to motion to compel
opposition, researching URCP on discovery. Outlining
arguments in response.

2.75

178.75

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

0.30

36.00

Searching files and Depositions for Ardell Rae reference,
researching timeliness and motions to compel, drafting
response to opposition to motion to compel.

2.85

185.25

Drafting and editing reply to opposition to motion to compel,
brief discussion with KJS, searching correspondence files for
additional correspondence relating to discovery.

3.25

211.25

- CM

- CM

3/14/2006 - KJS
- CM

3/15/2006 - CM
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Amount

3/15/2006 -

MJG

Drafting Order on Salary Continuation

1.00

200.00

3/16/2006 -

KJS

Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel
Discovery.

1.00

120.00

-

CM

Reading pleadings: subpoena duces tecum, correspondence
relating to subpoena, motion to quash subpoena.

1.50

97.50

-

MJG

Deposition preparation

2.00

400.00

CM

Research and read cases cited in motion. Research federal
and Utah rules of civil procedure and discovery. Outline
arguments for memorandum in opposition to motion to quash
subpoena.

MJG

Deposition of Stev^-R^cker in Salt Lake City

6.00

1,200.00

3/20/2006-

CM

Research Utah statutes, state and federal case law: motion
to quash subpoena, privacy, relevancy, financial affairs,
overly broad, undue burden statute of limitations, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Draft memorandum in opposition of
motion to quash subpoena.

3.50

227.50

3/21/2006-

CM

Final editing of memorandum in opposition of motion to
quash subpoena. Shepardize cases. Final research. Brief
discussion with Carrie Crossland as to oral
arguments/hearing, and motion to compel exhibits.

1.80

117.00

MJG

Depositions

7.50

1,500.00

CM

Read Branson's pleadings on damages, punitive damages,
and motion to compel. Research cases cited by Branson and
shepardize.

0.50

32.50

MJG

Reply to Motion to Compel

0.25

50.00

CM

Researching punitive damages, defendant's financial
condition, relative wealth, factors in determining, proving
claims. Shepardizing cases.

2.35

152.75

MJG

Letter to Magleby, Reviewed Judge's Decision, Review
Motion to Quash

1.50

300.00

CM

Reading research on punitive damages. Additional
researching of: defendant's wealth, discovery, confidentiality;
Rule 26(c). Drafting and editing research memo to Marlin
Grant.

2.75

178.75

3/17/2006 -

-

^ 3/22/2006 v

33

/

3/23/2006-

X3/24/2006-

3.40

221.00
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34

Amount

3/27/2006 - MJG Phone calls regarding Depositions

0.25

50.00

3/28/2006 - MJG Deposition of Marvin Neff, letters and discovery; and draft
letter to Jim Magleby

7.25

1,450.00

3/30/2006 - CM

0.20

13.00

1.00

200.00

0.15

18.00

1.30

45.50

1.00

200.00

0.70

84.00

2.00

70.00

3.00

600.00

4/4/2006 - MDE Research issue regarding ratification of contract (fraud); and
draft note to attorney.

1.00

35.00

- MJG Review of cases on damages, fraud and rescission

1.00

200.00

4/5/2006 - MJG Deposition - Alice Neff

4.00

800.00

4/7/2006 - MJG Draft Motion to Reconsider

1.50

300.00

0.30

10.50

3.00

600.00

4/11/2006 - MDE Research; review cases; and draft note to attorney.

2.00

70.00

4/12/2006 - CM

Research damages, partnership/corporate dissolution,
buyout, fair market value.

3.50

227.50

4/14/2006 - CM

Summarizing depositions, additional research: damages,
timing, trial court discretion, buyout, going concern, fair
market value.

2.50

162.50

4/15/2006 - CM

Damages research; shepardizing and reading cases. Drafting
memo.

0.85

55.25

Brief research with Carrie Crossland of damages, division of
assets, and partnership dissolution.

- MJG Research on Damages and Response to Orders
3/31/2006 - KJS Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant (re: trial strategy).
- MDE Research issue regarding Fair Market Value; emailed
attorney.
- MJG Reply to Support Judge Low's Order
4/1/2006- KJS

Work on trial memo. Review notes from Paralegal and
current filings.

4/3/2006 - MDE Research issue regarding awarding attorney fees and costs
- MJG Reply on Motion to Compel and matters

4/10/2006 - MDE Meet with attorney; shepardized cases dealing with fraud
(waived; not received timely); and emailed attorney.
- MJG Motion to Reconsider research and drafting

011269
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4/17/2006 - CM

Damages research: going concern, duplicative damages,
date of sale, benefit of the bargain, rescission, measure of
damages. Reading research

3.50

227.50

4/18/2006 - CM

Final research case law and statutes: partnership
interests/dissolution, securities, date of damages.
Shepardize cited cases. Revise and edit memo

3.20

208.00

- MJG Damages reviewed; Letter to Steve Racker; Phone Calls to
Marvin

1.50

300.00

4/19/2006 - MJG Review of Steve Racker letter and fax back; talked to Marvin,
reviewed damages case law

0.75

150.00

4/21/2006 - KJS

1.00

120.00

4/25/2006 - MJG Review two new motions by Magleby - Review notes and
values; Letter to Magleby on Stipulation

3.50

700.00

4/26/2006 - MJG Reading Marv's Deposition, Josh Foukas, Sandra's
Deposition, gathering facts and information to reply to
Magleby's Supplemental Motion

6.00

1,200.00

4/27/2006 - MJG Draft Reply and Objection and various matters

3.00

600.00

4/28/2006 - MJG Draft Objection to Interpleader order changes; Finalize Reply
and matters

2.00

400.00

5/8/2006 - MJG Review of Emails and matters

0.25

50.00

5/9/2006 - CM

Summarizing Depositions

2.50

162.50

Summarizing Depositions

2.90

188.50

Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant (re: Case Strategy
and upcoming depositions). Consultation with Paralegal.

0.40

48.00

- MJG Preparation for Hearing, Hearing with Judge Low, Visit with
Marvin, Phone call to Mike Skolnick

6.00

1,200.00

- CM

Summarize depositions, discussion with Marlin Grant,
research Utah: fraud, misrepresentation.

3.00

195.00

5/12/2006 - KJS

Research regarding Expert Witness (re: expert to testify
regarding Business Dissolution and/or Business Buy-Out
agreements). Memo to File.

0.70

84.00

- CM

Reading Branson's depositions and pleadings: looking for
accusations of fraud/misrepresentation and rebuttal
statements by Branson.

3.20

208.00

5/10/2006-

CM

5/11/2006 - KJS

Work on trial memo. Research new bills regarding discovery
of wealth against a defendant. Memo to Attorney Marlin
Grant.

CONSTRUCTION

Page
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5/13/2006-

KJS

36

Amount

Reviewed current pending motions. Trial preparation.
Reviewed notes from Paralegal.

0.50

60.00

Reading Branson's depositions, reviewing file and exhibits:
looking for accusations of fraud/misrepresentation and
rebuttal statements by Branson.

1.00

65.00

Reading Branson's depositions and pleadings: looking for
accusations of fraud/misrepresentation and rebuttal
statements by Branson.

3.20

208.00

0.25

50.00

Reading Branson's depositions and pleadings: looking for
accusations of fraud/misrepresentation and rebuttal
statements by Branson.

3.00

195.00

5/17/2006 - CM

Reading depositions, outlining potential arguments and
factual support for rebuttal of Branson's prima facie showing
of fraud/misrepresentation.

3.40

221.00

5/18/2006 - CM

Summarizing depositions

3.25

211.25

5/19/2006 - CM

Reading depositions, reviewing pleadings, drafting rebuttal.

3.30

214.50

5/20/2006- CM

Editing rebuttal.

1.00

65.00

1.00

200.00

- CM

5/15/2006 - CM

5/16/2006- MJG Letter
- CM

5/22/2006-

MJG Letter to Magleby

5/25/2006 - JCJ

Conference with Marlin and planning

80.00

5/26/2006 - MJG Phone call

0.25

50.00

5/27/2006 - KJS

Review updated versions of Deposition Summaries.
Research and Work on Case and Trial Strategy. Update File
Notes.

1.10

132.00

5/29/2006 - KJS

Reviewed current Depositions. Continue work on Case and
Trial Strategy. Update File.

0.70

84.00

5/30/2006 - JCJ

Review emailed response from Marv, conference with Marlin
Grant, file review and preparation and planning for deposition

- CM

Research Utah Statutes and Case law: punitive damages,
fraud, misrepresentation, assault/battery, dismissal, causes
of action. Read Assault/battery file, pleadings, testimony.

- GKW Reading Branson's motion for discovery of personal wealth,
Research on issue of prima facie case for punitive damages,
preparation of research memo on same. Review of motion to
determine case law relied on, downloaded cases used in

0 1 4 n n <«

150.00
3.00

195.00

2.50

162.50

Page
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motion.
5/31/2006 - MJG Letter for subpoena information; Review of prima facie
punitive damages claim; and review of bank records

3.25

650.00

Research Utah Statutes and Case law, ALR, Am Jur: statute
of limitations, dismissal/causes of action, relevancy, barred
actions, willful/malicious conduct, factual basis. Review file
and pleadings.

3.40

221.00

6/1/2006 - GKW Research whether plaintiff can use facts of claims that are
time barred for the purpose of establishing prima facie case,
relevance issue

0.50

32.50

3.50

227.50

- CM

- CM

Review file and pleadings: memorandum decision, order on
3rd motion to compel, Branson Depositions Exhibits.
Research Utah Rules of Evidence: Relevance, prejudice,
hearsay, admissibility. Edit draft of rebuttal.

- JCJ

Partial review of records and planning

6/2/2006 - GKW Research related to motion for summary judgment on fraud
and malicious prosecution claims.
- CM

Research Utah statutes and case law: retroactive
applicability, discretion, admissibility, prima facie, fraud,
malicious prosecution. Read Assault/P.O. violation file:
pleadings, affidavits, statements.

- JCJ

Further review of records and deposition planning

250.00
0.60

39.00

3.40

221.00

200.00

6/3/2006- CM

Read research. Additional research Utah statutes and case
law: elements of breach of duty, slander of title, defamation,
invasion of privacy/false light. Add reply to Assault/Malicious
prosecution, defamation, false light/invasion of privacy.

3.50

227.50

6/5/2006- KJS

Reviewed Plaintiffs Submission of Evidence Supporting
Punitive Damages Claims. Work on Response.

0.70

84.00

Revise draft of reply to Branson's Submission. Add reply to
factual allegations, breach of duty, fraud, conversion. Review
Branson's depositions and Cade Smoot's deposition.
Bluebook citations.

4.00

260.00

0.50

100 00

0.80

96.00

- CM

- MJG Review appraisals and letter
6/6/2006 - KJS

Work on Plaintiffs Submission of Evidence Supporting
Punitive Damages Claims. Work on Response.

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
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Amount

1 00

65 00

3 40

22100

4 00

800 00

4 20

147 00

- GKW Continue drafting and researching Motion for Summary
Judgment, researching factual issues

1 50

97 50

- CM

3 50

227 50

2 00

400 00

6/6/2006 - GKW Review notes in file, began drafting Motion for Summary
Judgment
- CM

Edit draft of reply to Branson's Submission Additional
research

- MJG Review of Reply, drafting additional responses and reviews
6/7/2006-

-

MDE Review documents, draft questions for Expert Witness, draft
exhibit chart, make copy of exhibits used in John K Morris
Expert Witness Report and organize into a binder, and meet
with attorney

MJG Draft questions for deposition, review of Morns' report

- JCJ
6/8/2006-

Revise draft of reply to Branson's Submission Additional
research - prima facie purposes, burden of proof Read and
compare cases cited in Submission

Further deposition preparation

100 00

MDE Copy documents and organize into a binder, and meet with
attorney

- CM

Revise draft of reply to Branson's Submission Additional
research - punitive damages, willful and malicious, malice
Read Bingham and S Neff depositions Brief discussion with
Marlin Grant

- MJG Letter to Jim Magleby
- JCJ

6/9/2006-

CM

- JCJ
6/10/2006-

KJS

1 00

35 00

3 50

227 50

0 50

100 00

Deposition preparation, consultation with Marlin, case
planning, call to Marv, call from Magleby, call Magleby,
further review of records and outline of questions
Revise reply to Branson's Submission Review pleadings and
research Additional research - discovery, punitive damages,
admissibility, prejudice, URE Read Johnston deposition
Compile and copy exhibits Final editing

1,500 00

4 70

Final preparation, travel, consultations with Marv, deposition
of John Morris
Reviewed current Deposition transcripts Work on Trial
notes

n 4 >\ r\ n <**

305 50

2,000 00

0 70

84 00
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MDE Revise motion for summary judgment

1 00

35 00

-

CM

Further revisions of Reply to Submission Read depositions
Additional factual responses Compile and copy additional
exhibits

3 50

227 50

-

MJG

Brief research, review, draft and finalize

4 00

800 00

KJS

Reviewed Current Pleadings, Motions and Responses
Worked on Trial Notes Update File

0 70

84 00

6/12/2006 -

6/13/2006 -

-

GKW Continue to revise motion for summary judgment

100

65 00

-

CM

Final editing of Reply to Submission Update with Marlin
Grant's revisions Add additional rebuttal of factual
allegations Compile and copy

3 40

221 00

6/14/2006 -

CM

Final editing of Reply to Submission Update with Marlin
Grant's revisions Add additional rebuttal of factual
allegations Compile and copy

3 00

195 00

MJG

Draft final brief

1 00

200 00

6/15/2006 -

JCJ

Review memorandum regarding punitive damages and
discovery, case planning

6/16/2006 -

MJG

Finalize Motion

6/17/2006 -

KJS

Reviewed Motion notes from Caitlin and Gabe
Notes

6/19/2006 -

-

350 00

0 50

100 00

0 70

84 00

GKW Research whether plaintiff can use facts of claims that are
time barred for the purpose of establishing prima facie case,
relevance issue

0 50

32 50

-

MJG

Discussion with James Jenkins

0 50

100 00

-

JCJ

Case planning, conference with Marlin Grant

6/20/2006-

KJS

Conference with paralegals Caitlin and Gabe concerning
pending motions and reply's Consultation with Attorney Jim
Jenkins (re Current motions) Updated Trial Notes

Updated Trial

200 00
1 10

132 00

-

GKW Research related to motion for summary judgment on fraud
and malicious prosecution claims

0 50

32 50

-

MJG

0 50

100 00

Letter and oral argument

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
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6/20/2006 - JCJ

Review and revise Request for hearing re punitive damage
discovery, draft Notice of Appearance

6/21/2006 -

Conference with Caitlin concerning trial preparation and

KJS

pending motions and replies
-

40

Amount
100 00

1 00

120 00

0 70

45 50

2 50

162 50

4 00

140 00

2 00

130 00

Updated Trial Notes

GKW Edit motion for summary judgment

6/22/2006 - GKW Continue to revise motion for summary judgment
6/23/2006 -

MDE Review research, and start to write an additional memo
GKW Continue drafting and researching motion for Summary
Judgment, researching factual issues

-

JCJ

Call from Attorney White, review and calendar hearing,
review deposition transcript, call to White regarding hearing
schedule

6/24/2006 -

KJS

Work on Trial notes

Update file notes

300 00

0 60

72 00

6/26/2006 - GKW Edit motion for summary judgment

0 50

32 50

6/27/2006 - CM

Meeting with Marlin Grant and James Jenkins - trial
preparation and strategy

1 50

97 50

-

GKW Research, continue editing motion for summary judgment

2 00

130 00

-

MJG Trial strategy, procedures and things to do reviewed with Jim
Jenkins and Caitlin

4 00

800 00

- JCJ
6/28/2006 -

KJS

Case planning session with Marlin Grant and Caitlin Mitchel
Conference with Paralegal (re update on current pending
motions, trial preparations) Trial preparation

650 00
0 35

42 00

-

GKW Continue editing motion for Summary Judgment

1 00

65 00

-

MJG Review of brief on summary judgment for fraud and expert
witness Jeff Thorne

3 00

600 00

6/29/2006 -

MJG Expert opinions and matters, summary judgment on fraud

2 00

400 00

- JCJ

6/30/2006 - JCJ

Review draft expert opinion, research rule 26 requirements,
revise draft, review Plaintiffs Submission regarding punitive
damages
Further study of Plaintiffs Submission memorandum,
research and case planning

n i ^ nnv:

200 00

2 00

350 00

Page
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7/3/2006 - MJG Read expert opinion of Huff

1.00

200.00

7/5/2006 - KJS

3.20

384.00

- MJG Work on Summary Judgment

1.00

200.00

- CM

6.80

442.00

2.60

169.00

r

Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins and Paralegal (re:
work on Trial Brief). Trial preparation.

Work on pre-trial brief. Reviewing files; read all motions filed
by Marvin.

- GKW Continue drafting Memorandum for summary judgment
- JCJ

7/6/2006 - KJS

800.00

Conference with Marlin Grant, review expert report of Thome,
review of expert report of William S. Huff for Bowen, case
planning, call Skolnick, in-file memorandum, further
evaluation of Plaintiffs Submission re punitive discovery and
planning for hearing, consideration of supplemental
memorandum, conference with Caitlin Mitchel and Kelly
Smith
Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins and Paralegal (re:

1.20

144.00

- MJG Letter to Magleby

0.50

100.00

- CM

7.20

468.00

8.40

546.00

7.00

455.00

2.00

130.00

work on Trial Brief). Trial preparation.

Work on pre-trial brief. Reviewing files; all notices to submit
for decision and replies. Searching
- GKW Organized legal research box, researched fraud, fiduciary
duty; edited motion for summary judgment
7/7/2006 - CM

Work on pre-trial brief. Reviewing files; reading all Court
Orders and Memorandum Decisions.

- GKW Continue research, etc.
- JCJ

7/8/2006 - JCJ

Review tapes of 5/11/06 hearing, case planning, conference
with Marlin Grant, draft stipulated scheduling order, calls to
Magelby and Skolnick to set attorney conference, call from
Skolnick

1,100.00

Review 7/6/06 Memorandum Decision denying Plaintiffs
Motion Summary Judgment

88.00

7/10/2006 - KJS

Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins and Paralegal (re:
work on Trial Brief). Reviewed Memorandum Decision from
Judge Low. Trial preparation.

0.90

108.00

- CM

Cross Referencing Court docket with Pleadings Index and
files. Creating pleadings chart of comparisons. Reading and
summarizing Memorandum Decision 7/6/06.

6.80

442.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

A- f
;A
A/0
-L\r
O

7/10/2006- GKW Review Depositions and expert opinion from Bowen
7/11/2006 - CM Editing pleading chart Cross Referencing Court docket with
Pleadings Index and files Search for deeds and abstracts for
real property at issue in this suit
- GKW Factual research into depositions and letters of Branson Neff
7/12/2006-

CM

- JCJ

Reviewing all dispositive pleadings Create charts of
dispositive pleadings by subject area

42

Amount

5 70

370 50

8 20

533 00

1 50

97 50

7 30

474 50

Review Notice and Request for Summary Judgment hearing

50 00

7/13/2006 - CM

Draft summary of dispositive pleadings

3 00

195 00

7/15/2006 - KJS

Work on Trial Brief Trial preparation

1 50

180 00

7/17/2006-

CM

Draft dispositive pleadings summary of SJ Motion SOL, and
Motion in Limine and SJ Motion Merger and Integration
Review related pleadings

6 70

435 50

7/18/2006 - CM

Research URCP - timing Discuss Branson's objection to
Marv's expert witness Draft dispositive pleadings summary
of Summary Judgment Motion Binding Effect, and Summary
Judgment Motion Salary Continuation Agreement Review
related pleadings

8 40

546 00

1 90

123 50

- GKW Edited motion for summary judgment
- JCJ
7/19/2006 - KJS

Status review, research issues of damages

150 00

Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant (re Status of Case
and Trial Preparations) Trial Preparations

1 80

216 00

- MJG Review of decision and drafting response to Jeff Thome's
testimony

2 00

400 00

- CM

5 60

364 00

3 20

208 00

2 25

450 00

7 90

513 50

Review pleadings and draft dispositive pleadings summary
section on Manila Ranch, and initial Motion for Summary
Judgment Research expert testimony, expert opinion,
qualifications UREs 701, 702, 703

- GKW Edited motion for summary judgment
7/20/2006 - MJG Notice to Submit for Reconsideration, and Drafting Order on
Partial Summary Judgment and review of remaining issues,
phone call to Marvin
- CM

Research Utah bifurcated standard for admission of expert
testimony, draft memorandum in opposition to Branson's
Motion to Exclude

Page
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7/20/2006 - JCJ
D
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^

Research limitation of actions and the discovery rule
regarding fraud, probate and real estate causes, review
proposed Order on Partial Summary Judgment, revise draft,
discussion with Marlin Grant, draft order to clarify
Memorandum Decision of March 31, 2006

7/21/2006 - MJG Drafting motion to clarify the court's order
- CM

Read all cases cited by Branson in Motion to Exclude and
cases cited by Utah State Bar annual convention section on
Expert Testimony. Outline additional arguments for memo
objecting to Branson's Motion to Exclude.

- GKW Edited Motion for Summary Judgment
- JCJ

43

Amount
450.00

1.50

300.00

5.90

383.50

1.90

123.50

Discussion and file search regarding March Memorandum

80.00

Decisions
7/22/2006 - KJS

1.70

204.00

1.00

65.00

Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation.

7/24/2006 - GKW Factual research, edited motion for summary judgment

2.00

400.00

7/25/2006 - MJG Letter to Marv; changes and drafting motion to support
- CM Additional research: FRE 702, 703, 704; URE 703, 704; case
law - ultimate issue, expert opinion, conclusions of law. Final
revisions to Memo objecting to Branson's Motion.

7.20

468.00

7/26/2006 - CM

1.00

65.00

6.00

390.00

1.50

300.00

5.30

344.50

0.80

96.00

Review pleadings. Edit dispositive pleadings summary of
accounting. Draft summary of unresolved issues. Revise
format of summary as memo and draft introduction to
summary.

7.70

500.50

Trial Preparation. Work on Trial Brief. Update File.

1.50

180.00

Reviewing pleadings, researching deeds and plat map
information for ABCO properties.

- GKW Edited Motion for Summary Judgment
7/27/2006 - MJG Brief regarding Clarification on Order and Memorandum
- CM

7/28/2006 - KJS
- CM

7/29/2006-

KJS

Draft dispositive pleadings summary of accounting, special
master pleadings. Review related pleadings. Create
Discovery pleadings chart.
Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins (re: Trial Preparation).
Work on Trial Brief. Update File.

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
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7/29/2006 - CM

Revise dispositive pleadings summary. Update summary and
dispositive pleadings chart with newly filed pleadings from
docket.

2.10

136.50

7/30/2006 - CM

Revise dispositive pleadings summary memo.

1.70

110.50

Draft dispositive pleadings summary of discovery pleadings
in general. Review discovery pleadings and documents
provided in response to discovery requests. Call District
Court, request copies of missing Orders.

7.40

481.00

Editing dispositive pleadings chart. Revise dispositive
pleadings summary of discovery issues.

6.20

403.00

- GKW Revise Memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment

1.30

84.50

- MJG File Motion to Clarify

1.00

200.00

8/2/2006 - GKW Continue revising Memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment

1.90

123.50

8/4/2006 - CM

Edit dispositive pleadings summary of discovery pleadings in
general. Review discovery pleadings and documents
provided in response to discovery requests.

7.00

455.00

8/5/2006 -

Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation.

2.20

297.00

Revise dispositive pleadings chart. Cross check chart with
revised summary memo and updated court docket.

2.00

130.00

9.80

637.00

7/31/2006-

1/ J

44

CM

8/1/2006- CM

KJS

_ CM
-

GKW Divide memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment into two parts, and rewrite motions and over length
memorandum application.
CM

Update dispositive pleadings summary memorandum, edit
section on unresolved issues and subject charts.

2.10

136.50

8/7/2006 - CM

Draft section on protective orders for dispositive pleadings
summary memorandum, create chart of general discovery
pleadings. Reading related pleadings.

7.10

461.50

0.20

13.00

10.20

663.00

8/6/2006-

GKW Edit memorandums
8/8/2006-

CM

Reading missing pleadings from court. Update summary with
orders obtained from clerk of court. Create charts for subject
pleadings files. File research. Final revisions of dispositive
pleadings chart and summary memorandum. Brief discussion
with Miles Jensen.
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8/8/2006 - GKW Edit memoranda, prepare affidavit of Marvin Neff

Amount

0.80

52.00

2.00

400.00

8/10/2006 - GKW Edit memorandum for summary judgment, conference with
Marlin Grant, deposition research for quotations

7.50

487.50

8/11/2006 - GKW Edit Memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment.

1.00

65.00

8/12/2006-

1.90

256.50

1.40

91.00

8/14/2006 - GKW Edit memorandums for summary judgment, factual research

1.50

97.50

8/15/2006 - GKW Changes to motion for summary judgment, memoranda, and
affidavit
8/16/2006 - KJS Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. Conference with
Paralegal. Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation.

3.00

195.00

0.90

121.50

- GKW Edit Memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment.

4.00

260.00

8/17/2006 - GKW Edit Memorandum in support of motion for summary

2.20

143.00

1.00

200.00

1.00

65.00

1.10

148.50

8/21/2006 - MJG Review motion for summary judgment on fraud

1.50

300 00

8/22/2006 - MDE Review depositions summaries already started; and prepare
to continue to draft depositions summaries regarding
Branson Neff.

1.00

35.00

1.00

75.00

- MJG Finalize two motions for summary judgment

2.00

400.00

8/24/2006 - MJG Motion for summary judgment; drafting reply

2.00

400.00

- MJG Review of summary judgment motion with Gabe; review with
Caitlin all of status and deposition information

£

45

KJS

Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation. Reviewed updated
Pleadings.

- GKW Edit both Memorandums in support of motions for summary
judgment.

judgment.
- MJG Review phone calls, discussions with paralegals
8/18/2006 - GKW Finalize Neff summary judgment docs
8/19/2006 - KJS Trial preparation. Reviewed Paralegal notes and documents
(re: Trial Brief).

- JRP

Legal research for Motion in Limine.

Page
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8/25/2006- MJG Motion for contempt; finish motion for summary judgment on
fraud and malicious prosecution; motion and reply in support
of clarification; hearing preparation; phone calls and issues
- JCJ

5.00

46

Amount
1,000.00

750.00

Review file records, case planning and preparation for
hearing, conference with Marlin Grant
Legal research

0.50

37.50

- MJG Preparation for argument

1.00

200.00

8/28/2006- JRP

- JCJ
8/29/2006- JRP

Hearing preparation, draft hearing agenda, call to Marlin
Grant, email to Leslie
Prepare Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe
Leverich.

- MJG Oral Argument
- JCJ

450.00

0.80

60.00

3.50

700.00
950.00

Further hearing preparation, hearing regarding punitive
damages and status, conference with Marv, work on
proposed Amended Scheduling Order and preliminary
Pretrial Order, review motion and memoranda regarding
Thorne report, draft Request to Submit for Decision
3.00

225.00

1.00

200.00

0.20

15.00

1.00

200.00

5.40

189.00

1.00

200.00

3.30

247.50

3.90

136.50

1.00

200.00

Legal research; and Draft Motion in Limine.

1.40

105.00

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

2.10

73.50

0.50

100.00

8/31/2006- JRP

Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe Leverich;
legal research.

- MJG Letter to Jim Magleby
9/1/2006- JRP

0jrV°£9/5/2006 -

Draft Motion in Limine

MJG Reading Travis Bowen's Responses

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.
9/6/2006-

MJG Review of Motion in Limine and cases

- JRP

Legal research

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.
9/7/2006-

MJG Review Case Law

- JRP

9/8/2006-

MJG Phone call and Items

x

/f***'

011231
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Amount

MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

1.00

35.00

JRP

1.60

120.00

MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

1.00

35.00

9/12/2006-

MJG

Letter to Magleby

0.25

50.00

-

JRP

Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe Leverich.

0.30

22.50

-

MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

3.20

112.00

9/13/2006 -

MJG

Review of Magieby's Reply and Statute of Limitations and
Clarification as well as ratification and election of remedies
issues

0.50

100.00

-

JRP

Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe Leverich.

0.30

22.50

-

MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

4.40

154.00

-

JCJ

Read breach of contract issues

9/14/2006-

MJG

Drafting Reply

2.00

400.00

-

JRP

Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe Leverich.

4.30

322.50

-

MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

5.30

185.50

MJG

1.00

200.00

MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

5.40

189.00

MJG

2.00

400.00

MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

4.20

147.00

JRP

0.10

7.50

4.40

154.00

9/8/2006 9/11/2006 -

r

47

9/15/2006 9/18/2006 9/19/2006 -

Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Joe Leverich's Valuations.

Reply - Finished Facts

Reviewed Subpoena and Finalized Reply

Prepare James Motion in Limine.

100.00

-

MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff.

-

JCJ

Hearing on Bowen Summary Judgment motions, argue misc
matters regarding restraining order and discovery,
conference with Marv and Marlin Grant and advise, planning

-

MJG

Court hearing and discussion with Marvin; review of part of
discovery

3.50

700.00

JRP

Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment.

0.20

25.00

9/20/2006 -

500.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

9/20/2006 - MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff
- MJG Reply, reading Objection, review of expert report and other
matters
9/21/2006 - JRP

Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff
9/22/2006 - JRP

Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment

- MJG Reply on Fraud Motion by Magleby reviewed

1

V

48

Amount

4 60

161 00

7 00

1,400 00

7 20

900 00

4 50

157 50

170

212 50

1 00

200 00

9/23/2006 - KJS

Reviewed Recent Pleadings Work on Trial Brief Trial
preparation Update File

1 50

202 50

9/25/2006 - JRP

Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuation of
James & Co

2 60

325 00

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff

3 00

105 00

- MJG Motion in Limine Drafted

1 50

300 00

4 80

168 00

1 50

300 00

6 30

787 50

7 60

266 00

Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant (re status of current
pleadings) Trial Preparation

0 30

40 50

Draft and Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, and Revise
and Finalize Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Summary
Judgment

2 00

250 00

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Sandra C Neff, and
Alice Neff

4 60

161 00

- MJG Reply on Motion to Reconsider, Election of Remedy and
Integration, and Finalize Reply Motion on Malicious
Prosecution/Slander and Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert
Testimony

7 00

1,400 00

9/26/2006 - MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Marvin Neff
- MJG Motion in Limine
9/27/2006 - JRP

Draft and revise Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Kyle Smoot, Cade
Smoot, Connard O Roper, Richard V Peet, and Sandra C
Neff
9/28/2006 - KJS
- JRP

01109^
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9/29/2006 - MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Alice Neff, and Ken

49

Amount

4.90

171.50

1.00

200.00

0.90

121.50

0.10

12.50

2.30

80.50

0.50

100.00

5.20

182.00

2.00

400.00

7.10

248.50

2.50

500.00

Oakeson.
- MJG Finalize Reply
9/30/2006 - KJS
10/2/2006 - JRP

Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation. Update File.
Phone call with Marvin concerning a response to Plaintiffs
Opposition to Motion Regarding Violation of Civil Protective
Order.

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Melanee Bingham,
Van Bingham, Don Johnston, and Maurice W. Carter.
10/3/2006 - MJG Letter on Submission
/7<1<£4-A/1

£_

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Maurice W. Carter,
and Steven M. Racker.

10/4/2006 - MJG Reply on Statute of Limitations
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Travis Bowen.
10/5/2006 - MJG Finalize Reply and Office Visit with Marv

8^

JCJ Continue
Review damage
from Magleby
Q,I/\^J -- MDE
to draft disclosures
deposition summaries
regarding Travis
Bowen.

10/6/2006 - JRP

Prepare Reply to Opposition to Marvin G. Neffs Motion
Regarding Violation of Civil Protective Order.

- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding John K. Morris.
10/9/2006 - MJG Reply on Fraud Motion
- JCJ

Review memorandum decision from Court

- JRP

Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Violations of Civil
Protective Order; legal research.

10/10/2006- MJG Reply
- JRP

Legal research; and revise Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding
Fraud, etc...

- MDE Meet with John; and find pages of deposition's referenced in
Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Fraudulent

100.00
4.00

140.00

1.10

137.50

6.00

210.00

5.00

1,000.00
50.00

5.80

725.00

2.00

400.00

2.60

325.00

1.40

49.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
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50

Amount

Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims.
10/11/2006-

MJG

Papers

1.00

200.00

-

JRP

Revise Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment Regarding Fraud, etc.

0.60

75.00

-

MDE Continue to look for pages of deposition's referenced in
Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Fraudulent
Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims; meet
with John; and meet with attorney.

0.90

31.50

MJG

1.00

200.00

MDE Locate pages in Branson's deposition where he talks about
Marvin wanting to be bought out for the price Branson was
asking for; look for other deposition pages; and revise
Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Fraudulent
Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure Claims.

3.40

119.00

10/13/2006-

MJG

Finalize and file Reply

0.50

100.00

10/17/2006-

MJG

Jury Instructions

1.00

200.00

10/20/2006-

MJG

Trial Preparations

3.00

600.00

-

JRP

Prepare Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude Evidence

1.00

125.00

10/23/2006 -

MJG

Preparation for Trial - Exhibits on Value of ABCO, Farr West,
Lincoln, Farm etc.

4.00

800.00

-

JRP

Legal research; draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence

2.60

325.00

10/24/2006 -

JRP

Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence; Draft Proposed Jury Instructions.

2.70

337.50

10/25/2006 -

MJG

Review of Deeds and Chain of Title for Trial

1.00

200.00

JRP

L e g a l research

0.80

100.00

] 10/27/2006 i QQ-^IS

MJG

Trip to Salt Lake City and meeting with Skolnick and
Townsend; Letter to Townsend

5.50

1,100.00

Qtf**

MJG

Work on Exhibits

0.50

100.00

10/12/2006\

s
^i
'

\

^)P^^

"

-

Finalize Reply

> draft/prepare Proposed Jury Instructions.

(111235
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10/27/2006 -

JCJ

Review memo from Marlin Grant, review notes and memo to

51

Amount
50 00

Marlin Grant
-

JRP

Legal research, Draft Proposed Jury Instructions

10/30/2006 -

MJG

Exhibits and Instructions to Brad Townsend Pretrial Order

10/31/2006 -

MJG

Order on Jeff Thorne Items

-

JRP

Draft Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research

11/1/2006 -

JRP

Draft Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research

-

MJG

Pretrial Order

-

JCJ

Review memorandum decision regarding Thorne, discuss

150

187 50

4 00

800 00

0 50

100 00

2 50

312 50

140

175 00

0 25

50 00
80 00

with Marlin Grant and file memo

4 60

575 00

11/2/2006 -

JRP

Draft Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research

2 20

275 00

11/3/2006 -

JRP

Draft Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research

1 00

200 00

-

MJG

Exhibits and title

1 70

212 50

11/6/2006 -

JRP

Revise Proposed Jury Instructions

0 50

100 00

-

MJG

Exhibits

1 00

200 00

11/8/2006 -

MJG

Jury Instructions

5 70

712 50

11/9/2006 -

JRP

Revise Proposed Jury Instructions

2 50

500 00

-

MJG

3 00

600 00

11/10/2006 11/13/2006 -

MJG
MJG

Jury Instructions on contract acceptance, etc , review of
complaint and counter complaint and answers
Drafting letter and getting all exhibits to Jeff Thorne
Preparation for Oral Argument, and Letter to Jeff Thorne and
call with Mike Skolnick

3 50

700 00

11 /14/2006 -

JRP

Legal research

160

200 00

-

MJG

Preparation for Oral Argument

6 00

1,200 00

11/15/2006 -

JRP

Review documents at courthouse

0 80

100 00

-

JCJ

Hearing on pending motions, discussion with Miles Jensen
and Marlin Grant

2 00

350 00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#
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Amount

11/15/2006- MJG Oral Argument Hearing and preparation

8.00

1,600.00

11/20/2006- MJG Review of Depositions

1.50

300.00

11/21/2006- MDE Assist attorney

2.40

84.00

2.00

400.00

2.50

312.50

1.00

200.00

11/27/2006- MJG Preparation for Trial

3.00

600.00

11/28/2006- MJG Preparation and Oral Argument

2.00

400.00

11/29/2006- MJG Trial preparation

2.50

500.00

- MJG Drafting opening statement and oral argument
1

11/22/2006- JRP

^
/

y*
x

Legal research

MJG Oral Argument Preparation

11/30/2006 - JCJ

450.00

Attend continued oral arguments, discussion with Marv and
Marlin Grant
3.50

700.00

12/1/2006- MJG Jury Instructions read and changed

2.00

400.00

12/5/2006- MJG Witnesses listed, Deposition preparation and damages
claims on John Brough, letter to Brad Townsend and various
matters

3.00

600.00

- MJG Oral Argument and Preparation

12/6/2006- JCJ

70.00

Conference and planning with Marlin Grant
6.50

1,300.00

2.20

297.00

- MJG Preparation for deposition of John Brough; work on trial
preparation and opening statement; review of exhibits on
values

8.00

1,600.00

- MJG Travel to Salt Lake City and deposition of John Brough

5.50

1,100.00

1.50

52.50

0.30

10.50

- MJG Writing Opening Statement; preparation for Deposition of
John Brough, phone calls to Marvin; Review of letters and
exhibits
12/7/2006- KJS

Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation.

12/8/2006- MDE Meet with attorney; review Deposition Exhibits; and draft
chart.
12/11/2006- MDE Scan Deposition Exhibit no. 381 on to disk and the computer;
and double check exhibits.

Page

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
Hours Tax#

Amount

12/11/2006 - MJG Prepare for trial, witnesses and exhibits reviewed and tabbed

6 00

1,200 00

12/12/2006 - KJS

1 80

243 00

- JCJ

Work on Trial Brief Conference with Paralegal Caitlin
Mitchell Trial preparation
Settlement discussion with Marlin Grant

50 00

- MJG Trial preparations, deposition and John Brough items, Brad
Townsend report and damages

7 00

1,400 00

- JRP

Review documents

0 20

25 00

Work on Trial Brief Trial preparation

0 90

121 50

Legal research

140

175 00

2 20

77 00

2 00

400 00

1 90

256 50

12/13/2006 - KJS
- JRP

12/14/2006 - MDE Review file, and start draft index
-

i

53

^12/15/2006

MJG Branson's Testimony and questions written
KJS

Work on Trial Brief and Exhibits with Paralegal
preparation

Trial

JCJ

Review and edit opening statement, case planning, review
witness list summary

200 00

MDE Continue to review file, continue to draft index and put
together binder by topic regarding depositions

5 00

175 00

MJG Branson's testimony and questions

2 00

400 00

12/16/2006-

KJS

1 20

162 00

12/18/2006-

MJG Branson's and Travis Bowen's Testimony

1 00

200 00

JRP

Draft Reply to Supplemental Memorandum

1 50

187 50

KJS

Work on Trial Brief and Exhibits Trial preparation
Consultation with Paralegal Update File

1 90

256 50

JRP

Draft Reply to Supplemental Memorandum

1 50

187 50

KJS

Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant and Paralegal Work
on Exhibits Trial preparation Update File

2 20

297 00

JCJ

Discussion and planning with Marlin Grant, discussion with
Melissa Elizarde regarding witness trial book preparation

12/19/2006-

12/20/2006-

Work on Trial Brief and Exhibits

Trial preparation

150 00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
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12/20/2006 -

sk

JL

54

Amount

MDE Meet with attorney James Jenkins, meet with attorney Marlin
Grant, and start to draft Witness binder and summaries

3 60

126 00

-

MJG

Trial preparation

4 00

800 00

-

JRP

Draft Reply to Supplemental Memorandum

2 30

287 50

12/21/2006 -

KJS

Trial preparation Worked on and began Review of Opening
Statement Update File

2 50

337 50

-

MDE Meet with attorney James Jenkins, continue to draft Witness
binder and summaries

7 40

259 00

-

MJG

Damage calculations on Brad Townsend review

4 00

800 00

KJS

Trial preparation
File

2 30

310 50

7 50

262 50

12/22/2006 -

-

Worked on Opening Statement

Update

MDE Continue to draft Witness binder and summaries

12/23/2006 -

KJS

Trial preparation Worked on Opening Statement
File

Update

1 80

243 00

12/26/2006 -

MDE Meet with attorney, continue to review file, continue to draft

2 30

80 50

4 00

800 00

1 80

243 00

7 50

262 50

6 00

1,200 00

0 90

121 50

8 10

283 50

7 00

1,400 00

0 70

94 50

5 90

206 50

index and put together binder by topic regarding depositions
12/27/2006 -

MJG

Trial Preparation

KJS

Trial preparation Conference with Paralegal Worked on
Opening Statement Update File
MDE Meet with attorney, continue to review file, continue to draft
index and put together binder by topic regarding depositions

12/28/2006 -

MJG

Trial Preparation

KJS

Trial preparation Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant
Update File
MDE Meet with attorney, continue to review file, continue to draft
index and put together binder by topic regarding depositions

12/29/2006-

MJG

Trial Preparations

KJS

Trial preparation

Review Opening Statement Update File

MDE Meet with attorney, continue to review file, continue to draft
index and put together binder by topic regarding depositions

m

1 ion

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
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12/29/2006- MJG Trial preparation and exhibits
1/2/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; call Ken at ABCO;
continue to review file; prepare Deposition Summary
regarding Reed Price; continue to draft indexes and put
together binders.
- JCJ

55

Amount

4.00

800.00

6.90

241.50

Trial preparation and planning, review witness information

450.00

and records
-

MJG Trial Preparations

1/3/2007 - JRP
n/-

^3

-

Trial preparation work; legal research; review evidentiary
exhibits.
MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; continue to review file;
continue to draft indexes and put together binders.

- JCJ

8.00

1,600.00

1.20

150.00

0.60

21.00

Discussion with Marlin Grant regarding pending motions, trial

100.00

preparation and preliminary ruling, case planning
-

MJG Trial Preparation

1/4/2007 - KJS
- JRP
-

MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; continue to review file;
continue to draft indexes and put together binders.

- JCJ

-

- JRP

1,400.00

2.30

310.50

4.50

562.50

5.10

178.50

Discussion with Marlin Grant regarding settlement, review
amended trial notice, discussion with Marlin Grant regarding
trial issues and preparation

MJG Office visit and review of facts

1/5/2007 - KJS

-

Work with Paralegal on Exhibits and Summaries. Trial
preparation. Update File.
Trial preparation work; legal research; review evidentiary
exhibits.

7.00

100.00

7.00

1,400.00

Conference with Paralegal Caitlin regarding trial preparation
and Witness Exhibits. Trial Preparation. Worked on
Summaries and Witness Exhibits. Update File

3.50

472.50

Trial preparation work; review evidentiary exhibits; legal
research.

1.90

237.50

3.80

133.00

MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; continue to review file;
continue to draft indexes and put together binders.

ABCO CONSTRUCTION-^
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Amount

1/5/2007 - MJG Jury Instructions, Opening Statements, New Subpoenas,
letter to Magleby and various matters

5 00

1,000 00

1/6/2007- KJS

Trial Preparation Worked on Summaries and Witness
Exhibits Update File

2 50

337 50

1/8/2007- KJS

Trial Preparation Further Work on Summaries and Witness

2 70

364 50

1 90

237 50

5 80

203 00

Exhibits Update File
- JRP

Legal research

- MDE Meet with attorney, assist attorney, continue to review file,
continue to draft indexes and put together binders
- JCJ Review memo regarding exhibit organization, review file
memo from Court
1/9/2007- KJS
- JRP

40 00

Trial Preparation Updated Summaries and Witness Exhibits
and worked on Witness Outlines Update File

2 20

297 00

Legal research, trial preparation work, review evidentiary

2 10

262 50

exhibits
100 00
- JCJ

Case planning, discussion with Marlin Grant

- MJG Trial Preparation
1/10/2007 - KJS Trial Preparation Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant
Updated Summaries and Witness Exhibits and worked on
Witness Outlines Update File
- JRP

Revise Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research trial
preparation work

- MDE Meet with attorney, assist attorney, continue to review file,
continue to draft indexes and put together binders
- JCJ

- JRP

2,000 00

1 90

256 50

6 60

825 00

5 70

199 50

Review memorandum decision, planning conference with
Marlin Grant, review file records

- MJG Trial Preparation
1/11/2007 - KJS

10 00

650 00
10 00

2,000 00

Trial Preparation for Witnesses (re Travis Bowen, Ken
Oakeson, Dale Dorius, Don Johnson, Melanee Bingham,
Reed Price, Kyle Smoot, Cade Smoot, Alice Neff and Steve
Rake) Update File

1 80

243 00

Legal research, trial preparation work, Draft Motion in Limine
regarding Slander of Title, Draft Motion in Limine regarding

4 70

587 50

ABCO CONSTRUCTS
J
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1/11/2007 - MDE Continue to review documents; and continue to draft index.
- JCJ

- JRP

115.50

10.00

2,000.00

Trial Preparation for Witnesses (re: Travis Bowen, Ken
Oakeson, Melanee Bingham, Reed Price, Cade Smoot and
Alice Neff). Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. Trial
Preparation. Update File.

3.60

486.00

Legal research; Draft Motion in Limine regarding Battery;
Draft Motion in Limine regarding Slander of Title; Draft
additional Proposed Jury Instructions; Draft Motion in Limine
regarding Guardian Policy

3.90

487.50

7.70

269.50

- MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; meet with attorney Kelly
Smith; continue to review documents; and continue to draft
index.
- JCJ

Amount

200.00

Review case law of slander of title, conference with Marlin
Grant and outline motion to dismiss, revise draft Summary
Judgment Order

- MJG Trial Preparation; Motions
1/12/2007 - KJS

3.30

57

Review and revise Motion in Limine/ Slander, revise motion
in limine re assault, review motion to dismiss, review motion
to bifurcate attorneys fees, consultation with Marlin Grant,
email from Kelly Smith, email to Kelly Smith

- MJG Trial Preparation; letter to Jeff Shields and Luann Adams;
Motions

400.00

10.00

2,000.00

1/13/2007- KJS

Trial Preparation for Witnesses (re: Travis Bowen, Ken
Oakeson, Melanee Bingham, Reed Price, Cade Smoot and
Alice Neff - summaries and exhibits). Email to Attorney Jim
Jenkins. Trial Preparation. Update File.

2.60

351.00

1/15/2007- KJS

Conferences with Attorney Jim Jenkins (re: Trial Preparation
for Witnesses). Worked on summaries and questions for
Witnesses (re: Travis Bowen). Conference with Attorney
Marlin Grant. Trial Preparation. Update File.

5.60

756.00

DWL Respond to Motions in Limine

7.90

1,382.50

JRP

Review Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instruction; trial preparation
work; legal research.

4.10

512.50

MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; meet with attorney Kelly
Smith; meet with attorney Jonathan Palmer; continue to
review documents; continue to draft indexes; and draft index
of jury instructions prepared by both sides.

4.00

140.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION^-^
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1/15/2007 - JCJ

Hours Tax#
Review witness list, jury instructions, and motions and
memoranda for bifurcation and in limine from Magleby,
review Plaintiffs Special Verdict Form, work on revisions to
opening statement, work on voir dire

- MJG Trial Preparation
1/16/2007- KJS

Conferences with Paralegal. Worked on summaries and
questions for Witnesses (re: Travis Bowen). Conference with
Attorney Marlin Grant. Trial Preparation. Update File.

- DWL Respond to Motions in Limine
- JRP

Legal research; Draft Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Jury
Instructions.

- MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; continue to review

58

Amount
350.00

12.00

2,400.00

3.60

486.00

11.40

1,995.00

3.30

412.50

5.60

196.00

documents; and continue to draft indexes.
- JCJ

Call to request jury list, review jury list and distribute for
comment

- MJG Trial Preparation

120.00
12.00

2,400.00

Conferences with Attorney Jim Jenkins and Marlin Grant.
Reviewed Jury List. Worked on summaries and questions for
Witnesses (re: Ken Oakeson). Trial Preparation. Update File.

2.30

310.50

Draft Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions;
legal research.

3.50

437.50

- MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorneys; continue to review
documents; and continue to draft indexes.

1.20

42.00

- MPJ Review and revision of Opening Statement.

0.50

87.50

1/17/2007 - KJS

- JRP

- JCJ

Review email from Leslie and jury list comments from
attorneys, conference with Marlin Grant, work on voir dire,
work on witness preparation and opening statement
12.00

2,400.00

Conferences with Attorney Marlin Grant. Reviewed Jury List.
Worked on summaries and questions for Witnesses (re: Ken
Oakeson and Dale Dorius). Trial Preparation. Update File.

3.10

418.50

Draft Special Jury Verdict; legal research.

5.00

625.00

- MJG Trial Preparation; Motions and responses
1/18/2007 - KJS

- JRP

600.00

r\ *\ 4 r\ r\ c\
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^1/18/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorneys; continue to review
documents; and continue to draft indexes.
- JCJ

Conference with Martin Grant regarding recent rulings and
trial preparation, further preparation of voir dire

- MJG Trial Preparation
1/19/2007 - KJS

- JRP

Amount
154.00
350.00

12.00

2,400.00

Trial Preparation. Conferences with Attorney Jim Jenkins.
Reviewed Jury List. Worked on summaries and questions for
Witnesses. Conferences with Attorney Marlin Grant. Update
File.

2.90

391.50

Draft Special Jury Verdict Form; legal research.

0.70

87.50

8.70

304.50

- MDE Continue to prepare for trial.
- JCJ

4.40

59

150.00

Further trial preparation, discussions with Marlin Grant

1/20/2007 - KJS

Trial Preparation. Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins and
Attorney Marlin Grant. Drafted Witness Summaries for
Witnesses Luann Adams, Larry Blanchard, Travis Bowen,
Melanee Bingham, Wallace Bowen, Maurice Carter, John
Brough, Chris Brown, Oleen Bunderson, Mike Gale, Curtis
Hansen, Sharlene Hansen, Reed Price, Richard Pett, Edie
Pallesen, Boyd Pallesen, Kevin Noyes, Devon Smith, Ardell
Reay, Steve Racker, Don Johnston, Brad Morris, Alice Neff,
Branson Neff, Marvin Neff, Jill Perry and Newell Norman.
Update File.

- JCJ

Further trial preparation, discussions with Kelly Smith
regarding witness preparation, discussions with Marlin Grant
regarding trial strategy

- MJG Trial Preparation

9.20

1,242.00

150.00

10.00

2,000.00

2.20

297.00

- DWL Exhibit preparation

0.90

157.50

- MDE Continue to prepare for trial.

8.00

280.00

1/22/2007 - KJS

- JCJ

Trial Preparation. Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins.
Reviewed Jury List. Worked on summaries and questions for
Witnesses. Update File.

Additional preparation for jury selection and trial preparations,
discussions with Marlin Grant

- MJG Trial Preparation

150.00

12.00

2,400.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

1/23/2007-

KJS

Trial Preparation and Trial Work Worked on Updated
Summaries and Questions for Witnesses Update File

-

JCJ

Final trial preparation, travel, jury selection and
commencement of trial and consultation with client

-

MJG

Trial

1/24/2007-

KJS

Trial Preparation and Trial Work Worked on Updated
Summaries and Questions for New Witnesses Conferences
with Attorneys Jim Jenkins and Marlin Grant Research (re
Case Law regarding Lost Profits) Update File

-

JCJ

Continuation of trial, work on damages issues and planning,
outline motion to strike damage evidence

-

MJG

Trial

1/25/2007 -

KJS

Conferences with Attorneys Jim Jenkins and Marlin Grant
Research (re Utah Case Law Research) Trial Work
Worked on Updated Summaries and Questions for Plaintiff
Witnesses Telephone Conferences with Witness Oleen
Bunderson Update Witness Information for Oleen
Bunderson Memo to Marlin Update File

-

JCJ

Review research and further work on damage issue, travel
and trial, further planning and review of supplemental
research, discussion with Jeff Adair

-

MJG

Trial

1/26/2007 -

KJS

-

190

60

Amount
256 50

2,100 00

12 00

2,400 00

3 90

526 50

2,200 00

12 00

2,400 00

3 30

445 50

2,300 00

12 00

2,400 00

Conferences with Attorneys Jim Jenkins and Marlin Grant
Trial Work Worked on Updated Summaries and Questions
for Plaintiff Witnesses Update File

2 50

337 50

JRP

Review incoming pleadings

0 20

25 00

-

JCJ

Trial

-

MJG

Trial

1/27/2007 -

KJS

Trial Work Worked on Updated Summaries for Witnesses
Update File

-

JCJ

Planning and trial preparation

-

MJG

Trial Preparation

1,800 00
12 00

2,400 00

2 10

283 50

200 00
2 00

400 00

Page
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r

29/2007 - KJS

Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. Trial Work. Worked
on Updated Summaries for Expert Witnesses. Update File.

1.70

1/30/2007 - KJS

Trial Work. Worked on Witness Summaries and Exhibits for
Witnesses: Jeff Thorne, Brad Townsend, Juan Trujillo, Dean
Udy, Russell Walker, Larry Whitaker, Kent Wiggings and
Andy Yeates. Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant.
Update Binders.

- JCJ

Trial preparation, Johnston preparation, email to Leslie,
travel, trial, research at Recorder's office, planning regarding
directed verdict

- MJG Trial
1/31/2007 - JCJ

2/1/2007- KJS

Reviewed File. Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins. Trial
Work. Work on Jury Instructions.

2,400.00

2.10

283.50

2,100.00

13.00

Trial and jury instruction preparation, trial, planning, work on

2,600.00
2,250.00

13.00

2,600.00

1.20

162.00

- MJG Trial
- JCJ

229.50

12.00

Planning and research in preparation for directed verdict,
conference with Marlin Grant, continued trial, case planning
and conference with Marlin Grant, review jury instructions
and verdicts

- MJG Trial

Amount

650.00

- MJG Conference with Marlin Grant, review outline regarding
Johnston testimony, call Johnston, conference with Marlin
Grant, prepare cross examination for Johnston
- MJG Trial

61

2,600.00
13.00

2,600.00

impeachment issue
2/2/2007-

MJG Trial

- JCJ
2/3/2007 - JCJ

15.00

Planning and trial preparation, conference with Marlin Grant,
continued trial
Case planning; research jnov motion and other post verdict
options

2/5/2007- MJG Trial
- JCJ

3,000.00

Review trial book, discussion with Marlin Grant, trial and
verdict

3,150.00
400.00

12.00

2,400.00
2,000.00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

^

2/6/2007-

MJG

Trial

fa°

JCJ

Planning regarding post-trial matters, discussion with Marlin
Grant

2/7/2007 -

\Jr

3 00

62

Amount
600 00
100 00

DWL Meet with Marlin Grant re recovering attorneys fees

0 30

52 50

-

MJG

Post Trial

1.00

200 00

-

JCJ

Discussion with Marlin Grant, conference call with Marv,

200 00

planning conference with Marlin Grant

1 20
2/8/2007 -

210 00

DWL Research recovery of attorneys fees

50 00
-

JCJ

Call to Magleby

MJG

Attorney fee issues/org files

JCJ

Call from Magleby, review rules and case planning,

1 00
2/9/2007 -

200 00
100 00

-

discussion with Marlin Grant

0 40

50 00

Legal research

310

542 50
507 50

2/12/2007-

JRP

2/13/2007 -

DWL Attorney's fees research
DWL Review Plaintiffs memorandum for attorney fees, Research
cited case law, Meet with Marlin Grant
JCJ Case planning, research attorney fee issues and jnov,
discussion with Ken Oakeson, email to Magleby, emails from
Magleby and his secretary, review memorandum regarding
Branson's motion for judgment and attorney fees, review
researched cases, case planning, discussion with Marlin
Grant

2 90

DWL Discuss with Marlin Grant - Opposition Memorandum to
Branson's Motion for Attorneys Fees, prepare Memorandum

3 50

612 50

MJG

Draft motion

3 00

600 00

JCJ

Call to Magleby, further case planning

-

2/14/2007-

2/15/2007

<J js| ov/

800 00

150 00

DWL Prepare Opposition Memorandum to Branson's Motion for
Attorneys Fees

6 50

1,137 50

MJG

Finalize motion

1 00

200 00

JCJ

Further planning and case evaluation regarding pending
motion for fees, review emails from Magleby, call Bethany at
Magleby's, discussions with David Larsen, review additional
research and draft response, outline and draft motion for
continuance

n 1 •*

nnn

700 00

Page
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2/16/2007-

MJG Draft reply

- JCJ

2/17/2007 - JCJ

600 00
650 00

Revise and email stipulation to Magleby, case planning

200 00
1 20

Review delivery message, email to Magleby, revise and final
Motion and Affidavit for extension, draft Order, revise and
final Order, review and revise Marlm Grant' s draft
memorandum for jnov, further review of records and
evaluation of Plaintiffs motion for fees, outline response
issues, research case law

2/20/2007 - MJG Final motion and draft notes to file

2/21/2007 - MJG Finalize motion and review memorandum regarding fees

4 00

800 00
550 00

2 50

Further research and planning regarding response to motion
for attorney fees, review revised draft of motion jnov

2/22/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney, and review Branson's depositions

42 00

1,100 00

- MJG Conference with Marlm Grant, email to Magleby, call to
Bethany, review email from Bethany, final extension
pleadings and file, email to Bethany, email to Marlm Grant,
call from clerk, further research and planning,

- JCJ

Amount

Revise motion, memorandum and affidavit for extension,
review emails from Magleby, revise draft response to
Plaintiffs Motion for Fees, call from Bethany regarding
missing exhibits and mailing

2/19/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney, finalize Motion for Extension of Time,
finalize Affidavit of James C Jenkins, draft and finalize Order
granting Motion for extension of time, and revise
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Judgment Notwithstanding
- JCJ

3 00

63

500 00
700 00

0 20

7 00

5 00

1,000 00

regarding 3 million damages
- MJG Finalize Motion, Statement of Facts regarding Attorney Fees
- JCJ

Revise draft of memorandum from Marlm Grant re jnov

2/23/2007 - MJG Response on atty fees and drafting objection
- JCJ

Further revision to jnov memorandum, additional research of
issues regarding damages, slander, fiduciary duty, call to
Marlm Grant

100 00
4 00

800 00
600 00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Hours Tax#

2/24/2007- JCJ

Redrafyno\gnej]
memorandum

ium, redraft attorney fee response

64

Amount
300 00

2/26/2007 - MJG Response

1 00

- JCJ ffeview revised draft of inov m p m 9, discussion with Marlin

200 00
120 00

Grant regarding attorney fee claims, email to Leslie
2/27/2007-

1 50

262 50

1 00

200 00

DWL Draft attorney fees memo

- MJG Motion on attorney fees
- JCJ Discussion with Marlin Grant and emails and calls to Leslie,
review and revise most recent draft of opposition memo
regarding attorneys fees, review research, planning

875 00

2/28/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney, and review file
-

DWL Research case law related to attorney fee recovery, Draft

2 50

87 50

6 20

1,085 00

1 00

200 00

attorney fees memo in opposition to motion for attorney fees
-

MJG Finalize response
350 00

- JCJ

Review and revise memorandum, review email and draft from
David Larsen

SUBTOTAL

[

For professional services rendered

2856 99
2856 99

410,889 66]
$410,889 66

Additional Charges
Qty/Pnce
BRANSON NEFF/N-4759 010
11/27/2002 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions
12/6/2002 - MJG Costs advanced for filing fee to file counterclaim
8/4/2003 - MJG Costs advanced to Picture Perfect re color copies
1/1/2004 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions

*~v -e ^ r\ r\ r>

41
1 00

41 00

1
90 00

;9000

1
28 30

28 30

12
1 00

12 00

AV
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Qty/Price Tax#

65

Amount

4/1/2004 -

MJG

Photocopies

3889
0 05

194 45

4/30/2004 -

MJG

Photocopies

65
0 10

6 50

5/1/2004 -

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions

2
100

2 00

5/11/2004-

MJG

Photocopies

652
010

65 20

7/31/2004 -

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions

15
100

15 00

8/16/2004-

MJG

Costs advanced to UPS

1
11 50

11 50

8/18/2004 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Box Elder County Recorder to release lis
pendens

1
20 00

20 00

8/31/2004-

MJG

Photocopies

137
010

13 70

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions

2
1 00

2 00

MJG

Care costs

1
40 00

40 00

-

MJG

Costs advanced Box Elder County Recorder to record
Release of Lis Pendens

1
20 00

20 00

9/13/2004-

MJG

Photocopies

794
0 05

39 70

1/21/2005-

MJG

Photocopies

301
0 10

30 10

2/1/2005 -

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions

13
1 00

13 00

2/2/2005-

MJG

Photocopies

3500
0 10

350 00

4/30/2005 -

MJG

Photocopies

366
0 10

36 60

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions

20
100

20 00

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page
Qtv/Price Tax#

66

Amount

5/31/2005-

MJG

Photocopies.

171
0.10

17.10

6/30/2005 -

MJG

Photocopies.

324
0.10

32.40

7/31/2005 -

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions.

1
12.00

12.00

-

MJG

Photocopies.

150
0.10

15.00

9/1/2005 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for transcript copies

1
329.65

329.65

9/30/2005 -

MJG

Photocopies.

372
0.10

37.20

10/31/2005-

MJG

Photocopies.

292
0.10

29.20

11/30/2005-

MJG

Photocopies.

145
0.10

14.50

12/1/2005 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Kinko's for litigation document printing

1
170.16

170.16

12/2/2005 -

MJG

Costs advanced to U.S. Postal Service for shipping costs

1
9.22

9.22

12/22/2005 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Magleby & Greenwood for copy fees

1
136.00

136.00

12/30/2005-

MJG

Photocopies.

2824
0.10

282.40

<^ 1/18/2006 ,kp/*9 [ ^

MJG

Costs advanced to Maurice Carter, Con Roper, and Richard
Pett for witness fees

1
55.50

55.50

y ^

1/26/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to SLC Corp for parking fee

1
10.00

10.00

-

MJG

Costs advanced to Steve Huggins for process service fee

1
25.00

25.00

1/31/2006-

MJG

Photocopies.

5937
0.10

593.70

-

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions.

11
1.00

11.00

&

n 11 o n 1

Page
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Amount

2
18.50

37.00

17
1.00

17.00

2412
0.10

241.20

1
768.40

768.40

- MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for services regarding
Dorius and Branson depositions

1
1,309.36

1,309.36

3/2/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for services regarding
Oakeson deposition

1
468.75

468.75

3/15/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services

1
1,046.05

3/27/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services

1
193.00

193.00

30
1.00

30.00

1
393.10

393.10

1
108.60

108.60

156
0.10

15.60

1
191.15

191.15

1
331.53

331.53

1
14.43

14.43

1
472.35

472.35

1
15.00

15.00

2/3/200§ - MJG Costs advanced to Don Johnston and Dale Dorius for
deposition fees
2/28/2006 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions.
- MJG Photocopies.

Bf

Qty/Price Tax#

67

A I 3/1/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services

3/31/2006 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions.
MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services
5/31/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Washington Mutual Bank for copies and
research
- MJG Photocopies.
6/15/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's for copies and binding services
- MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's for copies
6/16/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Postmaster for certified mailing
6/26/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services
6/29/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to First District Court for copy of video tape

/

1,046.05.
ft,U

Page
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Qty/Price Tax#

\/(j?

68

Amount

764
0.10

76.40

1
15.00

15.00

1
606.25

606.25

Photocopies.

140
0.10

14.00

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions.

5
1.00

5.00

8/31/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions.

15
1.00

15.00

9/30/2006 -

MJG

Photocopies.

137
0.10

13.70

10/23/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Salt Lake County Recorder for recording
fee

1
26.00

26.00

10/30/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Weber County Recorder for copy fee

1
13.00

13.00

10/31/2006-

MJG

Photocopies.

88
0.10

8.80

11/10/2006-

MJG

Photocopies.

115
0.10

11.50

11/13/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to U.S. Postal Service for mailing

1
4.05

4.05

11/15/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Kipp & Christian for copy fees

1
04.99

204.99

11/17/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced for fax transmissions.

40
1.00

40.00

-

MJG

Costs advanced to First District Court for certified copies

1
5.00

5.00

12/7/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to John Brough & Associates for deposition
services

1
95.00

495.00

12/14/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Phillips Hansen for plat

1
2.00

2.00

6/30/2006 -

MJG

Photocopies.

7/6/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to First District Court for copy of video tape

8/2006 -

MJG

Costs advanced to Mann, Hadfield & Thorne for attorney fees
regarding opinion

7/31/2006-

MJG

-

Page

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
Qty/Price Tax#
1
616.01

616.01

33
1.00

33.00

108
0.10

10.80

1
6.14

86.14

1/19/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Staples for supplies - trial

1
151.30

151.30

1/22/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Staples for supplies for Trial

1
139.92

139.92

1 /23/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Mann. Hadfield, & Thome for expert fee

1
202.08

202.08

1
13.00

13.00

1
350.00

350.00

120
1.00

120.00

9561
0.10

956.10

1
126.00

126.00

1
90.93

90.93

1
268.00

268.00

12/20/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Depomax for deposition services
12/31/2006 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions.
- MJG Photocopies.
1/12/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's to laminate and copy plat maps

- MJG Costs advanced to First District Court for audio CD
1/25/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Box Elder County Geographicals for
custom maps
1/31/2007 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions.
- MJG Photocopies.

f<:
£/C'

Amount

2/12/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Melanie Bingham, Wallace Bowen, Ken
Oakesen, Richard Pett, and Sharlene Hansen for witness
fees

2/22/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's for copies
2/23/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Lexis Nexis for research fees

[

SUBTOTAL:

$13,202.57

Total costs
8/31/2002 Invoice No. 19353
9/30/2002 Invoice No. 19810
10/23/2002 Payment - thank you

13,202.57]

19353
19810

$515.00
$487.50
($515.00)

ABCO CONSTRUCTION

Page

70

Amount
10/30/2002 Payment - thank you
10/31/2002 Invoice No 20431
20431
11/18/2002 Payment - refund on service fee to Box Elder County Auditor
11/30/2002 Invoice No 21775
21775
12/23/2002 Payment - thank you
12/31/2002 Invoice No 10721
10721
1/22/2003 Payment - thank you
1/31/2003 Invoice No 11208
11208
2/5/2003 Payment - thank you
2/25/2003 Payment - thank you
2/28/2003 Invoice No 11514
11514
3/5/2003 Payment - thank you
3/28/2003 Payment - thank you
3/31/2003 Invoice No 12418
12418
4/30/2003 Invoice No 13120
13120
5/31/2003 Invoice No 13612
13612
6/17/2003 Payment - thank you
6/30/2003 Invoice No 14552
14552
7/15/2003 Payment - thank you
7/31/2003 Invoice No 14958
14958
8/15/2003 Payment - thank you
8/31/2003 Invoice No 15399
15399
9/17/2003 Payment - thank you
9/30/2003 Invoice No 15976
15976
10/24/2003 Payment - thank you
10/31/2003 Invoice No 16679
16679
11/21/2003 Payment - thank you
11/30/2003 Invoice No 17583
17583
12/31/2003 Invoice No 17992
17992
1/5/2004 Payment - thank you
1/28/2004 Payment - thank you
1/30/2004 Payment - thank you
1/31/2004 Invoice No 18598
18598
2/29/2004 Invoice No 19416
19416
3/25/2004 Payment - thank you
3/31/2004 Invoice No 19827
19827
4/9/2004 Payment - thank you
4/28/2004 Payment - thank you
4/30/2004 Invoice No 20698
20698
5/6/2004 Payment - thank you
5/31/2004 Invoice No 21738
21738
6/30/2004 Payment - thank you
6/30/2004 Invoice No 22197
22197
7/21/2004 Payment - thank you
7/22/2004 Payment - thank you
7/31/2004 Invoice No 23256
23256
8/27/2004 Payment - thank you
8/31/2004 Invoice No 23963
23963
9/30/2004 Payment - thank you
9/30/2004 Invoice No 24604
24604
10/6/2004 Payment - thank you
10/28/2004 Payment - thank you

($487 50)
$307 00
($13 00)
$5,085 00
($307 00)
$4,196 39
($137 00)
$5,279 06
($5,085 00)
($4,195 00)
$2,374 50
($5,236 00)
($2,374 50)
$6,152 50
$2,470 00
$3,164 53
($2,470 00)
$5,188 53
($3,112 50)
$2,754 05
($5,188 53)
$8,691 35
($2,700 83)
$5,118 57
($13,706 80)
$4,840 06
($4,829 00)
$2,952 22
$2,311 03
($2,940 50)
($41 20)
($2,257 00)
$3,807 94
$4,298 48
($3,773 50)
$5,402 39
($4,248 50)
($6,152 50)
$2,195 28
($5,347 50)
$1,320 33
($2,192 95)
$3,042 00
($1,320 33)
($194 45)
$3,003 71
($3,039 70)
$3,784 22
($3,000 50)
$5,024 85
($39 70)
($3,749 50)

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
Amount
10/31/2004 Invoice No 25189
11/1/2004 Payment - thank you
11/30/2004 Payment - thank you
11/30/2004 Invoice No 25863
12/31/2004 Invoice No 26552
1/12/2005 Payment - thank you
1/31/2005 Invoice No 27298
2/28/2005 Payment - thank you
2/28/2005 Invoice No 27857
3/31/2005 Invoice No 28906
4/30/2005 Invoice No 29324
5/13/2005 Payment - thank you as of 4/19/05
5/16/2005 Payment - thank you
5/31/2005 Invoice No 30125
6/30/2005 Invoice No 30817
7/31/2005 Invoice No 31324
8/31/2005 Invoice No 32180
9/19/2005 Payment - thank you
9/30/2005 Invoice No 33107
10/24/2005 Payment - thank you
10/31/2005 Payment - thank you
10/31/2005 Invoice No 33795
11/3/2005 Payment - thank you
11/30/2005 Invoice No 34271
12/6/2005 Payment - thank you - Magleby & Greenwood
12/14/2005 Payment - thank you
12/28/2005 Payment - thank you
12/31/2005 Invoice No 34873
1/10/2006 Payment - thank you
1/24/2006 Payment - thank you
1/31/2006 Courtesy discount per Marlin Grant
1/31/2006 Invoice No 35695
2/28/2006 Invoice No 36234
3/30/2006 Payment - thank you
3/31/2006 Invoice No 37209
4/30/2006 Invoice No 37836
5/19/2006 Payment - thank you
5/22/2006 Payment - thank you
5/31/2006 Invoice No 38711
6/30/2006 Invoice No 39874
7/10/2006 Payment - thank you
8/31/2006 Invoice No 41285
9/5/2006 Payment - thank you
9/19/2006 Payment - thank you
9/30/2006 Invoice No 42282
10/5/2006 Payment - thank you
10/11/2006 Payment - thank you
10/31/2006 Invoice No 42802
11/21/2006 Payment - thank you
11/30/2006 invoice No 43958
12/31/2006 Invoice No 44625
1/5/2007 Payment - thank you

25189

25863
26552
27298
27857
28906
29324

30125
30817
31324
32180
33107

33795
34271

34873

35695
36234
37209
37836

38711
39874
41285

42282

42802
43958
44625

$5,184 15
($5,022 50)
($5,183 15)
$2,078 40
$3,801 33
($2,078 40)
$4,441 90
($4,441 90)
$18,838 35
$10,379 91
$4,426 75
($3,800 00)
($29,150 20)
$7,700 66
$2,751 29
$2,808 35
$8,846 99
($11,938 03)
$4,816 00
($2,713 60)
($2,703 25)
$12,158 83
($8,718 50)
$20,679 18
($170 16)
($12,078 70)
($4,767 44)
$17,111 30
($184 50)
($20,634 50)
($4,132 75)
$20,138 44
$13,734 54
($15,995 45)
$14,301 09
$9,727 46
($13,630 20)
($14,150 36)
$7,010 99
$20,097 87
($480 42)
$36,666 74
($33,849 75)
($20,097 87)
$15,173 28
($18,846 75)
($17,354 53)
$16,977 98
($16,972 13)
$12,981 28
$23,753 08
($12,486 75)

ABCO CONSTRUCTION
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Amount
1/31/2007 Invoice No. 45263
2/1/2007 Payment - thank you
2/28/2007 Credit interest charges per Marlin Grant
Total balance due
New balance of Default

45263

$85,663.14
($23,618.31)
($881.54)
$101,278.64

$0.00

Exhibit G

Travis Bowen
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0637
Dear Travis,
I need your help in executing the buy-out with my brother, Marvin. All we do is
fight and I am asking that you be a mediator for us.
Let mefirstgive you some history so that you get a feel for where I am coming
from. Back in about 1990, we were doing a project for the LDS church in Centerville.
We hauled a lot of dirt off the project to different places. One place we hauled dirt was
just west of the Centerville off ramp. These people would not pay us. Marvin asked what
we should do. I told him to put a lien on the property. Marvin later approached me and
said he thought we ought to buy the place.
I told him I thought the people were crooks and that the way they were building
the storage units on the place was so poor that we could never getfinancingfor it. He
then came up with the idea that we couldfinancethe place by mortgaging our houses. We
had taken a hit for $360,000.00 (thefigurewas provided by Marvin, I don't really know if
this is the con*ect figure). All I know was that we were in trouble and I was out working
my butt off trying to pinch every buck I could out of every job. I thought Marvin was
doing the same.
Marvin was now working on the storage rental units at Centerville and on the
Centerville chapel. I thought that he was doing everything for the Company as I was.
One day I saw some time cards in the office for work at Centerville and Marvin had
crossed out Centerville and allocated the work to other projects. I asked the secretary
about this and she responded that Marv said I knew all ibout it and agreed.
I thought perhaps Marv must be trying to bury the cost of Centerville storage units
in other projects. At the time I though this project was being done for ABCO and I would
benefitfromit, so I did not pursue the matter. ABCO men and equipment were doing the
project and it was beingfinancedby ABCO.
Later on I found that Marvin has mortgaged his house to buy more ground and
expand the project and upon inquiring about the status of the project, Marv informed me
that this is his personal project and I am not part of it. He had secured a lawyer with
whom I did not have a personal relationship so I would not know and set up his own
program. We argued about this. Marvin had let the ABCO projects go while he worked
on what is now known as Aspen Springs units for his own personal benefit at a time when
we were spread pretty thin and ABCO was infinancialdifficulty to the point that we had
to mortgage the farm to provide us with working capital. Now Marv was jeopardizing
ABCO to work on his own project. All this time I thought it was to the benefit of ABCO.

I went to see Lynn Larsen, ABCO contract attorney. He told me that Marv had a
fiduciary responsibility to ABCO and that by using ABCO resources and his time, he being
paid by ABCO to do the project it should be an ABCO project. At this time the project
was not completed and I had two options- sue Marv and put a lien on the project, which
would create a situation where it would probably kill the project and split up ABCO, or let
it go. At the time I thought Marv would eventually make some settlement with me. I did
not want afightand I let it go. (In retrospect I should not have, but I thought I was doing
the best thing for everyone.)
Marv claims that he paid ABCO for all the work at Aspen Springs, but I don't
believe it and he won't produce the books to prove it.
About two years ago I was making a check outfromthe Westco account, which is
our farm account, and I noticed that some checks had been made out to Marvin's kids.
Now this was not unusual because we had paid our kids each year and the accountant
would tell us how much and Marv and I would agree on the amount and Marv would
write the checks. My kids because they were older and could justify more with the IRS
were usually given more than Marv's kids. But each family was to ultimately get equal
amounts. Marv was spread thin because he has more kids.
I asked Marv what the deal was, how come he was paying his kids and not mine.
He said he was just making up for difference the kids had been paid in the past. I
accepted this answer and never worried about it. Later, I had occasion to get into Westco
check book and found that upon checking out the check written to Marv's kids they had
now been given more than my kids had in total by thousands of dollars. I again asked
Marv what the deal was and demanded that he give me an accounting. Alice provided a
printout that showed Marv had written checks to his kids without discussing it with me for
the amount of $63,000.00 more that my kids had received.
I told Marv this was notright,this was called in the real world embezzlement. He
told me he did not feel the least bit guilty because he deserved more than me because he
was worth more than me.
This resulted in a big argument. I told him I wanted an audit. A few days later, I
told Marv to write a check to each of my kids for $22,000.00. He said he would not for
the company could not afford it and he hadfiguredup where I had taken $210,000.00
more than hefromthe company. I told him I had never written a checkfromthe
company that did not go to legitimate company expenses. He went on to tell me that the
insurance on our vehicles had cost so much more because I had boys and he had girls; that
my health and retirement insurance cost so much more because I was older, etc. I told
him that these were not partnership related items, but ABCO employee related. I told him
I wanted an audit. He told me to quit being so "pissy" and we could work it out.

I called Davis and Bott and asked if they would come and audit ABCO and
Westco. They said they would not come unless Marvin agreed. Marv would not agree.
I told Marv a divided house could not stand and that I did not like coming to work
and being mad and not being able to trust him and under these circumstances it would be
better if he were to buy me out.
We argued over what the outfit was worth. We argued over Aspen Springs. Marv
would not agree and claimed he was not making any money on it. I told him I just wanted
my fair share of the ground. I told him the ground was worth $80,000.00 per acre. He
claimed it wasn't worth $10,000.00 per acre. I got myfiguresfromthe neighbors of
Aspen Springs.
I had Lee Rasmussen run an appraisal on the Company and Marvin said he (Lee)
did not know anything and would not accept what Lee said. I had you look it over also.
Marv did not agree with that. I told him OK I wouldfigureit out and he couldfigureit
out and we could workfromthere. You willfindenclosed the copies of rough drafts of
our settlement.
The following are items that need to be handled:
1. $52,000.00 payment due March 21,2000.
2. $16,000.00 due last January.
3. Salary continuation. This was not what Marv and I thought it would be when
we looked closely at the program. Marv thought that maybe he would discontinue this. I
told him if he decided to discontinue the plan, I would not hold him to paying me because
without the other employees participating in the plan it would be impossible to make it
pay. However, if he decided to continue the plan, he could pay me out in two ways. 1)
$10,000.00 plus for ten years, or 2) wait until I turn 67 and he could pay me $25,000.00
for 10 years. I should at least get the $10,000.00 per year because that much I helped
participating and pay for. I heardfromthe employees that Marv was keeping the plan and
called Richard PettfromEquitable to make certain. Marv had not discontinued the plan.
When Marv found out I had called Richard, Marv cussed him out and told him I wasn't
part of the company and he could not talk to me. It appears that Marvin is trying to cheat
me out of my salary continuation plan.
This is not part of the split, but part of my salary as an employee of ABCO.
Marvin has his salary continuation plan in place for him as do the other key employees. I
want what is due me, nothing more, but nothing less.
4. My total salary was not paid to me for 1999. Over the past years, ABCO has
paid me my monthly check plus $4,000.00 for IRA and $4,400.00 to pay for my Condo
plus our taxes. Lee Rasmussen always paid enough in quarterly taxes to pay for taxes and

recover $4,400.00 plus a little more back in taxes so I could use the $4,400.00 to pay
towards the condo.
This year I went down to pick up my taxes the day they werefinished,which was
also the day they were due, and found that I was not receiving money for the IRA or my
$4,400.00. Within an hour I had to dig up $10,000.00 to send with my tax returns. Marv
claims he does not owe this to me. He is trying to cheat me. I received less in
compensationfromABCO in 1999 than I did in 1989. This is not right. ABCO owes me
my total compensation for 1999.
5. I understand that ABCO has terminated paying my Guardian insurance
premium, but has not signed the policy over to me. This needs to be taken care of. No
one is paying the policy at this time.
6. Marv is supposed to pay my Medicaid insurance until I am 65 years old. He
claims that the premiums are costing more that he anticipated. This needs to be checked
out.
7. Marv has a court order on me so I can't call him, or go to the office or shop.
This has killed our agreement that I can have access to shop and office and to the
equipment. I left all my tools, including hand tools with the company because I thought I
would have access to them at all times. Just last week I needed to repair a water line at
the farm. I could not go to the shop an get my pipe vise and dies. Those tools I have had
since before ABCO. Now I can't access my tools. I think Marv is wrong in creating this
situation and has breached our sell out agreement by so doing.
I had arranged not to go anywhere for the Memorial weekend so I could wrap up
what I had to do for ABCO, but I could not go to the office nor did I have access to the
paper work I needed.
Marvin is not going to let this agreement with the equipment work. Since he is not
willing to make it work, he should pay me $250,000.00 for the equipment and tools. If
Marvin does not want to do this, I will split them with him down to the last wrench, chair,
computer and piece of paper.
8. Marv agreed to pay forfixingup our rental units at the farm with the stipulation
that I would not "go wild". Upon sending some bills for the "fixup" to the office, they
were sent back indicating that ABCO was not responsible for these bills. I talked to Marv
and told him that I knew that over the last seven years the farm had created more revenue
than he had paid on the mortgage and this extra money should go to the farm.
Marv claimed this was not true. I asked him to provide the books to Westco to
see if this was true or not. He has refused to do this.

9. I told Marv I should have 1/2 of what ABCO made in 1999 since this year was
not included in what ABCO was worth. He said ABCO would not even make
$40,000.00. I told him if that is all we were going to make on the amount of work we had
done, he had better change business. Ifigurewe should have made about $400,000.00. I
would like to see the books.
On the 25th of April 2000 (the proceedings of this day are enclosed) I asked
Marvin to have an audit or let me review the books on ABCO since 1988 and the books of
Westcofromthe time we took out the last mortgage on the farm, which I believe was in
1993. Marvin said nobody was going to see the books.
After April 25th, things have changed. I have taken enough. I have turned my
cheek twice and thought that I was doing the best for all concerned. I was wrong.
1. Marv has taken advantage of me on Aspen Springs.
2. Marv has misappropriated funds from ABCO to himself and his children. This
is called embezzlement.
3. Marv has created a situation where I don't have access to tools and/or
equipment.
4. Marv created a situation that caused me to be thrown in jail and is now costing
me attorney fees.
Bottom line - Marv must do the following:
1. Marv pays me $52,000.00 and $16,000.00 plus immediately.
2. Marv pays me my complete salary for 1999.
3. Marv continues to pay my insurance as agreed.
4. Marv continues to pay off my truck.
5. Marv signs over the Guardian policy and he pays the premiums at no cost to me
until he does.
6. Marv pays forfixingup the rental units on the farm and produces books for
Westco to determine how much money is available.
7. Marv produces books for ABCO from 1988 to January 1,2000 and a review is
made to determine how much money has been misappropriated and how much went to
Aspen Springs..

8. Marv pays me $250,000.00 for equipment and tools since he has denied me
access to them.
9. Marv complies with my salary continuation plan with ABCO.
10. Marv pays me 1/2 of what ABCO made in 1999.
Since I can no longer trust Marv, I think it appropriate that he pay me the rest of
what he owes me in a lump sum and also pay the taxes on this sum.
If Marv is not willing to comply with the above, then please consider this the letter
required in the contract documents to rescind the buy out contract. I will again become
part of ABCO and make certain that I am treated fairly. I am not required to turn the
other cheek again.
Hope you can help.
Thank
x nameyou.
you.

/

Branson G. Neff

PS
On Friday, June 9,2000, ABCO bookkeeper Ken Oakeson, brought me a
check for $52,000.00. I don't know why the $16,000.00 was not included. I can't even
call tofindout or thank Marv for reconsidering and paying me.
I think since Marv had me thrown in jail there is no more negotiation left in me.
My attorney has advised me to give you this letter rather than meet in person in view of
the court order. He thinks Marvin set me up last time and I was dumb enough to let him. I
don't think I want to be in that situation again. Pleasefindenclosed the documentation to
what occurred on May 25,2000.
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I received a call from Judge Kevin Christensen. He requested to know what
was happening with Branson Neff• Judge Christensen was contacted by
^Branson Neff's wife. Judge Christensen had represented Branson Neff in
I the pasc. Judge Christensen asked if the case would be sent to his court.
I informed him "Yes." Judge Christensen informed'me he would be releasing
Bransontfefifon his own recognizance. Judge Christensen told me Branson
Neff has lived here his whole life and is not a threat to go anywhere. I
informed Judge Christensen that Branson's brother, Marvin, was going to get
a"Restraining Order to keep Branson away from, the business. Judge
Christensen requested to speak with Branson. Branson was allowed to speak
with Judge Christensen for ^ few minutes before he was booked into jail.
Branson was instructed by Judge Christensen to stay away from ABCO
Construction. Branson agreed to do so.
Branson Neff was booked into the Box Elder County Jail on one count of
assault. I issued Branson a citation for the assault charge (Citation
#A10559) •
This will need to be forwarded to the County Attorney for possible
charges of assault on Marvin Neff at the request of Branson Neff.
Branson Neff's statement will be added when it is completed and returned
to the Sheriff's Office.
This case will remain active until reviewed by the County Attorney,
No further action taken*
REFER TO COUNTY ATTORNEY.
Case ACTIVE.
8. Date, Time, Reporting Deputyt
05-24-2000
1611
jc. Wiggins 1C25
Received:05-25-00
ryped-di:05-25-00

V t V <{ I d

Marvin told me that Branson was pushing him with his belly and hitting
him in the chest and throat with his index fingerI instructed Branson to turn around and place his hands behind his
back that I was placing him under arrest for assault. ""Branson refused
the request and took-a .step back away from me. Branson tried to argue
the fact that he owns the business, and I have no right to arrest: him.
I informed Branson if he did not comply with my orders, he would be
charged wirh resisting arrest along with disorderly conduct and assault,
Branson complied. He turned around, placed his hands behind his back,
and requested the cuffs be placed on loose due to medical reascns. I
complied with Branson's request and placed the cuffs on as loose as
possible. I double locked the cuffs and escorted Branson out of the
building to my patrol vehicle.
I had to physically escort Branson out: the door. Branson and Marvin
were still exchanging words. Marvin followed us out of the building.
I instructed Marvin to go back inside, or he would be going_along also.
Marvin complied and went back inside: I placed Branson in the back seat
of my vehicle. I explained to Branson why he had been arrested and what
the charges were. I told him I was going back in to speak with Marvin
and get a written statement frcm him. I told Branson if Marvin wouldn't
do a statement, I would be issuing him a citation for disorderly conduct
and releasing him but if Marvin does a statement, I would be booking him
into jail on assault charges.
I went back into ABCO and spoke with Marvin and the three witnesses.
1 informed Marvin of his options - He could press charges for assault
and Branson would be booked into jail for the assault. If net, I would
be issuing Branson a citation for disorderly conduct and releasing him.
Marvin stated he wanted Branson charged with assault. I told him I would
eed a detailed statement of what happened frcm the time Branson entered
he building tc the time I arrived. I also requested witness statements
from the two secretaries and other workers thac were in the office when
Branson came in. The three witnesses complied with my request:. (See
witnesses' statements for further information-)

t

Marvin asked what he had to do to keep Branson from coming back into
the business. I instructed him on how to get a Protective Order and
where he has to go to get one. I informed Marvin I would return and pick
up the witnesses' statements around 1300 hrs•
I then returned and informed Branson of what was going on and informed
him I would be booking him into jail on assault charges. Branson wanted
to press charges on Marvin for assault also* I told Branson I would give
him a witness' statement, and it would be forwarded to "the County Attorney.
I then asked Branson if he had a vehicle in the parking area of ABCO.
Branson stated "Yes". I asked if it was locked. He replied, "No, can my
wife come and get it". I told him "Yes". He requested I call his wife to
come get his truck. I returned inside and asked the secretary if she could
contact Branson's wife to come pick up his truck. She did. When Branson's
wire arrived, I informed her of what was going on and that she could come
and bail Branson out of jail in Brigham City. : allowed Branson to speak
with her for a few minutes to arrange bail.
I then transported Branson to jail.

While doing the booking paperwork,

ocom

narrative:.
Assault Investigation Narrative
!• Brief Description of the Offense:
Suspect entered victim's business, started threatening him, became
physical hitting him, and pushing him around.
2^ Location of Occurrence *
24 35 North 7600 West, Corinne
ABCO Construction
3. Relationships Between the Parties; Motives, Mutual Consent:
The suspect and victim are brothers. They were in business together
at one time.
4. Weapons or Force Used:
Weapons were hands and fist.
Force was hitting and pushing.
5. Description of victim's Injuries & Medical Treatment Given?
No medical treatment required,
5. Witness Observations:
There were three witnesses.
Information.

See three statements for further

1. Deputy's Narrative, Date, Tine, Action Taken*
On 05-2S-2000 at 1054 hrs, I was dispatched to the above location on
i civil disturbance/911 hang up. While en route to the location, I was
.nformed by dispatch that they were placed on hold.
When I arrived at ABCQ Construction as I was exiting my vehicle, I
'as met by Kyle Smoot. Kyle requested I wait outside for a few minutes.
e stated they are inside trying to talk it out- I walked past Kyle
nd into the business. As I entered I saw two male individuals toe to
oe* The two were identified as Branson Neff (DOB: 07-13-38 5 and Marvin
eff (DOB:0?-26-51) victim/complainant.
1 could tell Branson was very upset over something. Branson was
Ding oiosc of the yelling and finger pointing, i instructed both
ranfion and Marvin to separate. Marvin took a step backwards* Branson
allowed Marvin by stepping forward toward Marvin. I stepped between the
<o of them. I ordered Branson to back up. I told Marvin to back up to
xe open door behind hiuw Marvin complied. Branson stood his ground
iysically refusing to comply with my order. I told Branson a second
.me to back
up, or I would arrest him for disorderly conduct, Branson
tplied, ,rYou have
no right to arrest me. I have a right to be here. 1
rn this place.11 I had to tell Branson a third time to back away* He
implied by taking two steps backwards. I informed Branson he was being
scrderly at this time, and I could arrest him.
Marvin stated, "I want him arrested for assault. He hie me three
mes. Once in the chest with his fist, and he pushed me back against
drafting table by my shoulder while I was sitting in my chair.11

0
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I n c i d e n t Numbert OC-001781
Image:
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Corinne"
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Assault/Simple
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Suspect/Arrested
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11037 05/26/2000 Neff, Marvin Gray
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September 19,2000

To Whom It May Concern:
During the month of June, 2000,1 was employed as a paralegal by the Law Offices of
Travis L. Bowen, P.C. Travis L. Bowen and Gregory Burdett are attorneys that work for the
same firm. During the same month, I attended a meeting with Marvin Neff and Branson Neff at
the Law Offices of Travis L. Bowen, P.C "Travis L. Bowen attended thefirsthour of the
meeting and then left, and Gregory Burdett attended the final half-hour of the meeting. Marvin
and Branson were trying to come to an agreement about several business dealings and a piece of
property in Corinne, Utah. Aa th<s mating progressed, Branson becamefrustratedand

aggravated to the extent that he paced around the conference room during the negotiations.
Throughout the meeting, Marvin and Branson argued about their various business dealings and
also directed offensive, non-threatening, remarks (such as name calling) at each other. Marvin
remained calm as the remarks were exchanged, but Branson became more and more aggravated.
The meeting ended with no agreement or compromise by the Neffs. Upon walking to the
conference room door, Branson instigated a verbal altercation with Marvin. Bransombecame
more aggravated and I eventually separated him from Marvin to avoid any phyacaTconfact.
Neither brother physically touched each other, however, Branson made several remarks to
Marvin regarding a previous.altercation involving assault. I do not recall exactly what Branson
said to Marvin, although, I know that Marvin felt threatened by Branson's remarks.

Josh Fbukas

oec-4

My wife tfiett came downtothe officefe>seeme carted awaytojaillike a common
cnmfnat What a travesty f

I then grabbed Marv by the shoulder and pulled him up so he could get his feet oir
the floor. We both walked out of the office chest to chest, yelling at each other. When*
we got out in the general office, the secretaries looked aghast. I said^ well I guess I wilf
tell you what this all about. I told them that the reason I left the company was not to
retire, but that I couldn't stand to work with Marvin after I discovered he was stealing
from me. I told them that I had taken it in the shorts, by trying to work something out
that would not destroy the business and now he was reneging on that deal.
I told them that he was a thieving bastard (being used as an adjective,, rather than a
swearword). Marvin stuck his chin out and 3aid,"Hitme! I know you are dying to hit
me!" I told him if he would sign off that he would not get me for assault, I would be glad
to duke it out with himrighthere and now.
He again stuck out his chin and came over chest to chest said hit me, hit me. I
said, sign and motioned to the desk, and you've got it
The Sheriff now came and stood at the corner of our counter and told us to get
awayfromeach other. We then stepped backfromeach other The Sheriff said he was
there on an assault charge. I told him there was not assault, I was just trying to collect my
money, I then said all I did was poke him in the chest with my indexfinger,and as I told
him, I put my indexfingeron Marvin's chest. The Sheriff said that was assault
I said I couldn't believe it The Sheriff then told me I was under arrest and to put
my hands behind my back. I told him there was no need to cuff me, I would go with him
peaceably. He told me that it was the law that he had to cuff me and to put my hands
behind my back. I complied, but was dismayed
The Sherifftold me that I had norightbeing tho*e. I told him that I owned the
property and the building and that I had everyrightto be there, he grabbed me and
ushered me to hi$ car and told me he did not believe me. I told him to check the deeds at
the court house.
I told the Sheriff I could not believe what was going on. As brothers we have had
may arguments over the years and that the company was better fbrit I believe that if in a
partnership there are no debates or conflicts, one of the partners is not needed. I told him
that it was not always me that was the aggressor.
Tins time he owned me money and was reneging on our deal I told him that over
the years we had plenty of conflicts but I had never even thought of calling the police. I
figured ifwe could not handle the problem, we were not worth much.
The Sheriff then told me he had seen this situation a million times and would go
back in the office and see if they would reduce the charge to a domestic squabble and he
would be back and take the cuffs off.
When the Sheriff came back, he told me that Marvin would not budgefromassault
charges and did not want me to be able to come to the office. I told him I could not
believe what was happening and that maybe Marvin really did not have the money to pay
me and was creating a smoke screen to keep mefromapproaching himforthe money at
the office infrontof ABCO personnel
Marvin called by wife when I was in the Sheriff car and started to recite all the
things I had said to him trying to justify what he was doing to me. My wife said, No
Marvin that is not what Branson said to you. He said, how do you know. My wife said
because Branson does not use the * Y"woirt

The following is a chronology of events that took place at ABCO Construction
office on May 25,2000:
These events would not have taken place if Marvin had paid me as per our
previous agreement.
Since thefirstof the year, Marvin has owed me $16,000.00 phis for an insurance
policy I signed ova: to him. Another payment of $52,000.00 was due March 21,2000,
which he has failed to pay.
A few weeks ago, I asked Marvin if he had forgotten me and asked him fbrthe
money. He told me he had to borrow it and did not have it I told him that was bogus; he
had enough money in the hank and to just write me out a check. He told me he would
have to gather up the money. I told him he had three months already to gather up the
money and if he kept delaying payment, he would have to pay me 10% on the money per
month as that was what it was costing me not having the money on March 21st as agreed
upon including the $16,000.00 which had been due forfivemonths.
Last weekend, we all went to California to a nieces' wedding. While there Marvin
took a couple of extra days and visited all Southern California theme parks with his family.
Ifiguredsince he had time and money to spend on himself he ought to have enough
money to pay me.
On the day mentioned, I went down to ABCO office with the intent of collecting
my money. I sat down acrossfromMarvin and we exchanged pleasantries. I then asked if
he were ready to pay me. He said no. I said: How can you treat me like this? Youhave
already cheated me out of 1/4 million and whatever amount you have embezzledfromthe
Company. How can you sit there and tell me you won't pay? You need your ass kicked
right up around your ears. You cheated me out of 20% of the business and cheated my
boys out of having an opportunity to have a piece of the company. J am not going to let
you add insult to injury, you are abusing me - the guy who provided you with the most!
Marvin sat smugly back iniiis chair and said, "I am not going to pay you." I asked
why? He told me I had been saying badtilingsabout him and was trying to destroy him.
I told him I didn't have to tell anyone anything, the neighbors were not dumb.
They could see how he had cheated me and my boys. I told Mary the neighbors had
watched us for 20 years and I was sure they had a pretty good idea of what was going on.
I told him t had not told anyone in the company that he was embezzling, but if he
wasn*t going to pay me, I wanted the books (accounting) of both ABCO and WestCo. He
told me he wasn't going to give me the books and that no one was coming to the office to
look at therm No one was going to look at the books.
I said, then pay me. He just sat there and told me he wasn't going to pay me. I
jumped up and said, the hell you're not You can't do this to me. I went toward him
shaking my indexfingerat him and poked him in the chest to make an explanation mark
on what I had just said.
He tried to get up fast out of his chair and tipped over backwards where he had his
neck laying on the edge of the drawing table, sitting in the chair with his feet off the
ground and with me standing directly in front of his. He could not move in any direction.
Marvin starting yelling to Melanee to call the police,! was hitting hint The door
to the office was open and I yelled to Melanee to come and see that I was NOT hitting
him and that if I was, he would be bloody on the floor.

September 23, 2000
Marvin NefF
2495 N. 7600 W.
Corinne, Utah 84307
Dear Marv,
I am writing this letter in hopes that we can work out our differences. Prior to the
company buyout and property settlement, we did not see eye to eye on a number of issues but we
finally came to an agreement. I am committing myself toriseto a higher level and get along on a
complementary, giving and brotherly manner and I am asking you to do the same. I have been
upset because we have apparently betrayed our trust in each other and it is a shame after so many
great years together. I know I have mispoken and said some regrettable things about you, none
of which should have been said and for this I am very sorry.
I want you to know that I do not wish to perpetrate any physical harm upon you in any
way. I regret expressing myself so vigorously and vocally on April 25, 2000. I should not have
threatened you either verbally or physically. I apologize for any harm I may have caused,
emotionally or physically. Again, some terrible things were said, were spoken in anger and
unfounded. Upon reflection, you repeatedly told me to leave and calm down and I should have
calmly walked out of the office and gone home. I am sorry this incident occurred.
We have always been able to work out our business differences and want to continue to
do so. Perhaps, if we changed our thinkingfrom"what am I not getting" to being grateful for the
blessings we do have, and, "what can I do to help others succeed", it would make a lot of
difference. I am very grateful and appreciative for all the things you have done with me over the
years and know you feel the same way about the things I have done with you. I apologize for
expressing myself the way I have and hope you will accept this apology. I know that time will
heal all wounds and hope that our individual lives will again be close and enjoyable.

Respectfully,

Branson Neff
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Exhibit I

STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
Region 1/Brigham City
9 West Forest Street #275
PO Box 497
BrighamCity, UTS4302
(435) 734-2066

PRIVATE

c:

PLEA IN ABEYANCE REPORT
Date Due: 11-04-05
Sentencing Date: 11-08-05
JUDGE Ben H. Hadfield
Brieham City
(CITY)
Aaron Muir

NAME: Branson Gray Neff
ALIASES: Brans
ADDRESS: 2625 North 7600 West
Corinne, UT 84307
BIRTHDATE: 07-19-1938 AGE: 67

Court Case No.
051100300

First District COURT
Box Elder UTAH
(COUNTY)
IWESTIGATOR

OFFENDER NO. 170051
PROSECUTINGATTY: Amy Hugie
DEFENSE ATTY: Blake Nakamura
MARITAL STATUS: Married

Offense
Violation Of Protective Order, Class A
Misdemeanor; Interfere W/Legal Arrest,
Class B Misdemeanor

Plea
Plea In
Abeyance

Conviction Date
09-27-05

RECOMMEND A TION:
The staff of Adult Probation and Parole respectfully recommends the following additional Plea
In Abeyance terms be imposed and supervised by a private provider:
1.
2'.
3.
4.
5.

Serve 7 days in the Box Elder County Jail.
NoTto possess or have undeFhis control any firearms or dangerous weapons.
Enter and successfully complete domestic violence counseling.
Complete a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment.
Have no contact with the victim, or be within 500 feet of his person or property.

nnr* •* r\f\

6. Choose to either remove all barriers preventing the victim from relocating, or submit to
24 hour GPS tracking through a private provider.
7. Write a letter of apology to be approved by the court, and submitted to the Box Elder
News Journal.

EVALVATB^E ASSESSMENT AND PROBLEM AREAS:
Mr. Neff scored low on The Level of Service Inventory Assessment. The standardized test itself
may not be an appropriate indicator for determining which areas need to be worked on, in order
to minimize risk and avoid future legal problems. There are warning signs with this case
indicative of a tragedy waiting to happen.

OFFENSE:
A.

Plea Agreement: The defendant was originally charged under a different case number
with: L) Aggravated Assault/Domestic Violence, a Second Degree Felony; II.) Assault
Against Peace Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor; III.) Violation* Of Protective Order, a
Class A Misdemeanor; IV.) Interfering With Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor.
These charges, filed under ease no. 051100023 were dismissed, and then re-filed as: I.)
Protective Order Violation, a Class A Misdemeanor; and II.) Interfering With Arrest, a
Class B Misdemeanor.

B.

Factual Summary of the Offense: Officers responded to the report of a citizen dispute
between Branson and Marvin Neft; and that Branson Neff possibly had a gun in his truck.
Dispatch also stated there was a protective order on statewide against Branson Neff. The
petitioner of that protective order was Marvin Neff
Statements made during
investigation of the incident from the brothers were conflicting about what happened.
Marvin Neff said Branson hit him with his truck and attempted to run him over. Branson
Neff said Marvin hit him in the shoulder and ear with his hand, and that he sped away to
avoid being assaulted. Both parties received minor injuria during
fc
fttoffllh
Marvin had a cut on his head in his hairline. His right knee was cut and bleeding, his
pants were- ripped, and his right hand was cut and scratched. These injuries were
sustained when he let go of the vehicle as it was in motion and the subsequent rolling
down the road. He said he did not need medical attention at that time. Branson had a
small cut on his left ear. He also said he did not need medical attention.
The officer asked Mr. Neff if he wanted to pursue assault charges on Marvin. Branson
said he did not want to pursue charges on his brother. The officer told Branson he was
arresting him for a protective order violation. The officer asked him to turn around and
submit to being handcuffed. Branson moved away and said he would come peacefully,
but would not be handcuffed, and that he could take all the officers on. He was told it was
policy that he had to be handcuffed. He stepped over his dog, taking a fighting stance,
and clenched his fists. One officer took his left arm in a twist lock. He flexed and
attempted to pull away. Another reserve deputy secured his right arm as he was placed in
handcuffs. He was escorted safely to jail.
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C.

Defendant's Statement: My version is the true version. Here's what happened I think it
was January 25, 2005. You need to keep in perspective the whole reason this occurred.
Somewhere in 1999 I found that my brother who is in business with me was embezzling
from me. He had been writing checks in the amount of 1000s of dollars from the
corporate funds to his kids When I found this I requested a printout of the checks that he
had written. That printout showed that he had written his kids $63,000 to his kids in the
last couple of years to his kids without my knowledge. To keep this m proper
perspective, you need to understand that in years previous we had given all our kids
money, from the company as directed by our CPA. But we had had some tough problems
and lost a lot of money one year therefore, we hadn't given them any money for a few
years. Now, previous to the time I just mentioned, I saw that in the book that some

checks were written to his kids51 asfed tlffi Wtty Wj ft had llftt feCfeiVei any money.
He said that previously my kids had received more money because it was easier to justify
to the IRS because they were older and now he was just making up the difference. I
accepted that answer, but when 1 looked in the books later, there were more checks to his
kids and from my mental calculation, Marvin's kids had received more money in the last
few years than my kids in total. 1 then asked for the aforementioned accounting of the
books, I have since found upon having an auditor audit the books that this excuse of
Marvin's was a lie. I then told Marvin that I could not stand to work with a guy that was
a liar and a cheat then he told me that he did not feel a bit guilty, because he was so much
smarter than I was so he deserved more money. When he told me that the shit hit the fan.
Through numerous time and negotiations we finally agreed that he would buy me out. In
early 2000,1 went down to collect my payment to the ABCO office. Marvin told me that
he was not going to pay me. I told him that I was not going to accept that, that he
deserved the shit beat out of him. I stood up, and he stood up and backed up and fell
backwards. He started yelling to the secretary that I was beating him up and to call the
cops. I did not beat him up. He was pinned against his drafting table with his feet off the
floor with no purchase to get up. I reached down and grabbed his shoulders and pulled
him up. We went out of his office yelling at each other. The cops came, handcuffed me
and threw me in jail. Marvin claimed he had the right to do that because he owned the

office building. This was in fact incorrect because the building hadflOtt)OT ^M
to him yet; in fact, much of the buyout had not been accomplished.

(111

He put a protective order on me at this time. But he was not afraid of me. This was just a
ruse for him to be able to keep me from using the equipment at ABCO shop as we had
agreed. I went to Court to try and get the protective order off of me and went before
Judge Judkins. He directed Marvin that I could call him and that he was to respond by
providing me with the equipment or tools that I desired or requested. Marvin has failed
to do this although I have requested tools and equipment numerous times both by written
certified mail and by fax. He has never responded by furnishing the equipment and tools
or by giving me reason for not doing so. Marvin protested to Judge Judkins that I could
caU him. But Judge Judkins told him that I could not hurt him by calling therefore I
could. Marvin took this to mean that the Judge told him that I could hurt him. Then
upon arriving home, he called me. He wanted to make certain that I understood that he
could "clock" me any time he wanted. Showing me that the only reason that he had a
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protective order on me was so that he would not have to let me come to the shop and use
tools and/or equipment, and/or associate with the employees of ABCO.
In the summer of 2000,1 did not receive a tax notice for my farm or my home. My wife
went to the County Recorder to find out why. She found at the recorders office that my
farm and my home were no longer in my name, but that Marvin had recorded them in the
name of an entity that he owned. I wrote him a letter, in fact, numerous letters, and asked
that he take care of this matter, thinking maybe it may have been a mistake, rather than a
malicious act. But his response was in a meeting on 7600 West as we walked in the
morning and discussed this matter was for me to "get fucked". He would not respond to
numerous letters that are on record concerning this matter,
I then in the latter part of 2001 went to the hospital for a surgery to replace my aortic
valve. Marvin thought that I was going to die and he could get away with everything. He
wrote my wife a letter telling her that he was dropping my insurance. At the time she
was looking at a $100,000 bill for my surgery. My deal with Marvin was that he would
pay for my medical insurance until I became age 65 because I have diabetes and I knew
that I could not get insurance anywhere else. Marvin owed me thousands of dollars and
my wife called him and asked him to not do away with the insurance. He said that he had
paid too much money for insurance and that he wasn't paying any more. She asked him
to pay for the insurance from the money that he owed us but he refused to. My insurance
was subsequently dropped and I went bare until I became eligible for Medicare. The
insurance did pay for my heart surgery, but subsequent costs I had to handle on my own.
There were numerous aspects of our agreement that had not been consummated and I
could not get Marvin or the attorney Travis Bowen that was handling the buyout to
respond to numerous letters and pleadings to get this work done. I even went to our
church leaders and asked them to try and get us together to resolve this matter. They
refused to do this. I don't really know why, but I think Marvin browbeat them to the
point that they were afraid to do anything.
I then had no alternative but to launch a lawsuit against Marvin to recover all ttuft 1$ jftd
taken from me When 1 Came home k m the hospital my wife was being terrorized by
Marvir, He had written her and told her that he was dropping the insurant Se had her
house, he had her farm, and he had all the money that was due me for my work that was
due me for the work over the last 30 years. I hired attorney Ben Hathaway to try and take
care of this matter, but he was snowed under by Marv, and I had to fire him. I then
engaged the services of Jim Magleby to pursue this matter for me and try and recover
what is rightfully mine. To date we have recovered my home, about four months ago I
recovered most of my farm. Marvin had agreed to sign my water over to me but it has
not taken place yet, and we were still in litigation over the money he owes me. Marvin
has felt the pressure of the community because of his actions. And under this backdrop
of information the following incident occurred, I think on January 26, 2005.
It was my practice to come home late at night for the last 25 years to drive past my home,
past Marvin's home, past the ABCO office, and swing around past the south end of 7600
west where my lights could sweep the ABCO shop and yard to see if there was any
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unusual activity, tlL_. *drive home. Marvin knew this was my practice. It agitated him
that this was my practice, and that I could drive by and observe what he was doing. On
this particular night, I drove past, not to observe Marvin, but to see if anybody had moved
into the trailer home that had been put on property that had been ABCO property at the
end of 7600 West, that had recently been sold to someone. When I swung around the 360
degrees in order to return home, a vehicle was coming down 2400 North, and I had to
wait for it to pass. I could not tell who this was because all I could see was their lights
but it turned out to be my neighbor Maurice Carter, who is also Marvin's neighbor, who
lives on the east side of 7600 West between Marv's house and mine. When he passed a
considerable distance I then started north on 7600 West. As I passed the ABCO shop and
approached Marvin's house, I saw an image of a human being standing in the middle of
the road. I slowed down not being able to determine who it was and thinking lU^VbC tlM
someone was maybe drunk because they were not moving as I approached them. I
slowed down to a crawl, and as I crept past, at about two feet away I saw that the person
in question was Marvin. I then continued to move forward and he started to wave his
arms and was yelling. I thought that maybe he was in some kind of emergency and might
need my help. I therefore, stopped and backed up. I then rolled down my window and
said "What do you need?" and he said, " You don't need to keep driving by here we've
moved.11 meaning that ABCO construction had moved from that location over to Perry.
He then started accusing me of trying to kill his wife and kids. I told him that I liked his
wife and kids, I even liked him but I didn't like what he was doing trying to steal what
was mine.*11 then told him that he was a cheat, a thief, an embezzler, a liar, and a Judas.
Upon telling him that he was a Judas, he swung with his right fist, with him standing like
the police do behind the front door so that I could not see it coming. It hit me with full
force on my ear, and split my ear so it bled. However, I did not know it was bleeding at
the time. He then took a second swing at me. I could not move because I was tethered in
my seat by my seatbelt. I was able to move just so that the swing hit me in the shoulder
instead of my head. He then took a third swing, and by this time I had freed my left aim
from against the door and parried the blow and he grabbed my steering wheel with his
right hand. I told him "Enough of this, I'm out of here" and took off up the road. He
kept trying to pull me off to the side of the road and I was pulling for all I was worth to
keep the truck in the road, and with me trying to pull the steering wheel from him, and
with the purchase required to Stay Oil the road pulling a p & t i l , ffff tt f l M A&M
on the accelerator. We started going a speed that was now dangerous for him to let go.
He yelled out to me as I approached my driveway "You're going to kill me,
Brans...Stop." I stopped. He looked over and dropped off. I drove in my driveway. It
was a dark night with no moon or stars. I thought he might be hurt and I better go check.
I then drove out the north end of my driveway and swung around on 7600 West going
south, and saw Marvin walking down the road. I then pulled into the south end of my
driveway and went into my house.
I went in the house and greeted my wife. She said with great anxiety "What has
happened? You're bleeding all down the side of you head". She brought a tissue and
wiped the Slood off my ear and head. Apparently the blow that Marvin hit me with was
with enough force to split my ear open. I then told my wife that my attorney had told me
that Marvin would break under the pressure of this lawsuit because it was not going well
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for him. I then called Mr. Magleby and left a message on his answering service. After
hanging up the phone the doorbell rang. I told my wife not to answer it because it is
probably Marv and we are not pursuing this. The doorbell kept linging incessantly. 1
told my wife to go see if it really was Marv. She said she could not because we had a
snowman hanging on the door, which covered the peephole. I then went upstairs to look
out the upstairs window to see what I could observe. To my surprise, there was one
sheriffs vehicle parked in my driveway and two others coming in each end of my
driveway with their lights off. The phone then rang and asked if I was Mr. Neff and I
said "Yes". The person calling infomied me that they were the Box Elder County
Sheriffs office, that officers were at my door, and that I was required to answer my door

and let them in. I answered the door and officer Blanchard introduced himself, and asW
me if I had a protective order on me. I said "yes". He said we want to talk to you about
that may we come in?" I opened the door and he and a couple other officers came in. I
ushered them into our kitchen and introduced them to my wife. I told them the story that
I have just described. I asked them why they were there because I had not called them.
They said that Marvin had called them and that they were going to arrest me. I couldn't
believe that they were arresting me because I felt that I was the victim, not the
perpetrator. I told them that I would go peaceably but please don't put the cuffs on me.
They told me that it was the law, I told them that it was not the law and that they didn't
need to. I stood up and walked behind my table and an officer from each side jumped on
me. I yielded, and they put the cuffs on me.
I could not figure out why they were hauling me to jail, I had not done anything wrong
as far as they were concerned. I later found out that Marvin was accusing me of trying to
run him down with my truck. This is a complete, fabricated lie. My attorney has since
deposed and interrogated in pre-trial hearings and during these three different times, his
story has been different each time. According to Marvin's stories, this could not have
happened the way he has portrayed it. I felt completely confident that no jury would
convict me of aggravated assault because it did not happen. I was the victim of an assault
from Marvin.
I believe that this was a complete frame by Marvin. He made this part of the civil suit in
an effort to ingratiate himself in the civil matter, and in an effort to cost me more money.
Upon my launching this lawsuit, Marvin came to my office in Brigham City and told me
that I couldn't beat him in a lawsuit because he had all the money. I told him that I had
been broke* before and that there was no way that he was going to get away with what he
was doing.' He had been successful in getting the State to do his bidding without him put
in a dime in attorney fees and it has cost me megabucks to defend myself.
C

Custody Status: Mr. Neff was attested on January 27, 2005. He posted bail a few hours
later.

CRIMINAL HISTORY:
A.

Juvenile Record: None.
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B.

Adult Record:

Til innn
5-17-JXX)

^ f °'
UHP

°ffeme
Resisting/Interfering with
Arrest, Failure to Comply,
Carrying Concealed Weapon

Disposition
Convicted of Disorderly
Conduct 7-2-2001

01 -27-2005

BESO

Aggravated Assault, Threat
Against Life/Property,
Interfering W/Arresting
Officer, Protective Order
Violation

Instant offense

As early as the 1970s he has shown a propensity to use the threat of violence in order to enforce
his own style of justice. According to a Box Elder Count}' Sheriffs Sergeant, an incident
occurred when as a deputy serving civil papers, he first encountered Branson Neff. The then
deputy introduced himself and stated his purpose. At that time Mr. Neff went to the back of the
barn and retrieved a rifle. The deputy left at that point without violence. Later another deputy
attempted to serve civil papers on Mr. Neff. Mr. Neff had been working with a welding torch
and reportedly grabbed the deputy by his shirt and tie stating, "How would you like to be
burned?" The confrontation ended when the deputy deployed his sidearm in response with no
shots fired.
The incident listed on his adult record was also researched. The trooper who initially pulled Mr.
Neff over in Davis County no longer works for the Utah Highway Patrol. However, there is at
least one person who remembers the incident and Mr. Neff vividly. This witness with the UHP
states that the patrol vehicle video recording clearly shows Mr. Neffunloading the 357 magnum
pistol that he had brandished after failing to comply with the trooper's instructions. According to
the witness, this was done in an attempt to conceal the fact that the firearm was loaded. The case

was drawn out in the legal system until Ml. Mpleadtoa b e t ekge of ttWerly CotuW
The firearm was then returned to Mr. Neff
These incidents could have each ended with deadly consequences. They indicate a pattern of
disregard for law enforcement and disrespect for the responsible use of firearms.
C.

Pending Cases: None

D.

Gang Affiliation:' None

E.

Probation/Parole History: None
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VICTIMIMFA CTSTA TEMENTAND RESTITUTIONnS
that h S famib
Vmg
a i l t te for l h e
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^ bCen hhim
" Cway
° n S t that
five
years.
He
believes that TBranson is intent
on;destroying
any
is possible »«*
"with
guns
vehicles
^ Z ^
° t l " ™ - " k H e W0Uld l l k e to s e e the most string** reqmrements posstb
enforced as conditions of probation, including a lengthy jail sentence. He reports that he has
attempted to sell his property in order to move away from his brother but was foiled when
Branson tiled a "Us pendans" preventing the sale. Marvin would like Branson to either buy the
house for $335,000, or lift the lis pendans.

Marvin reports that he has incurred more than $800 in medical expenses related to the incident.
He does not know how to estimate the future expenses as he has developed back related
problems. He also feels that about $50,000 would help alleviate the mental anguish he has
experienced due to the slander and threatsfromhis brother.
DEFENDANTS LIFE HISTORY AND CURRENT LIVING SITUA TION:
Branson Neff was born July 19, 1938 in Salt Lake City, Utah. He remembers growing up
helping his father work on the ranch. He helped distribute produce to surrounding communities.
He claims that his mother was the dearest woman, a Saint, and the finest musician. He currently
lives with his wife of 43 years in Corinne.
EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENTAND FINANCIAL INFORMATION:
Mr. Neff has accomplished a lot in his life. He graduated from Olympus High School and
attended the University Of Utah. When he ran out of money he got a job as an apprentice
concrete worker. He then went on a mission for the LDS church to Western Canada, and then
took a job with Neff Engineering, which is relative owned. His sister then talked him into going
to Provo to attend BYU. While there he majored in Zoology and minored in Botany. He also
has a schoolteacher's certificate. While at BYU he bid on a job and secured it. He began his own
construction company as AB Neff And Sons. He was the owner from 1962 to 1977, when he

merged, and his company became ABCO Construction, which he ran with his brother, who is the
victim noted in this case. That partnership dissolved when Branson sold out his portion of the
business to his brother, in the year 2000. Branson now states that he spends his time working the
stock market.
Branson reports current monthly income and expenses of about $15,000 a month.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE HISTORY:
The defendant denies ever using substances. There is no evidence that would contradict this
assertion.

PageS

Respectfully submitted,

Approved:

Aaron Muir, INVESTIGATOR

Sm Scott, SUPERVISOR
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Exhibit J

&t 1 6 9 3 ? 8 Bfc 8 0 4 - Po 5 1 2
Date iMol-2002 12:80PH fee ttlW
luftan Adaas - Filed By Ep

Box E l d e r - C o - , CJT
For TRAVIS BOWEK

Prepared by and Return Recorded Deed To:
Law Office pFTravis Bowen PC
P.O.Box 11637
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0637

Mail Tax Notice Tot
Sandra CNcff
2625 North 7600 West
Conine, Utah $4307

Property Identified As:
Property Located At

Personal Residence
2625 North 7600 West
Conine, Utah 84307
QUTT-CLAIMDEED

For Value Received, Marvin G. Neff, Operating Manager of Steel water Investments, LP.,
General Partner, hereinafter called the Grantor hereby quitclaims unto Sandra C. NefF, hereinafter
called die Grantee, the following premises, in the County of Box Elder, State of Utah to-wit:
Beginning at a point on the West line of 7600 West Street, said point being North
1156.48 feet and West 33.00 feet &om the Southeast Corner of Section 32, Township
10 North, Range 3 West, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence
West 20L76 feet; thence North l°5r48 H East 202.95 feet; thence East 195,16 feet to
the West line of 7600 West Street; ihence South along said West line 202.87 feet to
the point of beginning. Contains 0.924 acres.
Tax/Parcel No: 04-075-0011
To have and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and the
Grantee's assigns forever.
Dated this JJL

4>y of M/JeTts^

• 2<>_5L.

}

a/u»^-i

G.Weff,Operatim
Steehbater Investments, L.P.,

Ent 1 6 9 3 9 8 Bk 8 0 + Po 5 1 3

STATE OF

ss.
COUNTY OF

2££

)

, 2 0 ^ / , before me, a Notary Public in and for
On this J_ day of
^ f^jjf
G. Nef£ Operating Manager known to me to be the person
said State, personally appe
whose name is subscribed to the wit! in instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was
executed.

"NU'IARY PUBLIC*"
KATHRVN L BYBEE
Sjtt Lake City. Ulal> 84114
My Commission e x p f o
Oec*mber £5, gQ03

_. .STATE OF m m r

j

Exhibit K

€nt X 6 9 9 2 T 2 Bk B O S PQ B&¥
Dst* 3Q-M-2002 L-44PH F*e*i2D,00
Lufinnftda&s- Filsd By m
B o x Eld&r
C a - » UT

Send Recorded Deed To:

f o r TraMIS L B0W6H

/ Law Office of Travis L. Bowen, P.C.
P.O. Box 11637
Salt Lake City, VT 84147-0637

Mail Tax Notice To:
Sandra C.Neff
2625 North 7600 West
Corjnne, Utah 84307

Property Identified As:
Property Located At:

Dairy Farm
2625 NortL7600 West
Corinne, Utah 84307
QUIT-CLAIM DEED

For Value Received, Steelwater Investments, L.P., hereinafter called the Grantor, hereby
quitclaims unto Sandra C. Neff, hereinafter called the Grantee, the following premises, in the
County of Box Elder, State of Utah to-wit:

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A"

To have and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and
the Grantee's assigns foisver.

Dated Us^f^(hvQfl^^^mJ^

, 20^£r,

y
Marvin G,
G. Neff, Co-Operating Mtfnaj
of Steel Water Management, L.C.,
Partner

Ent 1 6 9 9 3 2 6k 8 0 S Pq 0 9 0 u

STATE OF
COUNTY OF

jSjL **y

On thisB< y . day of (f ^^AjQ^LlM!/[
^S^JMML ,20 CV , before me, a Notary Public in and
for said State,
pe&onally
appeared,
5, peftonally appeared, Marvin
Marvin G.
G. Neff,
N Co-Operating Manager of Steel Water
Management, LX.C.,General Partner, known to me to be die person whose name is subscribed to
the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was executed.
NOTARY PUBLIC

KATHRYN L. BYBEE
160 EftSt 300 South
Salt UKeCtty, Utah 64114
My CommBSlon GxpCrto
December 25,2003

STATE OF UTAH

€nt 1 6 9 V 3 2 Bk 8 0 S P§ 8 9 1

—

,

EXHIBIT "A" - p.l of 2

PARCEL C: (TAX PARCEL NO. 04-075-0010 CORRECTION DESCRIPTION): Beginning on
the West line of 7600 West Street at a point 1654.80 feet North along the section line and 33.00
feet West from the Southeast Corner of Section 32, T10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence
West 1308.17 feet to fence line; thence the following four courses along fence lines: (1) N
00o02,24,r W 342.46 feet, (2) S 89°27,41" E 847.72 feet, <3) S 89°03,47" E 460.79 feet to the
West line of 7600 West Street, (4) South 326.95 feet along said West line of 7600 West Street to
the point of beginning. Containing 10.08 acres.

oA-g'TiS'-cxaaq cios*>v& &&<*-, e>vec.<-/vp tarm-pao/tec s .
PARCEL D: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning at a point 16S4.80 feet North along the section
lirte and 1341.17 feet West from the Southeast Corner of Section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M
and running thence the following Ten courses along fence lines: (1) S 00°26'42 W 72.74 feet, (2)
S 25*24*17" W219.96 feet, (3) S 00°00'53" E 21128 feet, (4)N M'mr
W 449.19 feet, (5) S
,
01 ° 14'40" W 366.58 feet, (6) S O0°18'59" W 775.06 feet, (7) N 89°40 2l" W 586.41 feet, (8) N
00°00'56tt W 1962.10 feet, (9) S 89°23'40" E 1134.31 feet (10) S 00°02'24" E 342.46 feet to the
point of beginning. Containing36.il acres.
PARCEL E: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning at a point 2475.16 feet N 89°40'2r W along
the section line and 33.00 feetN 00°00'56 W from the Southeast Corner of Section 32, T 10 N,
R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence the following four courses along fence lines: (1) TJ
89o4021M W 1017.25 feet, (2) N 0O°08M37" W 1967.96 feet, (3) S 89°20'44" E 1021.69 feet, (4)
S 00°W56" E 1962.10 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 45.99 acres.
PARCEL F: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning on the West line of 7600 West Street at a point
1654.80 feet North along the section line and 33.00 feet West from the Southeast corner of
Section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence West 1308.17 feet; thence the following
six courses along fence lines: <1) S 00°26,42" W 72.74 feet, (2) 25024'17M W 219.96 feet, (3) S
00QWSS* E 211.28 feet, (A)VM9IV3TWU9.19 feet, (5) sTff° 14*40" W 366.58 feet, (6) S
00°I8'59" E 775.06 feet; thence S 89o40,21*' E 795.78 feet, thence N 02o20'26" W 240.51 feet;
thence N24 0 42'14" E 91.43 feet; thence N 39D06'19" E 48.92 feet; thence N 62°57,36" E 109.14
feet; thence N"$2°32'05" E 86~.71 feet; thence North 323.62 feet; thence East 189.96 feet; thence
N 07°29,09n E270.91 feet; thence N 71 °42*31" E 298.41 feet; thence N 85°09'46" E 69.82 feet;
thence N 11 °23,40" E 165.78 feet; thence N 76<J4r44" E 212.61 feet to the West line of 7600
West Street, thence North 290.17 Teet along said West line to the point of beginning. Containing
41.64 acres.

-4-

i

L

V /

Ent 1 6 * 9 3 2 BK SOS Pg 8 9 2
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PARCEL G: (ABPLANALP SURVEY): Beginning on the West line of 7600 West Street at a
point 990.71 feet North along the section line and 33.00 feet West from the Southeast Comer of
Section 32, T10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence West 152.17 feet; thence S, 51 °28'58"
W 849.75 feet; thence North 323.62 feet; thence East 1*9.96 feet; thence N 07°29'09" E 270.91
feet; thence N 71 °42*31" E 298.11 feet; thence N 85o09'46" E 69.82feet;tiienceS 88o00'23" E
50.96 feet; thence N 88 °2TSt" E 188.80 feet to the West line of 7600 West Street; thence South
165,77 feet along said West line to the point of beginning^ontaining 4.95 acres.

-5-

En\ 1 6 9 9 3 2 L BV 8 0 S PQ 8 8 9
Dat* 30-Jul-2002 1:44PM Fee't20.Q0
LuAnn Adafis - Filed By 2m
BOK E l d e r d o * ,
UT
For TKflVJS L B0IO

Send Recorded Deed Tat
/ Law Office of Travis L~ Bowen, P.C.
P.O. Box 11637
Salt Lake City, UT $4547-063?
Mail Tax Notice T o :
Sandra C. Neff
2625 North 7600 Wear
CorinnetUtah 84307

Property Identified As:
Property-Located At:

Dairy Farm
2625 North 7600 West
Corinne, Utah 84307
QUIT-CLAIM DEED

Por Value Received, Steeiwater Investments, UP., hereinafter called the Grantor, hereby
quitclaims unto Sandra C. Neflf, hereinafter called the Grantee, the following premises, in the'
County of Box Elder, State of Utah to-wit:

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT *A"

To have and to hold the said premises, Tvith their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and
the Grantee's assigns forever.
Dated this , ^ / ^ d a y of^^O^ftd^C

»20£g-.

Marvin G. Neff, Co-Operating Mdiiagfl
of Steel Water Management, L-C, Ger
Partner

-2-

Ent 1 6 ^ 9 3 2 Bk S O S Pg 8 9 0

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
is A / day of (^AmJify
,20 0/ before me, a Notary Public in and
for said State
te, personally
'sonally appeared, Marvin G. Neff, Co-Ope
Co-Operating Manager of Steel Water
Management, LX,C.,General Partner, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to
the wiihin instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was executed.
NOTARY PUBMC

KATHBYN L. BYBEE
160 £*5* 300 South
8aK Lake City Utah 841 f 4
My Cotmrassfoft Expires
Dee«mb*r25,20O3
STATE O F UTAH

Quit-Claim Deed

•2-
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EXHIBIT "A"-p.l of 2

\

C?

PARCEL C: (TAX PARCEL NO. 04-075-0010 CORRECTION DESCRIPTION): Beginning oa
the West line of 7600 West Street at a point 1654.80 feet North along the section line and 33.00
feet West from the Southeast Comer of Section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence
West 1308.17 feet to fence line; thence the following four courses along fence lines: (1) N
00*0274" W 342.46 feet, (2) S 89°27*4P E 847.72 feet, (3) S 89°03'47" E 460.79 feet to the
West line of 7600 West Street, (4) South 326.95 feet along said West line of 7600 West Street to
the point of beginning. Containing 10.08 acres.
g>4-itf7iS'-o<36«t
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BWolL, 6VSC Lfip t* rrH-fttfMteC E.

PARCEL D:.(NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning at a point 1654.80 feet North along the section
line and 1341.17 feet Westfromthe Southeast Corner of Section 32, T 10 N, R3 W, SLB&M
and running thence the following Ten courses along fence lines: (I) S 00o26*42 W 72.74 feet, (2)
S 25°24'17" W219.96 feet, (3) S 00°00'53"_E 211.28 feet, (4) N 88018'37" W 449.19 feet, (5) S
01°14'40" W 366.58 feet, (6) S 00°18'59" W 775.06feet,(7)N 89o40,2tM W 586.41 feet, (8)N
00°00'56" Wl962Jj0^et, (9) S 89*23'40" E 1134.31 feet (10) S 00o02'24" E 342.46 feet to the
point of beginning. Containing 36.11 acres.
^
PARCEL E: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning at a point 2475.16 feet N 89°40,2I" W along
the section line and 33.00 feet N 00*00'56 W from the Southeast Comer of Section 32, T 10 N,
R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence the following four courses along fence lines: (1) N
89°40'2r W 1017.25 feet, (2) N 00o08M37" W 1967.96 feet,,(3) S 8902p,44H E 1021.69 feet, (A)
n
S 00o00'56n E 1962.10feettothe point of beginning. Cor^^45.9f
bais.
PARCEL F: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning on the West line of 7600 West Street at a point
1654.80 feet North along the section line and 33.00 feet West from the Southeast comer of
Section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence West 1308.17 feet; thence the following
six courses along fence lines: (1) S 00°26,42" W 72.74 feet, (2f25°24'l 7" W 219.96 feet, (3) S
WOO^" E 211.28 feet, (4) N 88°i8^37M W 449.19 feet, (5) SoT° 14'40" W 366.58 feet, (6) S
WWSy E 775.06 feet; thence S 89B40,21" E 795.78 feet; thenceN 02°20,26M W 240.51 feet;
thence N 24°42'14" E 91.43 feet; thence N 39t>06'19M E 48.92 feet; thence N 62°57,36tt E 109.14
feet; thence N"82°32i05n E 86~.71feet;thence North 323.62 feet; thence East 189.96 feet; foence
N 07o29'09" E 270.91feet;thenceN 71 0 42'3r E 298.41feet;thenceN 85p09'46" E 69.82 feet
thence N llo23'40" E 165.78feet;thence N 76°41,44H2 212.61 feet to the West line of 7600
West Street thence North 290.17 feet along said West line to the point of beginning. Containing
41.64 acres.
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PARCEL G: (ABPLANALP SURVEY): Beginning on the West line of 7600 West Street at a
pohn 990.71 feet North along the section line and 33.00 feet Westfromthe Southeast Corner of
feet; thoice N 71 M2'31" E 298.11 feet; thence K 85 °09,46" E 69.82 feet; thence S 88 °00'23" E
50.96 ^eet; thence N 88 6 2758 n E 188.80 feet to the West line of 7600 West Street; thence South
165.77 feet along said West line to the point of beginning. Containing 4.95 acres.

Exhibit L

Ent 1 7 4 9 1 3 Bk 8 2 0 Fc 5 5 0
Dsi* 2Mov-2Q02 9i4QAH P<* *13J30

Return Recorded Deed To:
Marvin G. Neff
2495 North 7600 West
Corinne, Utah 84307
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Mail Tax Notice To:
Backcountry Investments, LJP.
2495 North 7600 West
Corinne, Utah 84307

- hlG[K&{ ^ ^ O M p ^ ? ^

QUIT-CLAIM DEED

_^

c H * * * ^ M/vo^

ForValue Received, Steelwater Investments, LP., hereinafter caUedthe Grantor, hereby quitclaims
unto Backcountry Investments, LP., hereinafter called the Grantee, the followingpremises, in the County
of Box Elder, State of Utah to-wifc
Beginning at a point 33,00 feet N 89 degrees 40* 21" W from the Southeasteorner
of section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M thence N 89 degrees 40r21" W 1059.97
feet along the South line of said section 32; thence North 33*00 feet; thence N 02
degrees 20'26" W 240.51 feet; thence N 24 degrees 42r14" E 91.43 feet; thence
N 39 degrees 06r19" E 48.92 feet; thence N 62 degrees 57f36" E 109*14 feet;
thence N 82 degrees 32f05" E 86,71 feet; thence N 51 degrees 28*58" E 849.75
ft; thence East 15167 ft. to said West line of 7600 West Street; thence South
990.52 feet along said West line to the South line of said section 32; thence S 89
degrees 40,21!r E 33.00 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 16.88 acres,
more or less, and 6 lots*
Excluding therefrom the following described property:
Beginning at a point in the West line of 7600 West Street, said point being North
606.18 feet and West 33.00 feet from the Southeast corner of section 32, Township
10 North, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence
West 170.00 feet; thence North 233.00 feet; thence East 170.00 feet to the West
line of 7600 West Street; thence South along said West line 233.00 feet to the
point of beginning.
To have and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and the
Grantee's assigns forever.
Dated t h i s ^ r day of A f e v ^ a ^ ^

20 # 2 . .
STEELWATER INVESTMENTS, L.P.

Marviiu}. NefE Manager

G* Wj

Ent 1 7 4 9 1 3 8k 8 2 0 Pq S 5 1

STATE OF
COUNTY OF

J

^/aU^

: ss.

J

Onthis ftflky of ^ ^ ^ ^
, 20^^7beforeme, aNotary Public inandfor
said State, personally appeared Marvin G. Neff, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed
to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was executed.

2-KATIE HANSEN

liormmuc'Simdunif
72t HORSESHOE OR
R1CHRELD.UTAH84701 ,
COMfciEXP^3-30-2004

totaiy Public

tnt 174-913 8k 8 2 0 Pc 5 5 0
Date 26-t)ov-2002 VAm

Fee- $13^8

ituni Recorded Deed To:
Marvin G. Ncff
2495 North 7600 West
Corinne, Utah 84307

O A ~CT[&22B±?L

ul Tax Notice To:

_

Backcountry Investments* LP.
2495 North 7600 West
Corinne, Utah S4307

LBaM^ D€&c.
N 6 r

C / U

- MoTftPv/

QUIT-CLAIM DEED

T^ce^

^"
MCcvtpt£TG-

_ ^ cM*&& M A O £

For Value Received, Steelwater Investments. UP., hereinafter calledthe Grantor, hereby quitclaims
o Backcountry Investments, LP.5 hereinafter calledthe Grantee, the Mowing premises, in the County
3ox Elder, State of Utah to-wit:
Beginning at a point 33.00 feet N 89 degrees 40v! 21" Wfrom the Southeast corner
of section 32, T10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M thence N 89 degrees 40f21fr W 1059.97
feet along the South line of said section 32; thence North 33.00 feet; thence N 02
degrees 20f26" W 240.51 feet; thence N 24 degrees 42f 14" E 91.43 feet; thence
N 39 degrees 06,19" E 48.92 feet; thence N 62 degrees 57f36" E 109.14 feet;
thence N 82 degrees 32f05" E 86.71 feet; thence N 51 degrees 28,58" E 849.75
ft; thence East 152.67 ft. to said West line of 7600 West Street; thence South
990.52 feet along said West line to the South line of said section 32; thence S 89
xfeggjBe#B31,f E 33*00 fccHo the point of beginning. Containing 16.88 acres,
more or less, and 6 lots.
Excluding therefrom the following described property:
Beginning at a point in the West line of 7600 West Street, said point being North
606.18 feet and West 33.00 feet from the Southeast corner ofsection 32, Township
10 North, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence
West 170.00 feet; thence North 233.00 feet; thence East 170.00 feet to the West
line of 7600 West Street; thence South along said West line 233.00 feet to the
point of beginning.
To have and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and the
itee's assigns forever.
Dated this^ST day of A f c V f e t t ^ u ^

20^^.

STEELWATER INVESTMENTS, L.P.

MarvirlG. Nef£ Manager

Ent 1 7 4 - 9 1 3 3k 8 2 0 Pq S S I

STATE OF

/Jj/ks&~~.

^Uf/aJ^

COUNTY OF _Q

J
: ss.

J

On this
, 20 Q& Tbeforeme, aNotary Public inandfor
said State, personally appeared Marvin G. Neff, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed
to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was executed.

R. KATIE HANSEN

wurwsmtm

Notary Public

™ HORSESHOE DR
RfCHRElD. UTAH 84701
_COMM. EXP 3-30-2004 i
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Exhibit M

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER

BRANSON G.NEFF,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
xr

V.

MARVIN G. NEFF, TRAVIS L. BOWEN,
ESQ., TRAVIS L. BOWEN, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation, ABCO
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
corporation, and WESTCO, an unregistered
partnership between BRANSON G. NEFF
and MARVIN G. NEFF,

Case No. 030100275
Judge Gordon J. Low

Defendants.

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Marvin NefFs (herein,
"Defendant5') (1) Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Fraudulent
Concealment, and Fraudulent Non-Disclosure Claims; (2) Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Malicious Prosecution, Defamation/False Light Invasion of Privacy, and Slander of
Title Claims; (3) Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Denial of Defendant's Motion in Limine
and Motion to Find the Contract Binding on the Parties; (4) Defendant's Brief Requesting
Clarification on the Order Regarding Partial Summary Judgment on the Statute of Limitations to
Foreclose All Claims to Aspen Springs or Disproportionate Family Payments; (5) Defendant's
Motion Regarding Violation of Civil Protective Order; (6) Plaintiffs Motion for Civil Contempt
Against Defendant; and (7) Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Produced by
Plaintiffs Experts Regarding Any Appraised Valuations of ABCO, Inc., Aspen Springs, LLC,
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Fair West, Lincoln or other Properties Using Data After December 13, 1999. In preparation of
its decision, the Court has reviewed the parties' memoranda, attachments and/or exhibits, and the
applicable case law and statutory provisions. Additionally, oral arguments were held on
November 15, 2006 and November 30, 2006.
ANALYSIS
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is never used to determine the
facts, but only to ascertain whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute. Hill ex rel
Fogel v. Grand Cent, Inc., 744 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970). Or, to put it another way, summary
judgment is precluded not "simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a
material fact is genuinely controverted." Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391
(Utah 1980). Further, doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact properly presented, or the
nature of inferences to be drawnfromthe facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to the
party opposing the summary judgment. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983).
Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Fraud Fraudulent
Concealment and Fraudulent Non-Disclosure Claims
In the first motion, Defendant claims that the undisputed material facts show that summary
judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff did not rely on Defendant during the dissolution of the
parties' partnership, citing Rawson v. Conoyer, 2001 UT 24. To Defendant, each of the fraud
claims are not properly supported with sufficiently supported facts, given Plaintiffs various
deposition statements. Defendant then argues that ABCO's records and multiple valuations of
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ABCO's value were available to Plaintiff and that in light thereof, Plaintiff does not have a basis
to assertfraudinto these areas. Relying upon Burke, v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1982),
Defendant states that the parties' Property Settlement Agreement and subsequent dissolution
agreements werefreefromfraudbecause they were entered into at arms length after lengthy
negotiations and that even if not all aspects of the parties' dealing were disclosed, access to the
accounting records were uninhibited. Defendant purports that Plaintiff asserted fraud claims are
supported with bald statements or improper opinion evidence and that Plaintiff received more than
he bargained for in light of the available accounting.
Responding, Plaintiff argues that the Court has repeatedly ruled that there are disputed
issues of fact and that attorneys fees are appropriate for responding to the repeated summary
judgment motions. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's statute of limitations arguments have been
briefed, heard, considered and rejected and that the arguments are moreover illogical because in
essence Defendant asserts that his known questionable actions should have put Plaintiff on notice
and act as a bar for all other claims of breach of fiduciary duty,fraud,fraudulentconcealment and
fraudulent non-disclosure claims. To Plaintiff, Defendant's arguments contain disputed issues of
material facts in light of the evidence already submitted to the court and Plaintiffs understanding
of the Property Settlement document. Next, Plaintiff states that the two brothers had a
confidential relationship and that Defendant's purported silence on various material facts
constituted afraud,under the disputed facts and in accordance with Onglntl (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). Then, specifically responding to Defendant's reliance
arguments, Plaintiff states that in light of Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App
1990), whether Defendant's statements were his opinions or affirmative representations are
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question facts for the jury, and that whether Plaintiff was reasonable in relying upon the asserted
statements is also a question for the jury, citing Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d
1060 (Utah 1996). Plaintiff also states that whether he had access to ABCO's books and records
is a disputed issue of fact and that Plaintiffs affidavit and deposition sufficiently disputes
Defendant's contention that access was available through certain ABCO employees. Lastly,
Plaintiff states that Defendant's actions caused various damages to Plaintiff, in additional to
whether Branson received payment for a 50% share of ABCO.
In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proving a prima
facia case with clear and convincing evidence and that his failure to do so supports a dismissal or
summary judgment order. Specifically, Defendant states that Plaintiff has failed to show what
material information Defendant failed to disclose, or that Defendant represented a value of the
business which was different from the actual value, or that any of the accounting books (now
open) support a different value than the value given to Plaintiff. Defendant further argues that the
Plaintiffs knowledge of the value of ABCO at the time the parties initially sought dissolution is
undisputed and that Plaintiffs contention that he wanted to "wait and see" if the value of ABCO
increased after the dissolution or check on ABCO's value after he agreed to a dissolution
agreement simply supports Defendant's position that the statute of limitations should restrict these
claims because they were known prior to October 29, 1999. To Defendant, statements as to
value do not ordinarily constitute fraud, as they are regarded as mere expressions of opinion and
when asserted, must be supported by "substantial evidence," based on Wright v. Westside
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 513 (Utah App 1990). Moreover, Defendant states that Plaintiff has
failed to show that ABCO was wrongly valued in light of any facts or accounting or that he made
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any attempts to look at the accounting records which were alleged not accessible. Absent any
proof of damages or injury, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs fraud and breach offiduciaryduty
claims are moot.
A.

Previous Court Rulings

Addressing the Court's previous rulings, the Court's December 2005 Memorandum
Decision was memorialized by the Court's own order, which expressly stated that it granted
Defendant's partial summary judgment motion regarding certain statute of limitation arguments,
finding sufficient notice, actual notice or imputed notice to trigger the application of UCA §7812-26 and UCA §78-12-27 in regards to certain claims related to Aspen Springs and certain
alleged disproportional payments. (March 2006 Court Order). The Court did not, however,
address whether the fraud claims or breach offiduciaryclaims were sufficiently supported until
this motion. By way of supplementation, the Court recognizes that the statutes of limitation
arguments issues were a close call, in that the Court struggled whether later developments of
Aspen Springs should be barred under the statute of limitations under the theory of imputed
knowledge due to Plaintiffs knowledge of ABCO's involvement in Aspen Springs, Phase I and II
in mid-1999. The Court, however, chose the more cautious alternative given the disputed facts
before it at the time, in lieu of Plaintiff s discovery requests into ABCO records Defendant
allegedly blocked access to, and in viewing the facts in light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
opted to only bar those claims that the Court could expressly ascertain Plaintiffs knowledge was
not disputed.
Additionally, the Court notes that its July 2006 Memorandum Decision likewise did not
rule on the sufficiency of Plaintiff sfraud,misrepresentation or breach offiduciaryduties claims.
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Last July the Court stated that relying upon Spor, the Court disagreed with Plaintiffs assertion
that the Property Settlement Agreement was an unenforceable agreement to agree, similar to
Brown Shoe Fit Co because (a) "disputed issues of fact exist regarding certain tenable
interpretations of the Property Settlement Agreement and their effect," (b) the relevant, though
disputed evidence demonstrated Plaintiffs assent and ratification of the Property Settlement
Agreement in light of his acceptance of certain Defendants' partial performance, and (c) Plaintiffs
claims equally challenged the validity of those assent and ratifying statements and actions, in that
certain fraud, misrepresentation and breach offiduciaryduty claims are asserted. Therefore, the
Court simply held the binding effect of the Property Settlement was voidable but not void as
presently pled. Further, the Court found that Defendant's merger, integration, and ratification
summary judgment arguments, again under the disputed facts presented at that time, could not be
granted while fraud claims survived. The Court again did not weigh the sufficiency of the fraud
claims in this ruling.
Exercising patience with the parties' excessive briefing practice and in an effort to
properly shift through the materiality of the presentment of an exuberant number of facts in light
of the arguments proffered, the Court fails to see any record created by the Court which expressly
ruled on Defendant's direct challenge to Plaintiffs claims, or which may preclude the Court from
revisiting this area in light of the parties' continual discovery and equally excessive briefing. Of
particular relevance, the Court notes that following the December Memorandum Decisions,
Defendant has submitted two affidavits to support the contention that ABCO records were
available with certain ABCO employees, Ken Oakeson and Melanie Bingham, and that Plaintiff
never attempted to gain access through these known record holders. Plaintiff disputes that Mr.
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Oakeson or Ms. Bingham had complete access to ABCO records, but does not sufficiently dispute
that he attempted to gain access to ABCO records through these employees or that these
employees could get access for Plaintiff upon a request. Given such, the Court finds that
revisiting below claims in this motion, especially those relating to Aspen Springs, appropriate and
will aid the trier of fact in sorting through certain matters of law.
B.

Fraud claims

On a motion for summary judgment, "once the moving party challenges an element of the
nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of
material fact." Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, P31, 54 P.3d 1054. The
nonmoving party must present "evidence that could be interpreted to satisfy the elements of the
claim." Id. at P35. The trial court "must consider each element of the claim under the appropriate
standard of proof " AndalexRes., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Moreover, it is also required that "[t]he nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory
assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Waddoups, 2002 UT
69 at P31." See also Dairy Prod Servs., Inc. v. Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, P24, 13 P.3d 581
(Stating 'bald statements do not suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact.1)
Looking next at Plaintiffs fraud claims, the Court finds Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24
applicable. The Rawson Court provided:
"Fraud is fa false representation of an existing material fact, made knowingly or
recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, upon which plaintiff
reasonably relies to his detriment.f"
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2001 UT at 1J28; see also OtsukaElecs. (USA) v. Imagining Specialists, 937 P.2d 1274,
1278 (Utah App 1997) (holding that the elements offraudare: (1) That a representation
was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which
the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9)
to his injury and damage.). "To have made a false representation recklessly, defendants
would have to know they had insufficient knowledge upon which to base the
representation made." Rawson, 2001 UT at TJ28. Yet, according to Ong InVl Inc. v. 11th
Ave. Corp., a partners's silence may constitute fraud, if the silence regards a material
matter. 850 P.2d 447, 454 (Utah 1993); See also D 'Elia v. Rice Dev., 2006 UT App 416,
1J52 (holding that to demonstrate constructivefraudin Utah, a party need only
demonstrate "two elements: (i) a confidential relationship between the parties; and (ii) a
failure to disclose material facts.").
Under either Onglnt'l or Rawson, the issue is simply whether Plaintiff presents sufficient
material facts to support the fraud claims, or that material facts support afindingPlaintiffs
reliance upon a falsity, upon which Defendant's alleged omission constitutes as fraud. Reviewing
first Defendant's alleged omissions regarding Aspen Springs (i.e. the alleged $80,000 unexcused
profits and Grave's payments), Plaintiffs asserted facts do not rise to the level of sufficient
materiality to preclude summary judgment. Plaintiffs alleged claim that the $80,000 profits
belong to ABCO equates to a bald speculation of impropriety, not evidence of a material fact
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because the funds were the undisputed remaining amountfromDefendant personal and
independent loan used in Defendant's independent business dealings. Further, there is no
supporting evidence that these funds were owed to ABCO or ABCO was owed any
payments/profits from the loan which should have been reported by Defendant during the parties'
negotiations toward dissolutions. The loan in question related to Aspen Springs, to which ABCO
had some involvement, but Plaintiff has no supporting evidence despite lengthy discovery into
Aspen Springs to contend that ABCO carried any liability in Aspen Springs in connection with the
loan or entitlement to the excess loan amount, and Plaintiff concedes that the Aspen Springs
project was treated as an outside job.
Second, the alleged omission regarding the Grave's payments the falls under those claims
barred under the Court's previous statute of limitation arguments. Thus, whether paid or not,
Plaintiff had sufficient notice of ABCO's business dealings with Aspen Springs Phase I and chose
not to pursue any of those claims during the parties' negotiations and dissolution of their
partnership, expressly stating such knowledge to ABCO's attorney in the summer of 1999.
Plaintiff cannot now assert that he was unaware of such concerns with Aspen Springs.
Additionally, Defendant asserted that such payments were paid back to ABCO and that ABCO
records merely fail to memorialize these payments, to which Plaintiff has no further supported
argument to refute the same. Plaintiffs part incredulity does not an issue of fact make. Here,
Plaintiff's fraud allegation fails because a lack of a records does not equate to sufficient proof of
fraud in the face of Defendant's contrary depositions and affidavits on point. Plaintiff may not, in
response, rest an incomplete records to support afraudallegation. Thus, regardless of
Defendant's silence on these two issues, Plaintiff has not sufficiently supported his fraudulent
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claims or demonstrated the same fall outside the Court's previous statute of limitation ruling.

Lastly, the Court notes that the presentment of an expert report does not constitute a
fraud unless is supported by sufficient facts. Here, Plaintiffs expert asserts certain damages but
uses figures that are not specifically connected to supported material facts offraud,and therefore,
cannot be used to get around the immateriality of Plaintiffs facts.
G

Misrepresentation

Misrepresentation carries the same mental state as fraud, and in reality, largely mimics the
elements of fraud. Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 2000,1J12-13.1 Similar to the
above, Plaintiffs again fails to support his claims of misrepresentation. Plaintiffs claims that he
relied upon Defendant's obligation that he would "open the corporate books and settle" does not
rebut Mr. Oakeson's and Ms. Bingham's affidavits that the corporate books were available to
Plaintiff, or that Plaintiffs alleged impeded right to the records caused accountants or persons
whom Plaintiff relied upon to value the business at the time of the parties' dissolution to
misrepresent ABCO's overall value. The Court fails to ascertain what evidence was in the
corporate books which would have changed the values discussed by Plaintiff and Defendant
during their negotiations to dissolve the partnership. Given Plaintiff's clear deposition assertions
that he did not rely upon Defendant when entering into the Property Settlement Agreement, the
Court finds Plaintiff's reliance upon Defendant to "open ABCO books for review" does not
translate into a misrepresentation on ABCO's value. Instead, Plaintiff arguments suggests that he

1

The Court notes that Plaintiff does not assert negligent misrepresentation, nor does
Defendant seek summary judgment against the same.
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entered into the Property Settlement Agreement perceiving the negotiation period as ongoing
until all of his concerns were resolved, while Defendant concludes that the Property Settlement
constituted the valued exchange and dissolution of the partnership and that Plaintiff suffers from
buyer's remorse. Under either argument, the Court fails tofindsufficient proof to support the
claim of misrepresentation in connection with ABCO's value when Defendant stated that he
thought ABCO "made" around $40,000 in net profit in 1998. Nor is sufficient specificity
provided showing that Rasmussen's valuation of ABCO, or any other person whom Plaintiff
relied upon to value ABCO, would have materially changed in light of any information in the
corporation books allegedly not available to Plaintiff
Plaintiffs other misrepresentation claims are somewhat more problematic but produce a
similar result. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant misrepresented and falsely included an employment
continuation provision and a provision promising equipment use while not planning on carrying
out the provisions is unsupported. Of particular concern, the Courtfindsthat Defendant admits
that the employment provision was placed to "largely appease" Plaintiff, but this does not raise to
making a knowingly false or reckless statement, although such braces the line. The Court rather
finds that the parties' Property Settlement Agreement contained these vague references, that such
provisions were not specifically valued, and that the parties ascertained different meanings
regarding them, in that the issue of how the provisions would fit in with Plaintiffs plan to begin a
competing construction outfit was not resolved with these two provisions. Thus, to the Court,
the issue turns on breach of contract and vagueness, rather than any misrepresentation, given
Plaintiffs repeated skepticism toward Defendant and Plaintiffs deposition statements providing
he did not rely upon Defendant's representations when entering into Plaintiffs agreement.
11
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D.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims

Utah's partnership law is embodied in the standard articulated in Onglnt'l, which
provides that "normally, partners occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each other in
the utmost good faith." 850 P.2d at 453-54. However, "when a relationship involving partners
becomes adversarial and the partners deal at arm's length, their fiduciary duties to one another
may be extinguished." Id. Addressing PlaintifFs claims of breach of fiduciary duty, the Court
holds that none of PlaintifFs assertions are sufficiently supported with material facts in regards to
Defendant's fiduciary duties prior to the parties' entering into the Property Settlement Agreement.
However, the Court sees disputed issues of fact regarding whether Defendant breached his
fiduciary duties to Plaintiff following the parties' entering into the Property Settlement
Agreement, or during the "winding up" of the partnership's dissolution. These post-dissolution
issues are more akin to breach of contract assertions than of breach of fiduciary duty, but
regardless of the semantics the result would likely be the same.
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons articulated in Defendant's memoranda,
Defendant's motion is granted, in accordance with the above.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Malicious Prosecution. Defamation/False
Light Invasion of Privacy, and Slander of Title Claims
Next, Defendant argues in this motion that Plaintiff cannot meet the required elements to
support a claim of malicious prosecution. Citing Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151
(Utah 1991), Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to show the probable cause element
because Judge Hadfield has already determined that the criminal charges against Plaintiff in State
v. Neff, Case No. 051100023. Even looking in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant
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attests that Plaintiff is unable to prove that Defendant initiated or procured the initiation of
criminal proceedings against an innocent defendant, that there was no probable cause or that the
proceedings terminated in favor of Plaintiff. Further, Defendant alleges that the malicious
prosecution litigation is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the criminal court
already determined probable cause against Plaintiff.
With respect to Plaintiffs defamation/false light invasion of privacy claims, Defendant
asserts that all of the purported statements allegedly proffered in Plaintiffs Second Amended
Complaint fails to satisfy the required intentional or reckless conduct. Defendant contends that
Plaintiff fails this standard because a witness's statements supports one of Defendant's statements
and Defendant's statements were based on Defendant's perception of Plaintiffs actions and
threats.
Lastly, Defendant professes that Plaintiff cannot support a slander of title claim where
statements are not maliciously made and no special damages can be proved, comparing the facts
of the parties' conveyance of property to First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d
1253 (Utah 1989) to assert that Plaintiff could all time correct the wrongly recorded deed.
Plaintiff again responds with the position that this summary judgment is baseless because it
fails to consider material issues of fact previously ruled by the court to preclude this type of
motion and that in light of the Court's previous rulings, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees.
Addressing Defendant's arguments, Plaintiff states that Hodges clearly holds that the court's
finding of probable cause is irrelevant and that the test is whether the complaining party had
probable cause. Plaintiff attests that similar to Hodges, the issue of whether Defendant had
probable cause to initiate the charges against him should be presented to a jury because Plaintiff
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has sufficient evidence to support his position that Defendant lied to initiate the charges against
Plaintiff and that the dismissal of the aggravated assault charge is in effect a resolution in
Plaintiff's favor.
Secondly, Plaintiff states that even if Defendant has evidence of the truth of his
accusations against Plaintiff, this defense does not support a summary judgment motion. Given
that Defendant admits to making certain statements which Plaintiff references as the basis for the
defamation claims, Plaintiff argues that the question of facts regarding their veracity are
appropriate for the trier of fact.
Plaintiff lastly claims that Travis Bowen's letter to Defendant and other fact evidence
supports Plaintiffs slander of title claims and while certain material facts are disputed, no legal
authority supports granting summary judgment against Plaintiff. To Plaintiff, Defendant's reliance
upon Banberry Crossing is improper because Plaintiffs ability to correct the deed error is
irrelevant as to whether Defendant caused the improperfiling,and Plaintiff should not be faulted
for mirroring the belief of his counsel, Travis Bowen, that Defendant alone could correct the
deed.
Defendant replies that Plaintiff simply does not have a basis to support his claim for
malicious prosecution when probable cause has been found to exist at the time of the criminal
proceeding, citing Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App 1987). Defendant
argues further that the criminal proceeding did not result in Plaintiffs favor because Plaintiff was
not absolved of responsibility. Contending that Defendant's statements are true, were based on
facts known in the general public, and/or were not proffered maliciously, Defendant asserts that
the underlying facts do not support Plaintiffs defamation claims. Defendant then claims that
14
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Plaintiffs asserted facts do not support a slander of title claim because Travis Bowen's clerical
error does not meet the malicious requirement in Banberry Crossing.
A. Malicious Prosecution
Pursuant to Agler v. Scheidle, 2006 UT App 495, a malicious prosecution claim has four
elements: "(1) A criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff;
(2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the
proceeding; [and] (4) 'malice,' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to
justice."
To this Court, the finding of probable cause by the magistrate in the Plaintiffs criminal
proceeding is dispositive of the matter. Nevertheless, addressing the probable cause element, the
Agler Court provided that a defendant in a malicious prosecution claim "has probable cause only
when a reasonable man in his position would believe, and the defendant does in fact believe, that
he has sufficient information as to both the facts and the applicable law to justify him in initiating
the criminal proceedings without further investigation or verification." 2006 UT App 495. Similar
to Agler, under either version of the facts Plaintiff knowingly carried the Defendant a number of
feet with his truck until the Defendant verbally expressed that the parties' actions qualified as a
risk to his life. Disputed facts may exist regarding who started the altercation and Defendant's
role when clinging to Plaintiffs truck may, yet, there is no dispute that Plaintiff's actions may
have qualified as an assault, in that he alone controlled the speed of the vehicle. The point is
Plaintiffs has not sufficiently asserted complete absolution of criminal responsibility, distinctly
different from the plaintiff in Hodges. While the Court is unsure as to why the criminal court
found probable cause against the Plaintiff in the criminal proceedings or why the State choose to
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dismiss the matter following the same matter, the Courtfindsthat Plaintiff fails to demonstrate
sufficient facts to support the probable cause element, in that Plaintiff concedes that certain risks
were present and perceived by Defendant in relation to his driving of the vehicle and that he alone
controlled the speed of the vehicle. Or to put it another way, there is not sufficient material facts
to support the opposing party's innocence at levels of the parties' altercation at the time
Defendant initiated the legal proceedings.
Second, the Court likewise fails tofindthat the malice element is sufficiently supported.
According to Agler, "the malice element means that Defendants initiated criminal proceedings for
"a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." 2006 UT App 495. " [I]n
proving malice in a civil action it is not necessary to prove actual spite, ill will or grudge, but it is
only necessary to prove wrongful or improper motive. "Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enters., 23
Utah 2d 169, 460 P.2d 333, 335 (1969). Again, similar to Agler, the record is void of any
evidence beyond Plaintiffs speculation that Defendant initiated the prosecution allegations for any
wrongful or improper motive. While the Court admits that the neighbor's affidavit is troubling, it
is neither conclusive of actual innocence nor is it sufficient proof of malice. Absent any additional
proof of a wrongful or improper motive, the Court fails to discern how Defendant's action in
calling the police and raising an allegation of assault translates into any benefit in the parties'
currently contested partnership dissolution litigation, in light of the numerous facts and issues
previously submitted to the Court.
Once again however, irrespective of the alleged motive of the Defendant in complaining to
the executive branch about the alleged behavior, the bringing of the criminal action by that agency
and the criminal court'sfindingof probable cause disposes of the Plaintiffs claim here. While the
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probable determination may not collaterally estop a malicious prosecution claim, the criminal
court's determination should be given great weight, in that Defendant did not initiate a civil
prosecution but turned the matter over tofirstthe executive branch to file criminal charges after
their independent investigation and then to judiciary to determine the sufficiency of those charges.
This weight is given because as a matter of public policy, victims of crimes should not be subject
to nakedly defending a harassing malicious prosecution tort action after an independent State
executive branch has established probable cause through a judicial determination finding that a
crime has occurred. Therefore, Plaintiff must show that evidence exists which 'vitiates the
probable cause for the arrest warrant' to survive summary judgment. Wolfordv. Lasater, 78 F.3d
484, 487 (10th Cir. 1996). This simple has not happened in this case.
For the forgoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the malicious
prosecution claim is granted.
B. Defamation/False light invasion of privacy
"Defamation is the act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to
a third person." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, p 5 ; See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872
P.2d 999, 1007 (Utah 1994) ("To state a claim for defamation, [one] must show that defendants
published the statements concerning him, that the statements were false, defamatory, and not
subject to any privilege, that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and
that their publication resulted in damage."
In this case, Defendant's summary judgment arguments rest on the fact that his statements
were based on truthful perceptions of the Plaintiflf and/or were not malicious. However, Plaintiflf
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disputes these allegations, challenging directly the veracity of Defendant's statements. As such,
the Court finds disputed issues of fact precluding summary judgment on this claim.
C Slander of Title Claim
Under First Sea Bank, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989):
[t]o prove slander of title, a claimant must prove that (1) there was a publication of
a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) the statement was false, (3)
the statement was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused actual or special
damages. A slanderous statement is one that is derogatory or injurious to the legal
validity of an owner's title or to his or her right to sell or hypothecate the property
Banberry further states:
A published false statement, however, does not constitute slander of title without
the element of malice. Malice may be affirmatively proven or implied. Affirmative
proof requires a showing that the wrong was done with an intent to injure, vex, or
annoy. Malice may be implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully records or
publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a false or misleading
impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that it should reasonably
foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property. While preparation of
the original notice of default may have been less than proficient, there is a
difference between poor performance and malice.
Here, the parties concede that Defendant's recording of the title deed in questionarguably
disparaged Plaintiffs title, but the Plaintiff fails to present sufficiently disputed issues of fact
whether malice was present, and whether Defendant's statements caused actual or special
damages. Plaintiff supports the latter two elements of slander of title with PlaintiflPs deposition
and Bowen's deposition regarding Defendant's lack of cooperation on repairing the deed error.
While there may be a question in regards to the suffering of actual damages, they are absent from
the record before the Court. The Court, however, denies Defendant's motion for summary
judgment on this claim, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving
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party,findingPlaintiffs deposition raises sufficient issues of material facts to support the elements
of slander of title and challenge Defendant's contestation.
Defendant's Motion Requesting Clarification on the Order Regarding Partial Summary
Judgment on the Statute ofLimitations to Foreclose All Claims to Aspen Springs or
Disproportionate Family Payments; Defendant's Memorandum of Points ofAuthorities
in Support of Complete Denial of the Aspen Springs Claim. Any Disproportional
Payments to Family Members, and the Value ofABCO
Seeking to clarify the Court's Memorandum Decision entered on December 15 2005,
which allowed PlaintiflFto "assert separate and distinct breach offiduciaryclaims and fraud claims
outside of those committed by Defendant's known or reasonably discovered actions pertaining to
either the Aspen Springs Development project or the alleged disproportional payments of family
members," Defendant argues for a complete bar on those claims in their entirety. To Defendant,
because Plaintiff had access to records and Lee Rasmussen's value ofABCO, the Court should
have specifically barred the undervalued claim on ABCO in that Plaintiff could have discovered
those claims prior to October 29, 1999. Defendant supports this position with asserted facts
regarding Plaintiffs alleged knowledge of ABCO's involvement with Aspen Springs and the
various accounting of ABCO's payment to Defendant's and Plaintiffs children, coupled with
various case law supporting the statutory discovery rule. Defendant then requests the Court deny
Plaintiffs entire claim on the Aspen Springs Project, any allegations of disproportional payments
to family members and ABCO's value, and to limit Plaintiffs fraud claims or breach of fiduciary
claims unless he can prove absolutely no constructive knowledge prior to October 29, 1999.
Responding, Plaintiff submits a motion to strike Defendant's brief and memorandum,
arguing that the Court drafted order specifically ruled on thefraudulentclaims relating to Aspen
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Springs, reserving the claims outside of Plaintiff's knowledge prior to October 29, 1999. In light
of the Court's Order, Plaintiff seeks to strike Defendant's Motion.
Defendant's Reply then asserts that summary judgement is justified because of Plaintiffs
failure to supply evidence, affidavits or proof that he discovered his alleged fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty claims prior to October 29, 1999. Absent any specific facts to support Plaintiffs
claims being outside the allegations barred by the Court's December 15, 2005 Memorandum
Decision, Defendant states that his general summary judgment motion should be granted. Lastly,
Defendant states that to allow Plaintiff to continue his assertion that he was misrepresented in
regards to ABCO's value, when its value was known or discoverable to Plaintiff, is harmful and
prejudicial to Defendant in that the statute of limitations should apply.
Plaintiff then submits a formal response to Defendant's Motion for Clarification, arguing
that the Court should reiterate its original ruling because Defendant fails to present any "new"
facts to support this restyled 'motion for reconsideration' and the Court has already rejected
Defendant's arguments. Plaintiff states that the Court specifically reserved fraud and breach of
fiduciary claims with Aspen Springs, such as those supported by the $80,147.63 differential in
Defendant's loan and the authorized loan amount in connection with Aspen Springs, Phase Two.
Next, Plaintiff argues that claims regarding ABCO's 'misappropriation' of funds to Defendant's
children known after April 1999 should also be allowed because the Court specifically reserved
those claims as well. To Plaintiff, the reservations of these claims is important because Defendant
precluded Plaintiff from gaining access to accounting books and records needed to properly value
ABCO, Defendant induced Plaintiff to sign the Property Settlement Agreement with no intention
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of honoring his promises, and that Defendants' actions toll the statute of limitations because they
qualify as further acts of fraud and concealment.
Plaintiff then refutes Defendant's arguments, asserting that Plaintiffs fraud based claims
should survive because the Property Settlement was understood by Plaintiff to be preliminary only
upon the alleged but unwritten condition to "open books and settle," and upon Defendant's
material omissions of fact. Second, Plaintiff states that Defendant's ratification arguments fail
because Defendant concealed substantial evidence and that at best, Plaintiffs retention of benefits
should be deducted from damages awarded. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendant's
integration arguments fail because thefraudclaims are substantiated and rebut the presumption of
integration, the Property Settlement Agreement was clearly not integrated, only two of the nine
buyout documents contain integration clauses and required in turn the execution of further
transactions, and that the two integration clauses cannot fix an unenforceable agreement to
agreement. Plaintiff requests that the Court orders no further briefing on these issues.
In reply, Defendant states that the Court should hold that Plaintiffs claims regarding
Aspen Springs in all phases, the disproportionate payment claims up to October 1999, and claims
on ABCO's disputed value are barred under the applicable statutes of limitation. Defendant
professes there is no disputed material fact that constructive discovery of those claims began
before October 29, 1999, that Plaintiff questioned facts underlying the same claims prior to
October 29, 1999, and that Plaintiff continues to sufficiently support all of the elements of theses
causes of action. Defendant then contends that Plaintiff must rebut or supply material facts to
dispute Defendant's constructive discovery arguments or that he was denied access in light of
certain ABCO employees deposition and/or affidavits. Defendant lastly asserts that there is no
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refute for Defendant's legal constructive discovery arguments and time-line and that the Court's
appointed Special Master found nothing unusual with ABCO's dealings with Aspen Springs or the
alleged disproportionate payments to the parties' family members.
Given the Court's granting of Defendant's summary judgment regarding the fraud, breach
offiduciaryduties (in part), and misrepresentation claims, the Court holds that Defendant's
primary clarification concerns have been addressed and resolved. Defendant's Clarification
Motion is therefore granted, in accordance with the Court's grant of Defendant's Summary
Judgment of certainfraud,misrepresentation, and breach offiduciaryduty claims.
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Denial ofDefendant's Motion in Limine and Motion
to Find the Contract Binding on the Parties
Defendant argues in this motion that the Court may have overlooked the rule of law that
states that allegations of fraud and misrepresentation claims can be waived and the Contract
ratified by either subsequent conduct or performance, and the continuation in receiving benefits.
Defendant claims that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiffsfraudulentclaims fail to carry a
prima facia case in light of Plaintiffs letter to Travis Bowen in June 2000, various statements in
Plaintiffs deposition. Supporting this position, Defendant cites Zuniga v. Leone, 297 P. 1919
(Utah 1931), Taylor v. Moore, 51 P.2d 222 (Utah 1935), Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813 (Utah
1968), and their progeny, arguing that Plaintiff cannot now rescind the parties' contract by
asserting fraud claims because he has elected his remedy when he failed to return the benefits from
the parties' contract. Defendant further argues that the parties' contracts, namely the Stock
Redemption Agreement, the Partnership Interest Redemption Agreement and Membership
Interest Redemption Agreement, contain integration clauses which precludes the allowance of
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parole evidence. Then, Defendant reasserts its initial argument that parole evidence should be
excluded because Plaintiffs allegation offraudis unsubstantiated and lacking sufficient support
with clear and convincing evidence.
Responding, Plaintiff submits a motion to strike Defendant's brief and memorandum,
arguing that the Court drafted an order that specifically ruled on thefraudulentclaims relating to
Aspen Springs, reserving the claims outside of Plaintiffs knowledge prior to October 29, 1999.
In light of the Court's Order, Plaintiff seeks to strike Defendant's motion to reconsider.
Additionally, Plaintiff formally responded to Defendant's reconsideration motion, arguing
that the Court has already ruled extensively at each of the issues raised in Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiff attests further that all of Defendant's arguments fail to defeat the issue of fact that the
parties' Property Settlement Agreement constituted an unenforceable agreement to agree as a
matter of law because (a) there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the parties had a
meeting of the minds, (b) there are issues of fact regarding a mutual mistake rescinding the
agreement, and (c) Defendant's constructive theft of the farm property nullified the parties'
agreement. Plaintiff then incorporates the arguments raised in his opposition to Defendant's
motion for clarification.
Defendant then submits afinalreply, arguing that the Court should revisit two issues, (1)
whether Plaintiff elected their remedy and can no longer void the contract because Plaintiffs right
of rescission has been waived, and (2) what parole evidence will be limited, in light of the
integration clauses. Looking at thefirst,Defendant contends that the undisputed part
performance by the parties supports the conclusion that the Property Settlement Agreement is
binding upon the parties, in that Plaintiff chose to retain the benefits of the dissolution agreement.
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Next, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiffs actions ratified the Property Settlement Agreement and/or
constitutes a waiver of his right to rescind the contract under Utah law. Defendant then asserts
that the Court must determine if the Property Settlement is fully or partially integrated when
determining the application of the parole evidence rule and must likewise ascertain whether the
parole evidence sought to be admitted is inconsistent or supplementary to the agreement under
Cantamar, LLC v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321. Lastly, Defendant states that Plaintiff should
be required to adhere to the representations that Plaintiff understood the Property Settlement
Agreement to be, namely those asserted in paragraph 50 of his Complaint.
Again, in light of the Court's above ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
on the fraud, misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Court finds that in large
part, Defendant's underlying concerns in seeking a reconsideration motion is largely met. Given
that the Court has granted summary judgment on the fraud and misrepresentation claims in
connection with the parties valuation of ABCO, the Court agrees with Defendant that Cantamar
has application. The Cantamar Court stated that:
before a trial court applies the parol evidence rule, it must determine as questions
of fact: (1) whether the agreement is integrated and, if so, (2) whether that
integration is complete or partial. See Eie v. St Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190,
1194 (Utah 1981) (f,,[T]he court must determine as a question of fact whether the
parties did in fact adopt a particular writing or writings as the final and complete
expression of their bargain.1" (quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d
261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972))). Additionally, if the court determines an agreement is
partially integrated, it must also consider whether the parol evidence the parties
seek to introduce is inconsistent or supplementary to the agreement. See Novell,
2004 UT App 162 at PI5. In resolving these preliminary questions, parol evidence,
"Indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible.'" Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App
361, PI8, 58 P.3d 854 (explaining that any relevant evidence is admissible in
determining whether agreement is integrated) (quoting Union Bank, 101 P.2d at
665); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210 cmts. b-c (stating that "any
relevant evidence" is admissible when considering whether an agreement is
24
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completely or partially integrated); id. § 213 cmt. b (directing that determination of
whether a term is inconsistent with an integrated agreement is "made in accordance
with all relevant evidence").
In harmony with previous Court decisions, the Court holds under the undisputed facts, that the
Property Settlement Agreement was entered into after the parties discussed the overall worth of
ABCO and coming to some resolution regarding a dissolution that Plaintiff would get the farm
plus some cash incentives, and that Defendant would get the corporation's business assets, minus
some use and value given to Plaintiff. While the Property Settlement Agreement is vague in parts
and several terms are unknown under the disputed facts, the agreement's vagueness does not
preclude its partial integration given Defendant's receipt of significant benefits of the agreement.
Additionally, the Court agrees that in light of the lack of sufficiency of evidence to support
the fraud claims, that Plaintiffs receipt of ABCO assets constitutes a wavier of his right to rescind
the contract. Under UCA § 48-l-29(l)(f), the Court may decree dissolution of a partnership
whenever circumstances render a dissolution equitable. Given the lengthy presentment of facts
surrounding the parties' claims and taking into consideration the circumstances of the parties'
lengthy negotiations leading up to the Property Settlement Agreement, Defendant's numerous
payments made and/or offered in accordance with the agreement, Plaintiffs undisputed receipt of
large sums of cash and other benefits of the agreement, and Plaintiffs undisputed efforts and
desire to enforce the terms of the agreement, the Courtfindsequitable grounds exist to support a
decree that the parties' dissolution took place at or around December 1999. As such, the Court
will entertain parole evidence offered to assist the Court in interpreting the parties' dissolution
agreement, namely the vague terms previously discussed, and evidence of damages of breach
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under the agreement or in connection with any of claims not subject to the Court's rulings
outlined above or previously.
Defendant's Motion Regarding Violation of Civil Protective Order; Plaintiffs
Opposition to Marvin G. Neff's Motion Regarding Violation of Civil Protective Order;
and Plaintiff's Motion for Civil Contempt Against Marvin G. Neff
Defendant states that on or about August 16, 2006 Plaintiff drove his truck over to a job
site where Defendant was working in violation of a civil protective order. In support of this
attestation, Defendant attaches pictures of Defendant's truck on an ABCO work site. Defendant
seeks sanctions against Plaintiff, an award of attorney's fees and costs and asks the Court to refer
to Judge Hadfield under the alleged probation violation.
Retorting, Plaintiff admits that he drove his truck around the vicinity where Defendant was
working, but asserts that he did not get out of his truck or make any gestures to Defendant and
that he drove away upon realize Defendant's presence. Plaintiff attests that he had a valid reason
to talk with person at the job site, did not know of Defendant's presence on the site until pulling
up at the site, and that Defendant has fabricated the parties' interaction. Plaintiff asserts in
contrast that Defendant refused to timely leave a wedding reception on August 11, 2006 and that
Defendant attempted to provoke Plaintiff by making a public scene at the reception.
In reply, Defendant contends that the statement of Officer Trujillo's narrative supports
Defendant's presentment of the facts and a finding that Plaintiff knowingly violated the Amended
Civil Protective Order under Defendant's assertion of the facts. Second, Defendant states that the
alleged interaction at a neighborhood function did not constituted a violation of the parties'
protective order because Plaintiff never came with 100 feet of Plaintiff.
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The Court recognizes that disputed issues of fact exist which preclude granting summary
judgment in regards to either asserted violation of the parties' civil protective order. As such,
Defendant's and Plaintiffs motions for civil contempt are denied.
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Produced by Plaintiffs Experts
Regarding Any Appraised Valuations ofABCO. Inc. Aspen Springs Storage. LLC, Farr
West Lincoln or other Properties Using Data After December IS. 1999
Defendant argues in this case that the Court should exclude a report by John Brough
because it is excluded under the Scheduling Order. Defendant contends further that such
information is irrelevant in that Plaintiff has elected his remedy by retaining benefits through the
contractual buyout and prejudicially considers data used after December 13, 1999, in that it fails
to take in to light the efforts of Defendant and the lack of efforts of Plaintiff following the parties'
Property Settlement Agreement. Lastly, Defendant states that Brough's appraisal and opinions of
ABCO's post-1999 value are highly prejudicial and irrelevant.
Plaintiff retorts that his damages expert testimony is extremely relevant and that this
testimony is more probative than prejudicial because it is the only way to address the factual
issues before the Court. Plaintiff argues that Defendant's various motions are simply a rehashing
of the arguments that the Court has already ruled on and that Plaintiffs experts appropriately
includes in his calculations ABCO's goodwill, that such testimony presents an accepted, present
value method for valuing ABCO, and that such testimony is highly relevant to a jury because
under Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, the jury should determine damages
from either the date of the alleged breaches offiduciaryduty or the date the case was ready for
trial. Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that the Court at .the August 29, 2006 hearing expressly extended the
deadline for expert reports to be filed to September 18, 2006 and that Defendant is the one that
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has abused the Second Scheduling Order, submitting three dispositive motions after the July 14,
2006 deadline for the same.
Infinalreply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs experts' testimonies and the James &
Co's valuation of ABCO are irrelevant because Plaintiffs fraud claims fail as a matter of law, in
that they are insufficiently supported with the facts. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs attempts
to bolster the experts' testimonies through the inclusion of goodwill when under Utah law,
goodwill is appropriately considered when there are ongoing or habitual customers which gives a
business a reasonable expectancy of preference in the race of competition, citing Jackson v.
Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah 1966). Yet, ABCO's business relies on being the lowest bidder on
each particular construction project, according to Defendant. Defendant asserts that if the
parties' interests in ABCO were both terminated, no intangible value would be evident. Lastly,
Defendant reargues issues regarding the effect of the Share Redemption Agreement and Plaintiffs
election to retain the benefits of the Property Settlement Agreement, and asserts that the instant
motion is not a violation of the parties' scheduling order because it is offered in response to
Plaintiffs experts' testimonies.
The Court again holds that Defendant's underlying concerns for raising the instant motion
are largely addressed in the Court's initial ruling on the fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of
fiduciary duty claims. As such, the Court is unsure if Plaintiff s damage expert is necessary. That
said, Plaintiff has existing claims equivalent to breach of contract damages and particular its
slander of title claim which allow for relevant damage testimony. So long as the damage expert's
testimony relates to the remaining claims, the testimony is allowed and to the extent it reaches
into barred claims or claims now denied for lack of sufficient evidence, the testimony is stricken.
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In accordance with the above, Defendant's Motions are granted in part, and denied in part.
Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare an order in accordance herewith.
Dated this ^

day of January, 2007.
BY THE COURT

•—•

ST—

Judge Gordon7. Low
First District Court
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRANSON G NEFF,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

MARVIN G NEFF,
Defendant.

Case No. 030100275

MEMBERS OF THE JURY: Please answer the following questions based upon the evidence. If
you find that the evidence satisfies the applicable burden of proof, answer "Yes." If you find that the
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine whether the evidence satisfies the applicable
burden of proof, or if you find that the evidence does not satisfy the applicable burden of proof, answer
"No."
BRANSON'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
QUESTION NO. 1 : Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Branson suffered
damages as a result of Marvin's breach?

Yes X

No

(A) If the jury answered Question No. 1 as "Yes," then proceed to Question No. 2
(B) If the jury answered Question No.1 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of
Marvin and against Branson on Branson's breach of contract claim.
Proceed to Question No. 3
QUESTION NO. 2 : What amount of damage does the jury find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Branson suffered as a direct and proximate result of Marvin's breach?
$

YyODc?

„ O^

This amount constitutes the amount of damages that the jury awards to

Branson on Branson's breach of contract claim.
Proceed to Question No 3.
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BRANSON'S ASSAULT/BATTERY CLAIM
QUESTION NO. 3: Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Marvin committed
an act against Branson intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with Branson's person, or
intending to place Branson in imminent apprehension of such a contact?
Yes

A

No

(A) If the jury answered Question No. 3 as "Yes," then proceed to Question No. 4.
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 3 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of
Marvin and against Branson on Branson's battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 6.
QUESTION NO. 4 : Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Marvin's act
either directly or indirectly resulted in a harmful contact with Branson's person?
Yes

>C No

(A) If the jury answered Question No. 4 as "Yes," then the jury has given judgment in favor of
Branson and against Marvin on Branson's assault/battery claim. Proceed to Question No.
5.
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 4 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of
Marvin and against Branson on Branson's assault/battery claim.
Proceed to Question No. 6.
QUESTION NO. 5 : What amount of damages does the jury find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Branson suffered as a direct and proximate result of Marvin's conduct?
_. This amount constitutes the amount of damages that the jury awards to Branson
on Branson's assault/battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 6.

BRANSON'S SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIM
QUESTION NO. 6 : Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Marvin slandered
title to Branson's property?
Yes / ^
(A)

No

If the jury answered Question No; 6 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of

Branson and against Marvin on Branson's slander of title claim, and hereby awards damages to
Branson in the amount of $

Q

. If the jury answered this question, then proceed to

answer Question No. 6(C).
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(B) If the jury answered Question No. 6 as "No," the jury has given judgment in favor of Marvin
and against Branson on Branson's slander of title claim. Proceed to Question No. 7.
(C) If the jury awarded Branson damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Marvin
should be held to pay Branson's attorney fees?
Yes f^

No

Proceed to question no. 7.
BRANSON'S BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CLAIM
QUESTION NO 7 : Does the jury find that Marvin breached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing owed to Branson?
Yes A

No

(A)lf the jury answered Question No. 7 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of
Branson and against Marvin on Branson's breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim,
and the jury awards damages to Branson in the amount of $

Q

Proceed to

Question No. 8 .
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 7 as "No," the jury has given judgment in favor of
Marvin and against Branson on Branson's breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. Proceed
to Question No. 8.
BRANSON'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
QUESTION NO. 8 : Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Marvin breached
his fiduciary duty to Branson?

Yes X
(A)

No

If the jury answered Question No. 8 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in
favor of Branson and against Marvin on Branson's breach of fiduciary duty
claim, and hereby awards damages to Branson in the amount of
$

(B)

O

. If the jury answered this question, then proceed to 8 (C).

If the jury answered Question No. 8 as "No," the jury has given judgment in
favor of Marvin and against Branson on Branson's breach of fiduciary duty
claim. Proceed to Question No. 9.
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(C) If the jury awarded Branson damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Marvin
should be held to pay Branson's attorney fees? Yes / \

No

. Proceed to next question.

BRANSON'S BREACH OF SALARY CONTINUATION AGREEMENT CLAIM
QUESTION NO. 9 : Does the jury find that Branson's retirement value was included in the
Property Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 147)?
Yes

fo

No

. Proceed to the next page.
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MARVIN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

QUESTION NO. 10 : Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Marvin
suffered damages as a result of Branson's breach?
Yes K

No

(A) If the jury answered Question No. 10 as "Yes," then proceed to Question No. 11.
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 10 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of
Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's breach of contract claim.
Proceed to Question No. 12.

QUESTION NO. 11 : What amount of damage does the jury find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Marvin suffered as a direct and proximate result of Branson's breach?
. This amount constitutes the amount of damages that the jury awards to
Marvin on Marvin's breach of contract claim.
Proceed to Question No. 12.

MARVIN'S ASSAULT/BATTERY CLAIM
QUESTION NO. 12 : Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Branson
committed an act of assault or battery against Marvin?

Yes X

No

(A) If the jury answered Question No. 12 as "Yes," then proceed to Question No. 13.
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 12 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of
Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's assault/battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 14.

QUESTION NO. 13 : What amount of damages does the jury find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Marvin suffered as a direct and proximate result of Branson's conduct?
$_/lj55

. This amount constitutes the amount of damages that the jury awards to Marvin on

Marvin's assault/battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 14
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MARVIN'S SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIM
QUESTION NO. 14: Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Branson slandered
title to Marvin's property?
Yes

No

n

(A) If the jury answered Question No. 14 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of Marvin
and against Branson on Marvin's slander of title claim, and hereby awards damages to Marvin in the
amount of $

. If the jury answered this question, then proceed to answer Question

No. 14(C).
(B) If thejury answered Question No. 14 as "No," the jury has given judgment in favor of Branson
and against Marvin on Marvin's slander of title claim. Proceed to Question No. 15.
(C) If the jury awarded Marvin damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Branson
should be held to pay Marvin's attorney fees? \yf

Yes

NoJlL

Proceed to question No. 15.
MARVIN'S BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CLAIM
QUESTION NO 15 : Does the jury find that Branson breached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing owed to Marvin?
Yes *n

No

(A)lf the jury answered Question No. 15 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of
Marvin and against Branson on Marvin's breach of duty of goodfaith and fair dealing claim,
and the jury awards damages to Marvin in the amount of $ _ _ ^ _ _ . Proceed to Question
No. 16.
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 15 as "No," the jury has given judgment in favor of
Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. Proceed
to Question No. 16.
MARVIN'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
QUESTION NO. 16 : Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Branson
breached his fiduciary duty to Marvin?

nHQlQ!!

Yes
(A)

/\

No

If the jury answered Question No. 16 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment
in favor of Marvin and against Branson on Marvin's breach of fiduciary duty
claim, and hereby awards damages to Marvin in the amount of
. If the jury answered this question, then proceed to 16(C).

(B)

If the jury answered Question No. 16 as "No," the jury has given judgment in
favor of Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Proceed to closing instruction.

(C) If the jury awarded Marvin damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Branson
should be held to pay Marvin's attorney fees? Yes

No

X^ . Proceed to closing instruction.

CLOSING INSTRUCTION
After answering the questions set forth above as instructed, the jury has completed this Special
Jury Verdict Form. The Jury Foreperson should then sign this document for return to the Court.

Disparaging: Questioning the right or title of another to a particular property
Pecuniary: Relating to money.
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